Articles

A framework for analyzing the political support for active labor market policy

G. SAINT-PAUL

Journal of Public Economics

février 1998, vol. 67, n°2, pp.151-165

Départements : Finance


We develop a general equilibrium analysis of the impact of active labor market policy on unemployment, wages and the welfare of the employed. This framework is used to assess the political support in favour of such policies and to relate it to the working of Such policies and other parameters characterizing the economic environment. The main finding is that if the employed have little exposure to unemployment and if the demand for unskilled labour is inelastic, then there may be political support for policies which actually raise the equilibrium level of total unemployment

A strong paradox of multiple elections

M. SCARSINI

Social Choice and Welfare

1998, vol. 15, n°2, pp.237-238

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision


We consider a stronger version of the paradox of multiple elections and show that it is possible that not only the winning combination of propositions, but also all the combinations sufficiently close to it, receive zero votes

Aggressiveness and Survival of Overconfident Traders

A. BENOS

Journal of Financial Markets

1998, n°1, pp.353-383


Analyse de la survie des firmes : le cas des imprimeurs OFFSET à Paris de 1950 à 1985

J. OBADIA, R. DURAND

Revue d'Economie Industrielle

2e trimestre 1998, n°84, pp.45-66

Départements : Informations Systems and Operations Management, Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Angoisse et créativité face aux différences culturelles

G. AMADO

Les Cahiers de l'ENSPTT

septembre 1998, n°9, pp.85-90

Départements : Management et Ressources Humaines


Another Look at Strategy-Structure Relationships: The Resource-based View

B. Moingeon, B. Ramanantsoa, E. Métais, D. ORTON

European Management Journal

1998, vol. 16, n°3, pp.297-305

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise


Another Look at Strategy-Structure Relationships: The Resource-based View

B. MOINGEON, B. RAMANANTSOA, E. Métais, D. Orton

European Management Journal

1998, vol. 16, n°3, pp.297-305

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Anticipating the Evolutions and Outcomes of Strategic Alliances Between Rival Firms

P. DUSSAUGE, B. GARRETTE

International Studies of Management and Organization

1998, vol. 27, n°4, pp.104-126

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Focuses on the strategic alliances set up by rival firms. Information on the evolution and outcomes of strategic alliances; Definition of strategic alliances.

Autour d'une lecture éthologique du concept de rationalité chez H. A. Simon

Y. PESQUEUX

Ethique des Affaires

juillet 1998, pp.51-60

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion


Basic Statistics on the Success Rate and Profits for Independent Inventors

T. B. ASTEBRO

Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

Winter 1998, vol. 23, n°2, pp.41-48

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


1,095 responses were received from a telephone survey of Independent Inventors. The majority of inventors surveyed (89%) are male, and a plurality of their Inventions are designed for consumer products (47%). Conditional on commercializing their invention, and at development costs about 1/8 of those in established firms, Inventive efforts by independent inventors lead to gains virtually comparable to those of established firms. Their innovations survive for about as long as the average start-up. Gross profit margins are comparable to the pharmaceutical industry (29%). However, only a small fraction of inventions developed by independent inventors reach the market (6.5%). The probability of reaching the market is four to eight times less than for Inventions developed by established firms. Why do only a fraction of inventions developed by Independent inventors become commercialized when those that do commercialize are quite profitable and survive for as long as other start-ups?