Séminaires de recherche

Convergent Creativity and Management Control Systems: Managing Stylistic Innovation in Fashion Companies

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Angelo Ditillo
Università Bocconi

19 décembre 2012 - HEC Campus, salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00

The empirical findings of this study indicate that management control systems are deeply embedded in the work environment of creative people and play a significant role in the creative teams directed at developing new products characterized by stylistic innovation. Yet, they do not address traditional goal divergence concerns but rather activate dialogues around meanings to define, negotiate, and legitimize the objectives that emerge during creation. This purpose is achieved through mechanisms that inspire (inspirational controls) these dialogues and mechanisms that configure (directional controls) the way they happen. Our research is based on a multi-case research design structured around an in-depth case study where the main traits of these systems are identified, followed up by five additional cases that reinforce, reshape, and enrich the findings. The study suggests that creativity and control do not have contradictory purposes and both are deeply integrated in organizations competing on creativity.

Director Independence and Insider Trading

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Indiana University

30 novembre 2012 - HEC Campus, salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00

While prior work establishes criteria for assessing director independence by scrutinizing outside directors’ professional and social connections, we examine the conditions under which outside directors’ trading and ratification decisions are incrementally useful in assessing their independence. Because crises test the independence of boards, we investigate the CEO replacement decision in firms caught intentionally misreporting earnings. We predict and find that outside directors’ selling that emulates selling by the CEO and inside directors makes them less willing to replace the CEO. Our findings derive from opportunistic rather than routine selling, and from collusive selling involving inside and outside board members rather than from selling by outside directors alone. We also predict and find that outside directors who ratify one or more value-destroying mergers in the misreporting period are less effective monitors. These results are robust to alternative measurements of opportunistic selling and to a comprehensive set of controls for the CEO replacement decision

Accounting Choices under IFRS and their Effect on Over-investment in Capital Expenditures

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Professor Mohamad MAZBOUDI
American University of Beyrut

23 novembre 2012 - Campus HEC, Salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00

IFRS allows firms to choose between fair-value accounting and historical cost accounting with impairment testing for property, plant and equipment (PPE). This study examines the effect of firms’ accounting choices for this group of non-financial assets on over-investment after IFRS mandatory adoption in the European Union (EU). My results indicate that over-investment in PPE (or capital expenditures) is lower following IFRS adoption among EU firms that used historical cost accounting with impairment testing in the post-IFRS period, consistent with EU firms having more timely loss recognition for PPE under IFRS strict impairment rules. In my analysis of United Kingdom (UK) firms, I find that most UK firms elected to use historical cost accounting with impairment testing for PPE after IFRS mandatory adoption. I also find that UK firms that previously used fair-value accounting under UK GAAP and then switched to historical cost accounting with impairment testing under IFRS exhibit greater reductions in over-investment relative to other EU firms that used historical cost accounting with impairment testing prior to IFRS adoption. Additional analysis suggests that the reductions in over-investment after IFRS mandatory adoption are greater as the severity of agency conflicts increases, consistent with outside shareholders demanding timely loss recognition as a means of addressing agency conflicts with managers.

Error management in audit firms: Error climate, type and originator

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Queen's Univerity, Canada

21 septembre 2012 - HEC campus, salle T027 - De 14h00 à 16h00

Audit standard setters and regulators are increasingly focusing on the management context within which the audit firm conducts the audit for its effects on audit quality. We examine a key, but little understood facet of organizational life in audit firms, how audit staff who discover and report errors in audit files are routinely treated in response to such reporting such errors. This construct, denoted as audit office error management climate, can be characterized on a continuum between a relatively “blame” oriented climate to a relatively more “open” climate. The former is one where errors are not tolerated and those reporting or committing errors are punished whereas the latter characterizes error commitment as a normal, albeit unfortunate aspect of organizational life, where the error discovery is used an opportunity for the organization to learn and without sanctions being imposed on the originator as long as similar errors are not repeated. We examine audit office error-management climate in the context of audit specific contextual factors that might affect the decision to report the discovered errors: audit error type (conceptual/mechanical) and who committed the error (the individual who discovered it or a peer). We find an overall main effect for office error-management climate however; error management climate interacts as predicted with these contextual factors (error type and originator). Specifically, an open error-management climate results in an increase in the reporting of mechanical errors and an increase in reporting of peer errors versus a blame climate. Our findings suggest that standard setters and regulators need to understand their standards and inspections can affect the nature of audit firm error management climates and how the differences in such climates can affect audit quality by encouraging or suppressing the reporting by staff of errors in working paper files. Further, audit firm management needs understand how what may appear to be innocuous differences in management style at the individual audit office can affect audit quality by considering how individual audit management practices at the local level can defeat formal policies that reflect a desire for an open error management climate at the firm.

Compensatory Consumption


Intervenant : Derek D. Rucker
Associate Professor, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Illinois

28 juin 2012 - HEC Paris Salle 301 - De 13:00 à 14:30