Articles scientifiques

Ambiguity and the Bayesian Approach


Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

An analytic calculus for the intuitionistic logic of proofs


Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Confidence in belief and rational decision making


Economics and Philosophy

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Confidence, Decision Under Uncertainty, Belief, Rationality

The standard, Bayesian account of rational belief and decision is often argued to be unable to cope properly with severe uncertainty, of the sort ubiquitous in some areas of policy making. This paper tackles the question of what should replace it as a guide for rational decision making. It defends a recent proposal, which reserves a role for the decision maker’s confidence in beliefs. Beyond being able to cope with severe uncertainty, the account has strong normative credentials on the main fronts typically evoked as relevant for rational belief and decision. It fares particularly well, we argue, in comparison to other prominent non-Bayesian models in the literature

Explore first, exploite next: the true shape of regret in bandit problems


Mathematics of Operations Research

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision

We revisit lower bounds on the regret in the case of multi-armed bandit problems. We obtain non-asymptotic, distribution-dependent bounds and provide straightforward proofs based only on well-known properties of Kullback-Leibler divergences. These bounds show in particular that in an initial phase the regret grows almost linearly, and that the well-known logarithmic growth of the regret only holds in a final phase. The proof techniques come to the essence of the information-theoretic arguments used and they are deprived of all unnecessary complications

Perception‐Theoretic Foundations of Weighted Utilitarianism


Economic Journal

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

We provide a microfoundation for a weighted utilitarian social welfare function that reflects common moral intuitions about interpersonal comparisons of utilities. If utility is only ordinal in the usual microeconomic sense, interpersonal comparisons are meaningless. Nonetheless, economics often adopts utilitarian welfare functions, assuming that comparable utility functions can be calibrated using information beyond consumer choice data. We show that consumer choice data alone are sufficient. As suggested by Edgeworth (1881), just noticeable differences provide a common unit of measure for interpersonal comparisons of utility differences. We prove that a simple monotonicity axiom implies a weighted utilitarian aggregation of preferences, with weights proportional to individual jnd's. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved