Articles

Analyse de la survie des firmes : le cas des imprimeurs OFFSET à Paris de 1950 à 1985

J. OBADIA, R. DURAND

Revue d'Economie Industrielle

2e trimestre 1998, n°84, pp.45-66

Départements : Information Systems and Operations Management, Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Another Look at Strategy-Structure Relationships: The Resource-based View

B. MOINGEON, B. RAMANANTSOA, E. Métais, D. Orton

European Management Journal

1998, vol. 16, n°3, pp.297-305

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Anticipating the Evolutions and Outcomes of Strategic Alliances Between Rival Firms

P. DUSSAUGE, B. GARRETTE

International Studies of Management and Organization

1998, vol. 27, n°4, pp.104-126

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Focuses on the strategic alliances set up by rival firms. Information on the evolution and outcomes of strategic alliances; Definition of strategic alliances.

Basic Statistics on the Success Rate and Profits for Independent Inventors

T. B. ASTEBRO

Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

Winter 1998, vol. 23, n°2, pp.41-48

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


1,095 responses were received from a telephone survey of Independent Inventors. The majority of inventors surveyed (89%) are male, and a plurality of their Inventions are designed for consumer products (47%). Conditional on commercializing their invention, and at development costs about 1/8 of those in established firms, Inventive efforts by independent inventors lead to gains virtually comparable to those of established firms. Their innovations survive for about as long as the average start-up. Gross profit margins are comparable to the pharmaceutical industry (29%). However, only a small fraction of inventions developed by independent inventors reach the market (6.5%). The probability of reaching the market is four to eight times less than for Inventions developed by established firms. Why do only a fraction of inventions developed by Independent inventors become commercialized when those that do commercialize are quite profitable and survive for as long as other start-ups?

Bioscoopbeelden Kunnen Gerust Bezichtigd Worden; Rotterdamse Bioscopen in het Seizoen 1908/1909

K. DE VALCK

Tijdschrift voor Mediageschiedenis

1998, vol. 1, n°1, pp.32-46

Départements : Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Documentation comptable sur Internet

H. STOLOWY

Revue Fiduciaire Comptable

novembre 1998, n°245, pp.20-26

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Duality and markovian strategies

D. ROSENBERG

International Journal of Game Theory

décembre 1998, vol. 27, n°4, pp.577-597

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


We introduce the dual of a stochastic game with incomplete information on one side, and we deduce some properties of optimal strategies of the uninformed player.

Évolutions économiques et techniques et nouveaux modèles de protection de la propriété littéraire et artistique

P. Benghozi, T. PARIS

Réseaux

mars-juin 1998, n°88-89, pp.11-23

Départements : GREGHEC (CNRS)


Floors, Limit Order Markets and Dealer Markets

T. FOUCAULT, F. SALANIE, B. BIAIS

Journal of Financial Markets

1998, vol. 1, n°3-4, pp.253-284

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


pas sous affiliation hecIn dealer markets, liquidity suppliers have entire flexibility to bargain on the price with their customers. In limit order markets, they are restricted to convex schedules: they cannot sell the first share at a higher price than the second. Floor traders simply respond to the liquidity demand conveyed by brokers by crying out one price. In floor markets risk-sharing is inefficient and spreads are large. In dealer markets, risk-sharing can be efficient, but spreads tend to be large. In limit order markets, the unique equilibrium entails efficient risk-sharing and competitive spreads. Hence there is a non-monotonic relation between the efficiency of the market and the extent to which the offers of the liquidity suppliers are restricted. Author Keywords: Floor markets; Dealer markets; Limit orders; Market design; Tacit collusion

From Organizational Learning to the Learning Organization

A. Edmondson, B. MOINGEON

Management Learning

1998, vol. 29, n°1, pp.5-20

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


This article reviews theories of organizational learning and presents a framework with which to organize the literature. We argue that unit of analysis provides one critical distinction in the organizational learning literature and research objective provides another. The resulting two-by-two matrix contains four categories of research, which we have called: (2) residues (organizations as residues of past learning); (2) communities (organizations as collections of individuals who can learn and develop); (3) participation (organizational improvement gained through intelligent activity of individual members), and (4) accountability (organizational improvement gained through developing individuals' mental models). We also propose a distinction between the terms organizational learning and the learning organization. Our subsequent analysis identifies relationships between disparate parts of the literature and shows that these relationships point to individual mental models as a critical source of leverage for creating learning organizations. A brief discussion of the work of two of the most visible researchers in this field, Peter Senge and Chris Argyris, provides additional support for this type of change strategy.


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