Articles scientifiques

C’era una Volta Kiobel: I Giudici Americani Tornano a Pronunciarsi sull’Extraterritorialità dell’Alien Tort Statute [Once Upon a Time, It Was Kiobel: American Courts Come Back to the Extraterritorialità of the Alien Tort Statute]


Diritto del Commercio Internazionale

2015, vol. 29, n°3, pp.885-906

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

L’Alien Tort Statute, che conferisce alle corti federali giurisdizione in materiadi azioni di risarcimento dei danni promosse da stranieri per violazioni del dirittointernazionale, non può essere applicato extraterritorialmente neppure ove lasocietà convenuta abbia la propria sede negli Stati Uniti e la condotta contestatasi sia qui realizzata, in quanto tali circostanze non sono suf¿cienti per superare la presunzione di non-extraterritorialità che grava su ogni legge del Congresso

Effects of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in Research and Innovation: Indirect Legislation in EU Policy-Making?


Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law

2015, vol. 47, n°1, pp.22-38

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : legal philosophy, European union, Jeremy Bentham, indirect legislation, pragmatic approach, research and innovation

This study offers new insights on the open method of coordination (OMC) of the European Union (EU) by focusing on the effects of this new method for producing EU regulation. The starting points here are that the OMC is not a radically new method of governance, and that it must be seen as an application of the theory of indirect legislation – as developed by Bentham. With the concept of indirect legislation, Bentham thinks a system of governing individuals that does not rest only on the fear of legal punishment, but is backed by the prospect of rewards and the fear of public censure. For the purpose of the comparison between the OMC and indirect legislation, the latter is considered as a system of social control, which – whether it be categorised as legal or not – is first and foremost normative and has effects, i.e. is applied, followed and enforced in a given community without resorting to the binding force of the law. Thanks to the input of indirect legislation, this study aims to understand what have been the real effects of the OMC and more particularly of the OMC applied to the research and innovation policy in Belgium

Global Shipping Alliances: What Prospects After the Rejection of the P3 Project by China's Competition Authority


The Journal of International Maritime Law

2015, vol. 21, n°3, pp.203-215

Départements : Droit et fiscalité

How Much Better is Better Regulation?


European Journal of Risk Regulation

2015, vol. 3

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

How Much Better Is Better Regulation? Assessing the Impact of the Better Regulation Package on the European Union – A Research Agenda


European Journal of Risk Regulation

2015, vol. 6, n°3, pp.344-356

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Emboldened by the Spitzenkandidaten process, the new European Commission emerges as the most political yet. The Commission asks EU citizens to judge its operation by its ability ‘to deliver solutions to the big issues that cannot be addressed by the Member States alone’. The Better Regulation Package translates this political commitment into an actionable approach assuring EU citizens that the Commission will remain ‘big on big things, small on small things’. To deliver on this promise, the Commission extends the Impact Assessment system, renews its consultation procedures and adds a few institutional mechanisms so as to enhance its ‘ability to deliver’ throughout the policy cycle. But in order to do so the Commission needs to bind – and somehow control – the European Parliament and the Council, on the one hand, and the Member States, on the other, in relation to their commitment to openness, participation and evidence-based policymaking. While legitimate, this attempt raises serious doubts about the compatibility of this reform with the principle of separation of powers and, in particular, that of institutional balance. A closer look at the Better Regulation Package reveals an entirely new understanding of the Commission’s own prerogatives and the way it intends to exercise its legislative and regulatory powers. And this in spite of the apparent continuity between the new and old Better Regulation initiatives and the instruments it had chosen to attain the declared objectives. With a view to lay out a future research agenda on EU Better Regulation, this article identifies the most immediate questions raised by the publication of the Package and makes a first timid attempt at addressing some of them. It aims at determining how much better, if any, is the new Better Regulation Package. It does so by discussing, first, the major novelties enacted by the Commission within its own Better Regulation system and, second, those proposed in the framework of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Regulation