Séminaires

REPEATED GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND DISCOUNTING

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Marcin PESKI
University of Toronto

16 avril 2013 - HEC PARIS : Room T201 - De 10h45 à 11h45

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We analyse discounted repeated games with incomplete information, and such that the players' payoffs depend only on their own type ( known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm for finding all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Horner and Lovo (2009).
This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and important class of games with multi-sided incomplete information. When players become sufficiently patient, all Nash equilibrium payoffs can be approximated by payoffs in sequential equilibria in which information is revealed finitely many times. The set of equilibrium payoffs is typically larger than the set of equilibrium payoffs is repeated games without discounting, and larger than the set of payoffs obtained in belief-free equilibria. The results are illustrated in bargaining and oligopoly examples.

titre : TBA

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Harry Di Pei
Northwestern

12 février 2019


titre : TBA

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : François Geerolf
UCLA

18 décembre 2018


“Welfare Effects of Housing Transaction Taxes: A Quantitative Analysis with an Assignment Model” (joint work with Niku Määttänen)

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Marko Tervio
Aalto

13 décembre 2018 - Bâtiment T - Salle T004 - De 14h00 à 15h15


We evaluate the welfare cost of housing transaction taxes with a new assignment model based framework, where welfare effects are driven by distortions in the matching of houses and households. We calibrate the model with data from the Helsinki metropolitan region to assess the impact of a reform where we replace an ad valorem transaction tax with a revenue equivalent property tax. The aggregate welfare gain from this reform increases rapidly with the initial transaction tax rate, with the Laffer curve peaking at about 10\%. The proportion of households that lose out from the reform is nevertheless increasing in the tax rate. We compare our model-based counterfactual aggregate welfare results with welfare calculations based on reduced-form estimates from previous policy evaluation studies; they are broadly in line, despite the latter using data from different housing markets at various levels and changes of the tax rate.

Weather and Death in India: Implications for Climate Change

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Olivier Deschenes
UCSB

29 novembre 2018 - Bâtiment T salle T004 - De 14h00 à 15h15


The industrial revolution in developing countries represents an unfinished process. Urban centers, dominated by manufacturing and services, sit alongside rural hinterlands dominated by subsistence agriculture. This paper uses a 1957-2000 district-level panel data set to test whether hot weather shocks have unequal effects on mortality in rural and urban populations in India. This depends on the degree to which incomes are affected by weather shocks and the extent to which individuals can smooth their survival across these shocks. We find that a one standard deviation increase in high temperature days in a year decreases agricultural yields and real wages by 12.6 % and 9.8 %, respectively, and increases annual mortality among rural populations by 7.3 %. By contrast, in urban areas, there is virtually no evidence of an effect on incomes and a substantially smaller increase in the mortality rate (of about 2.8% for a one standard deviation increase in high temperature days). Importantly, we find that greater availability of credit mitigates the mortality effects of high temperatures in rural areas, presumably by facilitating consumption smoothing. Finally, with all else held constant, the estimates imply that global warming will lead to meaningful reductions in life expectancy in rural India by the 2015-2029 period and quite large declines by the end of the century.

Learning When to Quit: An Empirical Model of Experimentation in Standards Development

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Emanuele Tarantino
Mannheim University

27 novembre 2018 - Bâtiment T salle T015 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Motivated by a descriptive analysis of standards development within the Internet Engineering Task Force, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model of R&D that highlights the decision to continue or abandon a line of research. Our estimates imply that sixty percent of IETF proposals are publishable, but only one-third of those good ideas survive the review process. Increased attention and author experience are associated with faster learning. We simulate two counterfactual innovation policies: an R&D subsidy and a publication-prize. Subsidies have a larger impact on research output, though prizes perform better when accounting for researchers' opportunity costs.


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