Articles scientifiques

Characterizations of Smooth Ambiguity Based on Continuous and Discrete Data


Mathematics of Operations Research

février 2017, vol. 42, n°1, pp.167-178

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision

Mots clés : smooth ambiguity; variational preferences; revealed preference; completely monotone functions; Afriat inequalities; moment problem

In the Anscombe-Aumann setup, we provide conditions for a collection of observations to be consistent with a well-known class of smooth ambiguity preferences (Klibanoff P, Marinacci M, Mukerji S (2005) A smooth model of decision making under ambiguity. Econometrica 73(6):1849–1892.). Each observation is assumed to take the form of an equivalence between an uncertain act and a certain outcome. We provide three results that describe these conditions for data sets of different cardinality. Our findings uncover surprising links between the smooth ambiguity model and classic mathematical results in complex and functional analysis.

Climate Change Assessments: Confidence, Probability, and Decision

Richard Bradley, Casey Helgeson, B. HILL

Philosophy of Science

juillet 2017, vol. 84, n°3, pp.500-522

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has developed a novel framework for assessing and communicating uncertainty in the findings published in its periodic assessment reports. But how should these uncertainty assessments inform decisions? We take a formal decision-making perspective to investigate how scientific input formulated in the IPCC’s novel framework might inform decisions in a principled way through a normative decision model

Gross, net, and new job creation by entrepreneurs


Journal of Business Venturing Insights

novembre 2017, vol. 8, pp.64-70

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : EntrepreneurshipJob creationIncorporationOccupational choiceSelf-employmentSole proprietorship

Using a dataset with over 24 million year-employment observations and the universe of more than 230,000 entries into entrepreneurship in one economy we analyze the gross (including the founders), net (excluding the founders), and new (jobs to the former unemployed or those outside the labor force) job creation by entrepreneurs two and six years after start-up. These novel measures of job creation show that the average entrepreneur does not create any jobs for any other than him/her-self, and typically arrives from having another job. Thus, short term job creation by entrepreneurs involves a reshuffling of jobs from older to new firms rather than creating new jobs

More haste less speed? Signaling through investment timing


American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

aout 2017, vol. 9, n°3, pp.148-186

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : JEL D21, D82, D83, D92, G31, G32)

We consider a cash-constrained firm learning on the value of an irreversible project at a privately-known speed. Under perfect information, the optimal date of investment may be non-monotonic in the learning speed: better learning increases the value of experimenting further, but also the speed of updating. Under asymmetric information, the firm uses its investment timing to signal confidence in the project and raise cheaper capital from uninformed investors, which may generate timing distortions: investment is hurried when learning is sufficiently fast, and delayed otherwise. The severity of the cash constraint affects the magnitude of the distortion, but not its direction

Optimal Dynamic Information Provision


Games and Economic Behavior

juillet 2017, vol. 104, pp.329-349

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Dynamic information provision, Optimal strategy, Greedy algorithm, Commitment

We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An advisor with commitment power decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker, so as to influence his short-term decisions. We deal with a stylized class of situations, in which the decision maker has a risky action and a safe action, and the payoff to the advisor only depends on the action chosen by the decision maker. The greedy disclosure policy is the policy which, at each stage, minimizes the amount of information being disclosed in that stage, under the constraint that it maximizes the current payoff of the advisor. We prove that the greedy policy is optimal in many cases – but not always