Articles scientifiques

Marking to Market and Inefficient Investment Decisions

C. OTTO, P. F. VOLPIN

Management Science

A paraître

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Marking to Market, Investment Decisions, Reputation, Agency Problem


We examine how mark-to-market accounting affects the investment decisions of managers with reputation concerns. Reporting the current market value of a firm's assets can help mitigate agency problems because it provides outsiders (e.g., shareholders) with new information against which the management's decisions can be evaluated. However, the fact that the assets' market value is informative can also have a negative side effect: Managers may shy away from investments that indicate conflicting private information and would damage their reputation. This effect can lead to inefficient investment decisions and make marking to market less desirable when market prices are more informative

Strategic Default, Debt Structure, and Stock Returns

P. VALTA

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

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Départements : Finance

Mots clés : Debt Structure, Debt Renegotiation, Stock Returns

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1101534


This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the debt structure and the strategic interaction between shareholders and debt holders in the event of default affect expected stock returns. The model predicts that expected stock returns are higher for firms that face high debt renegotiation difficulties and that have a large fraction of secured or convertible debt. Using a large sample of publicly traded US firms between 1985 and 2012, the paper presents new evidence on the link between debt structure and stock returns that is supportive of the model's predictions

Strategic Selection of Risk Models and Bank Capital Regulation

J. E. COLLIARD

Management Science

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage

D. GROMB, D. VAYANOS

The Journal of Finance

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Arbitrage, financial constraints, market segmentation, liquidity, contagion


We develop a model in which financially constrained arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies across segmented markets. We show that the dynamics of arbitrage capital are self-correcting: following a shock that depletes capital, returns increase, and this allows capital to be gradually replenished. Spreads increase more for trades with volatile fundamentals or more time to convergence. Arbitrageurs cut their positions more in those trades, except when volatility concerns the hedgeable component. Financial constraints yield a positive cross-sectional relationship between spreads/returns and betas with respect to arbitrage capital. Diversification of arbitrageurs across markets induces contagion, but generally lowers arbitrageurs’ risk and price volatility

The effects of investment bank rankings: Evidence from M&A league tables

F. DERRIEN, O. DESSAINT

Review of Finance

A paraître

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)



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