Séminaires de recherche

Earnings Targets and Annual Bonus Incentives

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Wim A. Van der Stede
London School of Economics and Political Science

25 janvier 2013 - HEC Campus, salle T015 - De 14h00 à 16h00


. We examine the extent to which firms use past performance as a basis for setting earnings targets in their bonus plans and assess the implications of such targets for managerial incentives. We find that high-profitability firms commonly reduce earnings targets when their managers fail to meet prior-year targets but rarely increase targets. Conversely, we find that low-profitability firms commonly increase earnings targets when their managers meet or exceed prior-year targets but rarely decrease targets. This target-revision process yields a serial correlation in target difficulty in that targets remain relatively easy (or difficult) through time. We also find that firms are reluctant to revise earnings targets below zero resulting in an unusually high frequency of zero earnings targets that are abnormally difficult to achieve. Collectively, our findings suggest that firms incorporate past performance information into targets yet they do so only to a limited extent. This is consistent with theoretical arguments that highlight the benefits of contractual commitments.

A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Kalle Kraus
Stockholm School of Economics

14 septembre 2018 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Shiva Sivaramakrishnan
Rice University

15 juin 2018 - HEC Paris - salle X120 - De 14h00 à 16h00


A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Xin Wang
Hong Kong University

8 juin 2018 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Hendrik Vollmer
University of Leicester

25 mai 2018 - HEC Paris - salle T020 - De 14h00 à 16h00


A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Martin Giraudeau
LSE/Sci. Po

4 mai 2018 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Crawford Spence
University of Warwick

20 avril 2018 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Shai Levi
Tel Aviv University

23 mars 2018 - HEC Paris - Salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Robert F. Göx
University of Zurich

16 mars 2018 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Giri Karagaretnam
Schulich School of Business

14 mars 2018 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Ilan Guttman
New York University

9 mars 2018 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


Real Externalities of Mandatory Disclosures: Evidence from the Oil and Gas Industry

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Bjorn Jorgensen
London School of Economics

26 janvier 2018 - HEC Paris - Salle T020 - De 14h00 à 16h00


This paper documents real externalities of firms’ mandatory disclosures. We focus our analysis on the regulatory disclosure of oil and gas (O&G) reserves, a setting in which mandatory information is particularly important to understand industry competition. Using a comprehensive sample of Canadian and US O&G producers, we hypothesize and find that larger increases in reserves are accompanied by lower stock returns and increases in investment for competing firms. These findings are consistent with O&G disclosures containing competition-sensitive information. To sharpen identification, we exploit three sources of institutional variation. First, the North-American pipeline infrastructure constrains the supply of natural gas, and thus competition in the gas market, but not the supply of oil. Second, the introduction of the fracking technology substantially altered the competition dynamics in the natural gas market. Third, mandatory O&G disclosure rules were modified in Canada and the US in a similar fashion, albeit at different points in time. Consistent with mandatory disclosure of O&G reserves imposing proprietary costs, we also find that, under the new rules, disclosing firms appear to be less able to exploit their competitive advantage. Overall, our evidence highlights important trade-offs in the market-wide effects of disclosure regulation.

Financialization and the institutional foundations of the new capitalism

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Bruce Carruthers
Northwestern University

