Séminaires de recherche

When transparency improves, must prices reflect fundamentals better?

Finance

Intervenant : Snehal Banerjee
Kellogg

21 mai 2015


No. Regulation often mandates increased transparency to improve how informative prices are about fundamentals. We show that such policy can be counterproductive. We study the optimal decision of an investor who can choose to acquire costly information not only about asset fundamentals but also about the behavior of liquidity traders. We characterize how changing the cost of information acquisition affects the extent to which prices reflect fundamentals. When liquidity demand is price-dependent (i.e., driven by feedback trading), surprising results emerge: higher transparency, even if exclusively targeting fundamentals, can decrease price informativeness, while cheaper access to non-fundamental information can improve efficiency.

Finance

Intervenant : Jean-Charles Rochet

13 septembre 2018 - T105 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Operating Leverage, Risk Taking and Coordination Failures

Finance

Intervenant : Matthieu Bouvard
Desautels Faculty of Management

14 juin 2018 - S125 - De 14h00 à 15h15

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We study an economy with demand spillovers where firms' decisions to produce are strategic complements. Firms have access to an increasing returns to scale technology and choose their operating leverage trading off higher fixed costs for lower variable costs. Operating leverage raises the sensitivity of firms' profits to an aggregate labor productivity shock, thereby magnifying systematic risk. We show that firms take excessive risk as they do not internalize that higher operating leverage increases the likelihood of a coordination failure where output is infficiently depressed across the economy. More generally, our analysis suggests that individual risk-taking decisions aggregate into excessive output volatility in the presence of strategic complementarities among agents.

The Origins and Real Effects of the Gender Gap: Evidence from CEOs’ Formative Years∗

Finance

Intervenant : Mikhail Simutin
Rotman School of Management

7 juin 2018 - T004 - De 10h00 à 12h30

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CEOs allocate more investment capital to male than female division managers. Using data from individual Census records, we find that this gender gap is driven by CEOs who grew up in male-dominated families—those where the father was the only income earner and had more education than the mother. The gender gap also increases for CEOs who attended all-male high schools and grew up in neighborhoods with greater gender inequality. The effect of gender on capital budgeting introduces frictions and erodes investment efficiency. Overall, the gender gap originates in CEO preferences developed during formative years and produces significant real effects.

Disclosure, Competition, and Learning from Asset Prices

Finance

Intervenant : Liyan Yang
Rotman School of Management

31 mai 2018 - T027 - De 14h00 à 15h15

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This paper studies the classic information-sharing problem in a duopoly setting in which firms learn information from a financial market. By disclosing information, a firm incurs a proprietary cost of losing competitive advantage to its rival firm but benefits from learning from a more informative asset market. Firms' disclosure decisions can exhibit strategic complementarity, which is strong enough to support both a disclosure equilibrium and a nondisclosure equilibrium. Allowing minimal learning from asset prices dramatically changes firms' disclosure behaviors: without learning from prices, firms do not disclose at all; but with minimal learning from prices, firms can almost fully disclose their information. Learning from asset prices benefits firms, consumers, and liquidity traders, but harms financial speculators.

Alpha Decay

Finance

Intervenant : Anton Lines
Columbia Business School

24 mai 2018 - T020 - De 14h00 à 15h15

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Using a novel sample of professional asset managers, we document positive incremental alpha on newly purchased stocks that decays over twelve months. While managers are successful forecasters at these short-to-medium horizons, their average holding period is substantially longer (2.2 years). Both slow alpha decay and the horizon mismatch can be explained by strategic trading behavior. Managers accumulate positions gradually and unwind gradually once the alpha has run out; they trade more aggressively when the number of competitors and/or correlation among information signals is high, and do not increase trade size after unexpected capital flows. Alphas are lower when competition/correlation increases.


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