Séminaires de recherche

Fleeting Orders

Finance

Intervenant : Shmuel Baruch
The University of Utah

30 avril 2015


We study a dynamic limit order market with a finite number of strategic liquidity suppliers who post limit orders. Their limit orders are hit by either news (i.e. informed) traders or noise traders. We show that repeatedly playing a mixed strategy equilibrium of a certain static game is a subgame perfect equilibrium with fleeting orders and flickering quotes. Furthermore, regardless of the distributions of the liquidation value and noise trade quantity, we always find a sequence of equilibria in mixed strategies such that the resulting random supply schedule converges in mean square, as the number of liquidity suppliers increases to infinity, to the deterministic competitive supply function.

Finance

Intervenant : Xavier Gabaix

13 juin 2019 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Adriano Rampini

23 mai 2019 - T105 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Luke Taylor

16 mai 2019 - T105 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Jessica Jeffers

18 avril 2019 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Emil Verner

4 avril 2019 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Contacts  

Département Finance 

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Faculté  

Jean Michel GAUTHIER

Finance

Voir le CV

4th Annual HEC Paris Workshop Preliminary Program “Banking, Finance, Macroeconomics and the Real Economy”  


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