Articles scientifiques

The sociology of translation and accounting inscriptions: Reflections on Latour and Accounting Research


Critical Perspectives on Accounting

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Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Mots clés : LatourAccounting researchSociology of translation

This paper is a reflection upon the work of Latour and its influence upon accounting research, thirty years after the publication of Science in Action. After outlining the core features of the Sociology of Translation, we reflect upon the reasons we consider made the sociology of translation a productive methodology for understanding accounting practices. We place this analysis within the context of the development of an organizational and sociological understanding of accounting that was emerging during the 1980s. Three key themes in the accounting research that has drawn upon the sociology of translation are elaborated. We follow this with an extended account of the accounting literature that has mobilised Latour’s work. We conclude with several suggestions for where this work is still going and might go further, before a concluding summary

The whistleblower: an important person in corporatelife? An answer from comparative law


Journal of Business Law

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Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS), Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Who’s Watching? Accountability in Different Audit Regimes and the Effects on Auditors’ Professional Skepticism


Journal of Business Ethics

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Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, Management et Ressources Humaines, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Accountability, Auditors, Professional skepticism, Joint audit, Judgment, Experiment

The European Commission has suggested that the use of joint audits should lead to improved auditor skepticism and—by extension—audit quality, throughincreased accountability. However, archival research does not find support for improved audit quality in a joint audit setting. To better understand the relationship between accountability in different review regimes and auditors’judgments, we examine the behavioral effect of implementing a joint audit relative to other review regimes based on a 1 9 3 experimental design. Forty-seven senior auditors and partners from a Big Four firm performed a goingconcern evaluation task under one of three review regimes: the joint audit, the internal review, and the no review regime. Notwithstanding the difference in the audiences to which auditors are accountable, there is no difference in thejudgment process. In terms of their judgment outcome, however, auditors in the joint audit setting were the least skeptical in their judgment of the going concern assumption. Overall, we suggest that the joint audit may lead tounintended behavioral consequences

Why Are Auditors Blamed When Something Goes Wrong? Experimental Evidence'


International Journal of Auditing

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Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

An Experimental Investigation of the Interaction Effect of Management Training Ground and Reporting Lines on Internal Auditors’ Objectivity, International Journal of Auditing

F. HOOS, William F. MESSIER JR, Jason L. SMITH, Paulette R. TANDY

International Journal of Auditing

juillet 2018, vol. 22, n°2, pp.150-163

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Mots clés : Internal Audit Function, Internal Auditors, Management Training Ground, objectivity

Seventy‐nine experienced internal auditors participated in an experiment investigating two factors that may affect internal auditors’ objectivity: (1) whether the internal audit function is used as a management training ground, and (2) whether the internal auditors’ reporting line is to management or the audit committee. Participants completed a case wherein management and the audit committee hold conflicting preferences regarding a major corporate investment opportunity. Participants evaluated relevant business risks and made an overall recommendation concerning the investment. The results include three important findings. First, we observe an interaction effect between management training ground and reporting line. When the internalaudit function is not used as a management training ground, internal auditors’ risks assessments do not significantly differ by reporting line. However, when the internal audit function is used as a management training ground, internal auditors’ risk assessments align with management's preferences when auditors report to senior management versus the audit committee. Second, when the internal audit function is a management training ground, internal auditors provide more favorable investment recommendations (i.e., consistent with management's preferences). Third, internal auditors unexpectedly provided more favorable recommendations to the audit committee than to management