Articles scientifiques

A theorem on aggregating classifications

F. MANIQUET, P. MONGIN

Mathematical Social Sciences

janvier 2016, vol. 79, pp.6-10

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Aggregation of classifications, Group identification problem, Task assignment problem, Nonbinary evaluations

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2686037


Suppose that a group of individuals must classify objects into three or more categories, and does so by aggregating the individual classifications. We show that if the classifications, both individual and collective, are required to put at least one object in each category, then no aggregation rule can satisfy a unanimity and an independence condition without being dictatorial. This impossibility theorem extends a result that Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) proved for two categories and complements another that Dokow and Holzman (2010) obtained for three or more categories under the condition that classifications put at most one object in each category. The paper discusses an interpretation of its result both in terms of Kasher and Rubinstein’s group identification problem and in terms of Dokow and Holzman’s task assignment problem.

Choice-based cardinal utility: a tribute to Patrick Suppes

J. BACCELLI, P. MONGIN

Journal of Economic Methodology

2016, vol. 23, n°3, pp.268-288

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : ordinal utility, cardinal utility, preference differences, representation theorems, Suppes, ordinalism, cardinalism

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1350178X.2016.1189112


We reexamine some of the classic problems connected with the use of cardinal utility functions in decision theory, and discuss Patrick Suppes’ contributions to this field in light of a reinterpretation we propose for these problems. We analytically decompose the doctrine of ordinalism, which only accepts ordinal utility functions, and distinguish between several doctrines of cardinalism, depending on what components of ordinalism they specifically reject. We identify Suppes’ doctrine with the major deviation from ordinalism that conceives of utility functions as representing preference differences, while being nonetheless empirically related to choices. We highlight the originality, promises and limits of this choice-based cardinalism.

Comparing attitudes toward time and toward money in experience-based decisions

E. KEMEL, M. TRAVERS

Theory and Decision

janvier 2016, vol. 80, n°1, pp.71-100

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Experience-based decisions, Time, Real incentives, Mixed modeling, Errors, Probability weighting

http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/832/art%253A10.1007%252Fs11238-015-9490-3.pdf?originUrl=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1007%2Fs11238-015-9490-3&token2=exp=1449744476~acl=%2Fstatic%2Fpdf%2F832%2Fart%25253A10.1007%25252Fs11238-015-949


This paper reports an experimental comparison of attitudes toward time and toward money in experience-based decisions. Preferences were elicited under rank-dependent utility for prospects with two or three consequences expressed either in time or in monetary units. Probabilities were unknown but learned through sampling. More specifically, time and money were compared under two conditions. In a first experiment, both consequences and probabilities of prospects were unknown and learned through sequential sampling. In a second experiment, the possible consequences were revealed after the sampling. A real incentive system was implemented for both time and money. The heterogeneity of preferences was assessed for time and for money through individual and mixed modeling estimations. We observe that the nature of consequences (time or money) modifies probability weighting in terms of elevation and sensitivity. Subjects exhibit more optimism and less sensitivity to probability changes when deciding about time than about money. Revealing the consequences impacts the shape of the utility function and leaves probability weighting unchanged. We also observe that the real incentives have no effect except for the reduction in decision errors. This effect is stronger for money than for time

Decision biases and entrepreneurial finance

Gordon ADOMDZA, T. ASTEBRO, Kevyn YONG

Small Business Economics

décembre 2016, vol. 47, n°4, pp.819–834

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Entrepreneurship, Decision biases, Cognitive biases, Entrepreneurial finance, Informal finance, Fundraising, Social ties, Venture performance

http://rdcu.be/pi47


We study the effects of three cognitive biases by the entrepreneur on obtaining funding. We find planning fallacy to increase funding amounts, whereas optimism and overconfidence by the entrepreneur have no effects on funding amounts from others. Further, planning fallacy positively impacts the probability of strong-tie (inside) investments but negatively impacts the probability of weak-tie (outside) investments. Mediation analyses further show that planning fallacy positively impacts venture performance through both self and other investor funding amounts. Our findings are not consistent with the pecking order theory of informal finance and suggest positive effects of at least one cognitive bias on entrepreneurial business success through increased funding

Incomplete preferences and confidence

B. HILL

Journal of Mathematical Economics

aout 2016, vol. 65, pp.83–103

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Incomplete preferences, Confidence, Multiple priors, Choice under incomplete preferences, Absence of trade

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2460508


A theory of incomplete preferences under uncertainty is proposed, according to which a decision maker’s preferences are indeterminate if and only if her confidence in the relevant beliefs does not match up to the stakes involved in the decision. We use the representation of confidence in beliefs introduced in Hill (2013), and axiomatise a class of models, differing from each other in the appropriate notion of stakes. The theory naturally suggests two distinct strategies for completing preferences, and hence for choosing in the presence of incompleteness: one that relies only on beliefs in which the decision maker is sufficiently confident, and one that mobilises all beliefs, no matter how little confidence she may have in them. Axiomatic characterisations are given for completion procedures following each of the strategies. Finally, in a market setting, the incorporation of confidence is shown to add an extra friction, beyond the standard implications of non-expected utility models for Pareto optima

Contacts  

Département Economie et Sciences de la Décision

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Faculté  

Ai Ting GOH

Economie - Sciences de la Décision

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