Articles scientifiques

(Interstate) banking and (interstate) trade: Does real integration follow financial integration?

T. K. MICHALSKI, E. ÖRS

Journal of Financial Economics

avril 2012, vol. 104, n°1, pp.89-117

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS), Finance

Mots clés : Trade, Banking deregulation, Finance growth nexus


We examine whether financial sector integration leads to real sector integration through trade. Our conjecture is that financial sector integration between two regions leads to higher trade flows between them. In our stylized model, this happens because banks with presence in the two regions are better able to assess risks and charge the appropriate premiums for trade-related projects pertinent for the two markets; whereas the same banks charge higher average interest rates for projects that involve trade to other markets from which they are absent. We use the deregulation of the inter-state banking in the U.S. as a natural experiment to test the implication of our theory model with the state-level Commodity Flow Survey data. Our empirical evidence, based on difference-in-difference and GMM2S-IV estimates, indicates that there is a trade channel associated with the finance-growth nexus: the trade share of state-pairs that have opened their banking market to each other's financial institutions increases by 9.2% relative to the trade shares of state-pairs that did not. Looking at actual entry data, we estimate that bank entry within a trading pair increases trade in this pair by 54% relative to those that do not have such a bank link. This is probably the lower bound estimate for international trade barriers stemming from the lack of a unified banking system.

Assesing the role of context in traffic light violations

E. KEMEL, L. CARNIS

Economics Bulletin

décembre 2012, vol. 32, n°4, pp.3386-3396

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2012/Volume32/EB-12-V32-I4-P326.pdf


Bound and Collapse Bayesian Reject Inference for Credit Scoring

G. Chen, T. B. ASTEBRO

Journal of the Operational Research Society

octobre 2012, vol. 63, n°10, pp.1374-1387

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Statistics, Credit scoring, Bayesian, Reject inference, Missing data

http://ssrn.com/abstract=579001


Reject inference is a method for inferring how a rejected credit applicant would have behaved had credit been granted. Credit-quality data on rejected applicants are usually missing not at random (MNAR). In order to infer credit-quality data MNAR, we propose a flexible method to generate the probability of missingness within a model-based bound and collapse Bayesian technique. We tested the method's performance relative to traditional reject-inference methods using real data. Results show that our method improves the classification power of credit scoring models under MNAR conditions.

Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Y. Heller, E. Solan, T. TOMALA

Games and Economic Behavior

janvier 2012, vol. 74, n°1, pp.222-234

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Cheap-talk, Communication equilibrium, Normal-form correlated equilibrium, Distributed computation

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691817


This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games

Confidence in preferences

B. HILL

Social Choice and Welfare

juillet 2012, vol. 39, n°2/3, pp.273-302

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2460508


Indeterminate preferences have long been a tricky subject for choice theory.One reason for which preferences may be less than fully determinate is the lackof confidence in one's preferences. In this paper, a representation of confidence inpreferences is proposed. It is used to develop an account of the role which confidencewhich rests on the following intuition: the more important the decision to betaken, the more confidence is required in the preferences needed to take it. An axiomatisationof this choice rule is proposed. This theory provides a natural accountof when an agent should defer a decision; namely, when the importance of the decisionexceeds his confidence in the relevant preferences. Possible applications ofthe notion of confidence in preferences to social choice are briefly explored.Keywords : Incomplete preference; Revealed preference; Confidence in preferences;Deferral of decisions; Importance of decisions; Social choice


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