Séminaires

First Ranked First To Serve: Strategic Agents in a Service Contest

Informations Systems and Operations Management

Intervenant : Konstantinos I. Stouras
PhD Candidate , INSEAD

13 mai 2016 - HEC Paris - Jouy en Josas - Bâtiment V - Salle Bernard Ramanantsoa - De 10h30 à 14h30


Motivated by two-sided marketplaces and work-from-home call centers which crowdsource demand to a pool of freelance agents, we model a service provider whose agents endogenously determine their participation and effort level. To motivate agents, the marketplace ranks agents in a prespecified number of priority classes based on their relative performance. Agents' idle time is not compensated and higher performers are utilized (and hence are paid) more. We study which priority class structure creates the best incentives for agents' participation and effort, and we show that the optimal design of such a “service contest” is often coarse, namely, it contains only a few priority classes. Discarding available information on agents' relative rankings, or, deploying coarser priority classes, can paradoxically provide higher incentives for agents' participation and for marketplace performance.

Product cannibalization in green distribution channels and the effect of advertising

Informations Systems and Operations Management

Intervenant : Vinay Ramani
Assistant Professor , Economics Group, Indian Institute of Management, Udaipur

22 avril 2016 - HEC Paris - Campus Jouy en Josas - Bâtiment V - Salle Bernard ramanantsoa - De 10h30 à 12h00


Product cannibalization can push some consumers to shift their purchasing preferences from new to used products. This is a costly issue for manufacturers, who have to adjust their pricing strategies accordingly to mitigate the negative effect of cannibalization. This paper investigates an atypical green distribution channel that takes the form of a closed loop supply chain and examines the effect of product cannibalization on firms' profits. In particular, we investigate how the presence of a Goodwill agency in a green market impacts the business of a manufacturer in a new market through cannibalization, and how the manufacturer reacts to mitigate its effects. We show that even if the manufacturer adjusts its price to decrease the negative effects of cannibalization, this effect is so severe that he always loses some profits. Nevertheless, when the manufacturer undertakes an additional marketing lever such as promotions or adhoc advertising, the chain achieves a profit-Pareto-improving outcome. Surprisingly, we find that in contrast to the marketing literature, the manufacturer is never able to fully overcome the negative effect of cannibalization even with advertising.

See No Evil, Hear No Evil? Dissecting the Impact of Online Hacker Forums

Informations Systems and Operations Management

Intervenant : Kai-Lung Hui
Professor of Information Systems, Business Statistics and Operations Management , Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

11 février 2016 - HEC - Jouy-en-Josas Campus Building V Room Bernard Ramanantsoa - De 10h00 à 11h30


Using a field data set culled from multiple sources, we study the impact of online hacker forum discussion on the extent of DDoS attack. We find evidence that hacking discussion reduces the number of DDoS attack victims. This effect is more pronounced among protection oriented posts, but follow-up discussion of censored posts increases the number of victims. We also find indicative evidence that the orientation of contributing authors may help explain the reduction in DDoS attack victims. Our results are robust to a series of robustness and falsification tests, including the use of additional hacker forums from other countries and with different languages. We conclude the sharing of hacking knowledge may not be bad for the society. We draw related managerial implications, particularly on the continuing debate of whether to censor harmful online materials.

Model Use in Sustainability Negotiations and Decisions

Informations Systems and Operations Management

Intervenant : Ellen Czaika
Post Doctoral Researcher , Institute for Data, Systems and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

1 décembre 2015 - HEC Paris - Campus Jouy en Josas - Bâtiment V - Salle Bernard Ramanantsoa - De 11h30 à 12h30


Sustainability negotiations and decisions require the integration of scientific information with stakeholder interests. Mathematical models help elucidate the physical world and therefore may orient the negotiators in a shared understanding of the physical world. Many researchers suggest collaborative modeling to facilitate integrating scientific information and stakeholder interests. In this thesis, I use methods that enable repeated instances of the same decision; the exploration of alternatives to model use (e.g. learning of a model’s logic, relevant information, or irrelevant information); and the exploration of alternatives to collaborative modeling (e.g. using an expert model or not using a model). This thesis comprises two studies that use serious game role-play simulations. The first study is a computer-driven role-play simulation of governmental policy creation and the second is a five-party role-play simulation to negotiate a more sustainable end-of-life for used paper coffee cups. In the first study, model users reached the Pareto Frontier—the set of non-dominated points—more readily (13%) than non-model-users (2.5%) and model users discovered the win-win nature of electricity access with higher frequency (63%) than non-model users (9%). Participants who learned of the model’s logic through presentation performed nearly as well as model users. In the second study, model use shortened the (mean) duration of the negotiation from 55 minutes to 45 minutes. Negotiating tables that co-created a model had a higher likelihood of reaching favorable agreements (44% compared to 25%). Model use did not significantly alter the value distribution among parties. Tables of negotiators used the model in two predominant manners: to test alternatives as they generated potential agreements and to verify a tentative agreement. The former resulted in higher mean table values than the latter. Together, these studies demonstrate: that mathematical models can be used in sustainability negotiations and decisions with good effect; that learning about the insights of a model is beneficial in decision making—but using a model is more beneficial; and that collaborative model building can provide better negotiation outcomes than using an expert model and can be faster than not using a model.

Motivating Action and Effort: Stimulating Online Reviews by Combining Financial Incentives and Social Norms

Informations Systems and Operations Management

Intervenant : Ravi Bapna
Directeur académique, Directeur de Programme , Carlson

27 novembre 2015 - HEC - Campus Jouy en Josas Bâtiment S Salle 210 - De 14h00 à 15h00


Online reviews enable consumers to learn more about products, yet a majority of products have very few reviews, and those that are provided are often brief and lack useful information. In hopes of motivating consumers to provide useful reviews, we test two influence strategies: (a) offering financial incentives – i.e., a small payment and (b) social norms, wherein we inform people about the volume of reviews authored by peers. We test the effectiveness of these strategies in two randomized experiments, one in the field, conducted in partnership with a large online clothing retailer based in China, and a second on Amazon Mechanical Turk. We find that financial incentives are more effective at getting people to write a review, but they do not lead people to expend effort, thus resulting in reviews that are not particularly useful. In contrast, social norms, while less effective at getting people to write a review, are more effective at motivating people to dedicate effort, leading to more useful reviews. Importantly, we show that the combination of financial incentives and social norms yields the greatest overall benefit, motivating both action and effort. We also provide evidence for the mechanism underlying this joint effect: the presence of a social norm provides people with a plausible rationalization for their decision to write a review as one of intrinsic goodwill, rather than as one of effort for payment. This enables us to circumvent the well-known undermining effect of financial incentives on intrinsic motivation.

Contacts  


Informations Systems and Operations Management


Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Faculté  

Sihem JOUINI

Informations Systems and Operations Management (GREGHEC)

Voir le CV

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