Séminaires

Building ( and Milking) Trust : Reputation as a Moral Hazard Phenomenon

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : DILME Francesc
University of Pennsylvania

14 février 2013 - HEC PARIS, Building T, Room 012 - De 11h00 à 12h00


We analyze the role of firms' switching costs in reputation building ( and milking) in markets for experience goods ( meals, vacation packages, services, etc.). Even though quality choices are unconstrained, firms optimally delay switching quality due to the presence of switching costs in the organization of production. In contrast to much of the previous literature, reputation arises as a moral hazard phenomenon instead of an adverse selection problem. The model generates rich reputation dynamics and comparative statics. In equilibrium, reputation building may be non-existent, it may exhibit one building-milking cycle, or it may cycle forever, with an ergordic distribution of quality. Switching decisions take place only when reputation es extreme ( very high or very low), and there is inaction in the mid range. The model is extended to analyze random capital depreciation with asymmetric information.

titre : TBA

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Harry Di Pei
Northwestern

12 février 2019


titre : TBA

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : François Geerolf
UCLA

18 décembre 2018


titre : TBA

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Marko Tervio
Aalto

13 décembre 2018


Titre : TBA

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Olivier Deschenes
UCSB

29 novembre 2018


titre : TBA

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Emmanuele Tarantino
Mannheim University

27 novembre 2018



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