Articles scientifiques

(Interstate) banking and (interstate) trade: Does real integration follow financial integration?

T. K. MICHALSKI, E. ÖRS

Journal of Financial Economics

avril 2012, vol. 104, n°1, pp.89-117

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS), Finance

Mots clés : Trade; Banking deregulation; Finance'growth nexus


We examine whether financial sector integration leads to real sector integration through trade. Our conjecture is that financial sector integration between two regions leads to higher trade flows between them. In our stylized model, this happens because banks with presence in the two regions are better able to assess risks and charge the appropriate premiums for trade-related projects pertinent for the two markets; whereas the same banks charge higher average interest rates for projects that involve trade to other markets from which they are absent. We use the deregulation of the inter-state banking in the U.S. as a natural experiment to test the implication of our theory model with the state-level Commodity Flow Survey data. Our empirical evidence, based on difference-in-difference and GMM2S-IV estimates, indicates that there is a trade channel associated with the finance-growth nexus: the trade share of state-pairs that have opened their banking market to each other's financial institutions increases by 9.2% relative to the trade shares of state-pairs that did not. Looking at actual entry data, we estimate that bank entry within a trading pair increases trade in this pair by 54% relative to those that do not have such a bank link. This is probably the lower bound estimate for international trade barriers stemming from the lack of a unified banking system.

Assesing the role of context in traffic light violations

E. KEMEL, L. CARNIS

Economics Bulletin

décembre 2012, vol. 32, n°4, pp.3386-3396

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2012/Volume32/EB-12-V32-I4-P326.pdf


Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Y. Heller, E. Solan, T. TOMALA

Games and Economic Behavior

janvier 2012, vol. 74, n°1, pp.222-234

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Cheap-talk, Communication equilibrium, Normal-form correlated equilibrium, Distributed computation

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691817


This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games

Confidence in preferences

B. HILL

Social Choice and Welfare

juillet 2012, vol. 39, n°2/3, pp.273-302

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Indeterminate preferences have long been a tricky subject for choice theory.One reason for which preferences may be less than fully determinate is the lackof confidence in one's preferences. In this paper, a representation of confidence inpreferences is proposed. It is used to develop an account of the role which confidencewhich rests on the following intuition: the more important the decision to betaken, the more confidence is required in the preferences needed to take it. An axiomatisationof this choice rule is proposed. This theory provides a natural accountof when an agent should defer a decision; namely, when the importance of the decisionexceeds his confidence in the relevant preferences. Possible applications ofthe notion of confidence in preferences to social choice are briefly explored.Keywords : Incomplete preference; Revealed preference; Confidence in preferences;Deferral of decisions; Importance of decisions; Social choice

Defending the Ramsey Test: What is wrong with Preservation?

B. HILL

Mind

janvier 2012, vol. 121, n°481, pp.131-146

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : CONDITIONALS; REVISIONS


In `A Defence of the Ramsey Test', Richard Bradley makes a case for not concluding from the famous impossibility results regarding the Ramsey Test ' the thesis that a rational agent believes a conditional if he would believe the consequent upon learning the anteceden ' that the thesis is false. He lays the blame instead on one of the other premisses in these results, namely the Preservation condition. In this paper, we explore how this condition can be weakened by strengthening the notion of consistency which appears in it. After considering the ffects of such weakenings for Bradley's argument, we propose a refinement of the Preservation condition which does not fall prey to Bradley's argument nor to Gärdenfors's impossibility theorem. We briefly compare it to Bradley's suggested restriction of Preservation

Contacts  

Département Economie et Sciences de la Décision

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Faculté  

Raphaël LEVY

Economie - Sciences de la Décision (GREGHEC)

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