Séminaires de recherche

Fleeting Orders

Finance

Intervenant : Shmuel Baruch
The University of Utah

30 avril 2015


We study a dynamic limit order market with a finite number of strategic liquidity suppliers who post limit orders. Their limit orders are hit by either news (i.e. informed) traders or noise traders. We show that repeatedly playing a mixed strategy equilibrium of a certain static game is a subgame perfect equilibrium with fleeting orders and flickering quotes. Furthermore, regardless of the distributions of the liquidation value and noise trade quantity, we always find a sequence of equilibria in mixed strategies such that the resulting random supply schedule converges in mean square, as the number of liquidity suppliers increases to infinity, to the deterministic competitive supply function.

Finance

Intervenant : Matthieu Bouvard
Desautels Faculty of Management

14 juin 2018 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Mikhail Simutin
Rotman School of Management

7 juin 2018 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Liyan Yang
Rotman School of Management

31 mai 2018 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Anton Lines
Columbia Business School

24 mai 2018 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Ian Martin
LSE

17 mai 2018 - De 14h00 à 15h15



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