Séminaires de recherche

When transparency improves, must prices reflect fundamentals better?

Finance

Intervenant : Snehal Banerjee
Kellogg

21 mai 2015


No. Regulation often mandates increased transparency to improve how informative prices are about fundamentals. We show that such policy can be counterproductive. We study the optimal decision of an investor who can choose to acquire costly information not only about asset fundamentals but also about the behavior of liquidity traders. We characterize how changing the cost of information acquisition affects the extent to which prices reflect fundamentals. When liquidity demand is price-dependent (i.e., driven by feedback trading), surprising results emerge: higher transparency, even if exclusively targeting fundamentals, can decrease price informativeness, while cheaper access to non-fundamental information can improve efficiency.

Finance

Intervenant : Xavier Gabaix

13 juin 2019 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Adriano Rampini

23 mai 2019 - T105 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Luke Taylor

16 mai 2019 - T105 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Jessica Jeffers

18 avril 2019 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Emil Verner

4 avril 2019 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Contacts  

Département Finance 

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Faculté  

Jean-Noel BARROT

Finance

Voir le CV

4th Annual HEC Paris Workshop Preliminary Program “Banking, Finance, Macroeconomics and the Real Economy”  


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