Séminaires

REPEATED GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND DISCOUTING

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Marcin PESKI
University of Toronto

16 avril 2013 - HEC PARIS Room T201 - De 10h45 à 11h45

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We analyse discounted repeated games with incomplete information, and such that the players' payoffs depend only on their own type ( known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm for finding all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Horner and Lovo (2009).
This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and important class of games with multi-sided incomplete information. When players become sufficiently patient, all Nash equilibrium payoffs can be approximated by payoffs in sequential equilibria in which information is revealed finitely many times. The set of equilibrium payoffs is typically larger than the set of equilibrium payoffs is repeated games without discounting, and larger than the set of payoffs obtained in belief-free equilibria. The results are illustrated in bargaining and oligopoly examples.

titre : TBA

Economie et Sciences de la décision

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Northwestern

12 février 2019


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UCLA

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Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Marko Tervio
Aalto

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UCSB

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27 novembre 2018



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