20 octobre 2017 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


One of key features of capitalism as a form of economic organization concerns its ability to change. Innovation often occurs by using old things in new ways, or by taking pre-existing elements and rearranging them into novel configurations [termed ‘conversion’ by Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 26)]. Change can also happen when old activities are simply discontinued, or when new activities are added [what Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 16) call ‘layering’]. Capitalist innovation does not arise ex nihilo, nor does it involve wholesale rejection of the past. As even casual students of contemporary capitalism realize, much of today’s capitalism resembles the old-fashioned kind studied by nineteenth-century social theorists like Marx, Durkheim andWeber. Heavy industry still exists, tangible goods are still manufactured in factories using assembly line methods, commodities are sent around the world via rail or ship, people still make steel and dig coal and iron ore out of the ground, and so on. Nevertheless, a growing number of scholars have identified ‘financialization’ as a significant change: the growth in importance of financial markets and financial institutions, and the increasing involvement of economic actors in financial transactions (Krippner, 2011; Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013; Philippon and Reshef, 2013). Such transactions consist of traditional activities like lending (e.g. bank loans and bonds) and investment (e.g. equities), but also newer ones involving derivatives and securitization. What is the significance of this change, and what undergirds it?
The markets that organize capitalism are based on a set of underlying institutional preconditions. What do such foundations consist of? Since markets are venues for economic exchange, the first precondition concerns the objects of exchange. What do buyers buy from sellers, and how are these objects constituted? This is not a matter of physical reality since market exchange involves rights over things or services, not necessarily the things or services themselves. But by virtue of private property rights, tangible and intangible objects are commodified and ownership rights over them can be freely transferred from one owner to another.
Second, markets depend on information to suppose an interdependent role structure: buyers and sellers. Markets cannot function without actors willing to act in both of these roles. If everyone wants to sell and no-one wants to buy, then market exchange will not occur. The same is true with only buyers, but no sellers. As Akerlof (1970) showed, asymmetries of information can cause markets to unravel. In his analysis, sellers possessed information that they could not credibly convey to buyers, but the more general problem is that both buyers and sellers seek information about the objects they transact. Too much uncertainty will curtail market exchange. Third, markets depend on regulation that is sufficient to suppose binding agreements. Many bilateral transactions unfold over time, they are not completed ‘on the spot’. For example, one party might receive goods and pay for them later, or someone might pay for goods, and receive them later. In modern markets, contracts are the vehicle typically used to make an agreement formally binding.1 Finally, market economies contain the possibility of failure by firms, who then face bankruptcy. Firms that are unprofitable will eventually close down and cease their activities: their assets will be distributed to their creditors and employees lose their jobs. Corporate bankruptcy or insolvency law provides the means to identify and extinguish failing firms.
Financialization, as I discuss below, involves the modification and rearticulation of these preconditions. Krippner (2011) emphasized the political origins of financialization, but here I explore its institutional basis, an aspect she does not treat. I have listed these preconditions as analytically separable, but in historical fact they were usually linked together. For example, the development of corporate lawenabled fictive individuals to become both owners of property and objects of property rights, where financial instruments functioned as the unit of ownership. A corporation was owned (by shareholders), and their ownership interests could be freely exchanged, but the corporation itself could also own property (for instance, other corporations). With the passage of general laws of incorporation and their modification at the end of the nineteenth century, corporations could own, buy, sell and enter into binding agreements. They could also fail, although limited liability protected the personal wealth of shareholders. In addition, these preconditions are often shaped through public regulation. Regulations may set restrictions on market entry (i.e. on who may act as a buyer or seller in a particular market), set prices or quality standards, standardize the contracts that govern exchange, mandate the provision of certain types of information by market actors or set the terms of market exit. The dynamism of contemporary capitalism stems, in part, from the emergence of new ways to satisfy these preconditions. Through institutional change, capitalism was able to financialize within an overarching framework of private property, information, regulation and failure, maintaining its identity as a distinct economic system. This complex combination of change and continuity unfolded as small variations were amplified into large and often unintended transformations. The outcomes were variably intended.

Star Analyst Voting and Recommendation Bias

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Qiang Cheng
Singapore Management University

18 octobre 2017 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


Being voted as a star analyst increases an analyst’ compensation, reputation, and mobility. In this
paper, we examine financial analysts’ economic incentives arising from currying favor from
mutual funds in star analyst voting. Using the proprietary, detailed voting data from China, we
find that analysts issue more optimistically biased recommendations to the firms owned by the
voting funds. The extent of the recommendation bias increases with the relative weight of the
firm in the voting funds’ portfolios and the weight of the funds’ vote in the calculation of final
voting outcome, and decreases with the reputation of the brokerage houses that employ the
analysts. In addition, we find that the capital markets do not seem to recognize and discount
analysts’ recommendation bias arising from such voting connections. Collectively these findings
indicate that analysts issue biased recommendations to secure favourable votes from, or return
favour to mutual funds that vote for them.

“The quality of earnings and non-earnings information in stock returns, and their relative effect on the cost of equity”

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Eli Amir
Tel Aviv University

6 octobre 2017 - HEC Paris T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


While prior literature shows that the quality of earnings information explains the variation in firms’ cost of equity, earnings information, after all, represents only a small part of firm specific, value-relevant, information. In addition, whereas different firms report earnings according to similar rules, their information environment on non-disclosure days is more heterogeneous. Using daily stock returns, we estimate the quality of information during earnings and non-earnings announcement days, and find that although the quality of information increases during earnings announcements, it explains less of the variation in expected returns than the quality of information on non-earnings days. Our findings suggest that the quality of earnings has but only a small effect on the cost of equity relative to the quality of information released on non-earnings days.

Séminaire HEC/ESSEC - Localization of Global Accounting Practices: A comparative analysis of practice variation in response to institutional complexity

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Eksa Kilfoyle
University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada

20 juin 2017 - Champerret - Amphi 461 - De 14h00 à 16h00


We conduct a comparative analysis of the initial stages of implementation of global accounting and control practices in two member organizations of an international network. We analyze organizational responses to institutional pressures. We attend to nested institutional levels and show how institutional logics, enacted by executives in early stages of implementation, mediate variations in the localized accounting and control practices. Our study contributes to understanding how field level pressures shape practice variation beyond loose coupling and decoupling. We also highlight the importance of early stages of localization of accounting practices, given the path dependent nature of institutions. Executive team decisions and actions in response to field level pressures in the early stages of localization shape organizational responses to the introduction of global accounting practices. We find that localized accounting and control practices are institutional hybrids and we propose a process that explains the source of variations in these accounting hybrids.


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