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Département Comptabilité Contrôle de Gestion

L’Investissement Socialement Responsable (ISR) en France reste peu développé pour les investisseurs particuliers, en dépit d’une croissance forte des fonds ISR et du lancement de labels à leur intention. L’objectif de cet article est de mieux comprendre le rôle limité des labels. Notre analyse s’appuie sur l’interaction entre trois éléments: label et asymétrie d’information, choix des attributs informationnels des labels et objectifs des organismes porteurs de labellisation, concurrence induite entre labels. Deux facteurs expliquent l’impact limité des labels. D’une part, les attributs informationnels mis en évidence par les labels reflètent plus le point de vue des sociétés de gestion que celui des investisseurs particuliers. D’autre part, la distribution de l’ISR auprès des particuliers passe majoritairement par les réseaux des banques et assurances, réseaux pour lesquels il ne constitue pas un véritable axe de différenciation concurrentielle.
The attractiveness of SRI (Socially Responsible Investment) for retail investors in France has remained limited in spite of the launch of labeling schemes and a substantial growth of SRI funds. The article analyzes why the labeling impact has been limited. Our framework is based on the interaction of three elements: labels and information asymmetry, the labeling organizations and the selection of information attributes, the induced competition between labels. Two main factors explain the limited impact of labels. First, the information attributes disclosed by the labels reflect the viewpoint of asset managers rather than the one of retail investors. Second, the distribution of SRI by banking and insurance networks is not a factor of competitive advantage.


Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

L’Investissement Socialement Responsable (ISR) en France reste peu développé pour les investisseurs particuliers, en dépit d’une croissance forte des fonds ISR et du lancement de labels à leur intention. L’objectif de cet article est de mieux comprendre le rôle limité des labels. Notre analyse s’appuie sur l’interaction entre trois éléments: label et asymétrie d’information, choix des attributs informationnels des labels et objectifs des organismes porteurs de labellisation, concurrence induite entre labels. Deux facteurs expliquent l’impact limité des labels. D’une part, les attributs informationnels mis en évidence par les labels reflètent plus le point de vue des sociétés de gestion que celui des investisseurs particuliers. D’autre part, la distribution de l’ISR auprès des particuliers passe majoritairement par les réseaux des banques et assurances, réseaux pour lesquels il ne constitue pas un véritable axe de différenciation concurrentielle.

Mots clés : Investissement Socialement Responsable (ISR), Investisseurs particuliers, Labels, Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), Retail Investors, Labels


Département Economie - Sciences de la Décision

We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In effect, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided one’s initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange.


Département Economie - Sciences de la Décision

We study a class of symmetric strategic experimentation games. Each of two players faces a (exponential) two-armed bandit problem, and must decide when to stop experimenting with the risky arm. The equilibrium amount of experimentation depends on the degree to which experimentation outcomes are observed, and on the correlation between the two individual bandit problems. When experimentation outcomes are public, the game is basically one of strategic complementarities. When experimentation decisions are public, but outcomes are private, the strategic interaction is more complex. We fully characterize the equilibrium behavior in both informational setups, leading to a clear comparison between the two. In particular, equilibrium payoffs are higher when equilibrium outcomes are public.


Département Economie - Sciences de la Décision

We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs depend, while the non-informed player only observes his opponent's actions. We show the existence of a limit value as the time span between two consecutive stages vanishes; this value is characterized through an auxiliary optimization problem and as the solution of an Hamilton-Jacobi equation.


Département Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm-specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more sophisticated “gaming” of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high-FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high-FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits.


Département Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise

How do we, as management researchers, develop novel theoretical contributions, and potentially break new ground, in management studies? To address this question, we review previous methodological work on theorizing and advance a typology of the reasoning processes that underlie theoretical contributions and significant advances in management studies. This typology consist of various types of analogical and counterfactual reasoning that range from focused thought experiments aimed at prodding existing theory in the direction of alternative assumptions, constructs and hypotheses to more expansive efforts around inducing new theoretical models and alternative explanations. With this typology we detail the mechanisms behind the formation of novel theoretical contributions and we illustrate the currency of our typology with a review of twenty-four major theoretical breakthroughs in management studies. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the implications of this typology for our collective efforts in building, elaborating and expanding theory in management studies.


Département Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise

To what extent do organizations respond favorably to minority participation, i.e. conform to demands from minority resource suppliers that hold an unconventional logic? A favorable response to minority participation (i.e. “alternative conformity”) contributes to decrease the influence of dominant players, alter the resource suppliers’ social structure, and promote new logics, which makes alternative conformity a soft control strategy for organizations. We expect a positive relationship between minority participation and alternative conformity and that relationship to be attenuated by organizations’ adherence to the dominant logic, centrality of minority logic holders, and minority logic’s institutional credit. We test and find strong support for our hypotheses using original data on investment funds in the French film industry (1994-2008).


Département Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise

We advocate for more tolerance in the manner we collectively address categories and categorization in our research. Drawing on the prototype view, organizational scholars have provided a ‘disciplining’ framework to explain how category membership shapes, impacts and limits organizational success. By stretching the existing straightjacket of scholarship on categories, we point to other useful conceptualizations of categories – i.e. the causal model and the goal-based approaches of categorization – and propose that depending on situational circumstances, and beyond a disciplining exercise, categories involve a cognitive test of congruence and a goal satisfying calculus. Unsettling the current consensus about categorical imperatives and market discipline, we suggest also that markets may tolerate more often than thought organizations that blend, span, and stretch categories. We derive implications for research about multi-category membership and mediation in markets, and suggest ways in which work on the theme of categories in the strategy, entrepreneurship, and managerial cognition literatures can be enriched.


Département Comptabilité Contrôle de Gestion

The position of an internal audit function as a “servant of two masters” (i.e. management and the audit committee) may lead to a conflict of priorities. In this setting, the tone at the top set by the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) plays a critical role in balancing the potentially competing preferences of management and the audit committee. We examine whether the emphasis in the CAE’s communication with internal auditors influences their judgments. We also test whether such influence is more pronounced in an internal audit task where potential for justification created through task complexity and ambiguity is high, as compared to low. We test two hypotheses in a mixed experimental design with the communicated preferences of the CAE to subordinates (cost reduction vs. effectiveness of internal controls) as a between-subjects factor, and levels of opportunity for justification (low, medium, high) manipulated within subjects. Findings suggest that the emphasis in the CAE’s message can bias internal auditors’ judgments, and such influence is more pronounced when the opportunity for justification is high, resulting in the elimination of a significantly greater number of internal controls and the design of less effective processes.


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