Articles scientifiques

Are Novice Private Equity Funds Risk-Takers? Evidence From a Comparison with Established Funds

P. GIOT, U. HEGE, A. SCHWIENBACHER

Journal of Corporate Finance

août 2014, vol. 27, pp.55-71

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : private equity funds; venture capital; buyouts; learning; reputation; risk-taking


This paper explores whether private equity firms that are new to the industry take excessive risks relative to funds from established firms. We use differences between the implicit incentives of managers of experienced and of novice funds as an identification strategy. We find that novice funds invest more slowly than experienced funds, contradicting the risk-taking hypothesis. However, the size of their investments, in value and as fraction of fund size, is larger; this could be consistent with risk-shifting by novice funds but also with alternative hypotheses. We find that the size difference increases over time and is absent from buyout investments. We also find that novice funds tend to underperform most dramatically for early large investments, and that the size of their investments increases after a first successful exit. These and other findings are in conflict with the excessive risk-taking hypothesis, but largely consistent with alternative explanations that emphasize differences in expertise

Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games

R. CALCAGNO, Y. KAMADA, S. LOVO, T. SUGAYA

Theoretical Economics

mai 2014, vol. 9, n°2, pp.409-434

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Revision games, pre-opening, ?nite horizon, equilibrium selection, asynchronous moves;


We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players repare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the ?nally-revised action is taken at the deadline. In 2-player “common interest” games, where there exists a best action pro?le for all players, this best action pro?le is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In “opposing interest” games, which are 2 × 2 games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game is generically unique and corresponds to one of the stage-game strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payo? structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for each of the players.

CEO Optimism and Incentive Compensation

C. OTTO

Journal of Financial Economics

novembre 2014, vol. 114, n°2, pp.366-404

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : CEO optimism, Incentive compensation, Compensation contract

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1484683


I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts

Epistemological foundations for the assessment of risks in banking and finance

G. VUILLEMEY

Journal of Economic Methodology

2014, vol. 21, n°2, pp.125-138

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : financial crises, causal process, forecasting, research program, risk


Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental Market

B. BIAIS, C. BISIERE, S. POUGET

Management Science

mars 2014, vol. 60, n°3, pp.753-769

Départements : Finance

Mots clés : cheap talk; experimental markets; equilibrium discovery; preopening period; preplay communication

http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1787


We experimentally analyze how to design preopening mechanisms facilitating coordination on high equilibrium liquidity and gains from trade. We allow a call auction to be preceded by a preopening or not, preopening orders to be binding or not, and the opening time to be deterministic or random. When the preopening is nonbinding, traders place manipulative orders, reducing the credibility of preplay communication. Random market opening deters manipulation, but also hinders communication by making it costly. Gains from trade are maximized when preopening orders are binding. This enables some traders to place early limit orders, attracting further liquidity


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