Articles

A Genuine Rank-dependent Generalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem

M. ABDELLAOUI

Econometrica

2002, vol. 70, n°2, pp.717-736

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


A Cognitive Foundation of Probability

I. GILBOA, D. Schmeidler

Mathematics of Operations Research

2002, vol. 27, pp.68-81

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Accounting Professionals and the Accounting Profession: Linking Conduct and Context

F. ANDERSON-GOUGH, C. GREY, K. ROBSON

Accounting and Business Research

2002, vol. 32, n°1, pp.41-56

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Action and possibilities: reconciling dual perspectives on knowledge in organizations

A. FANELLI, A. Hargadon

Organization Science

2002, vol. 13, n°3, pp.290-302

Départements : Management et Ressources Humaines


At times knowledge can be seen as the source of organizational innovation and change-at other times, however, it can be the very constraint on that change. This conflicted role offers insights into why the phenomenon of organizational knowledge has been interpreted by researchers in multiple and possibly conflicting ways. Some theories depict knowledge as an empirical phenomenon, residing in action and becoming "organizational" in the acquisition. diffusion, and replication of those actions throughout the organization. Others consider it a latent phenomenon, residing in the possibility for constructing novel organizational actions. This paper argues that while each of these qualities-empirical and latent-are intrinsic to knowledge in organizations. our understanding of organizational phenomena is essentially incomplete until the relationship between them is considered. Building on structuration theory. we propose a complementary perspective that views organizational knowledge as the product of an ongoing and recursive interaction between empirical and latent knowledge. between knowledge as action and knowledge as possibility. We ground this complementary model of knowledge in evidence from the field study of two firms whose innovation practices provide unique insights into how knowledge simultaneously enables and constrains behavior in organizations. We then discuss how a complementary perspective avoids the reification of knowledge by depicting it instead as an ongoing and social process and offers an alternative distinction between individual and collective knowledge

Alliances with Competitors: How to Combine and Protect Key Resources ?

W. Mitchell, B. GARRETTE, P. DUSSAUGE

Creativity and Innovation Management

septembre 2002, vol. 11, n°3, pp.203-223

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Our study addresses two main questions: First, what types of alliances do firms tend to create when combining different kinds of resources? Second, what governance mechanisms do firms set up to coordinate and protect resources when they use them for different alliances? We examine 227 alliances between competitors in Asia, North America, and Europe. We first identify two types of alliances: scale alliances in which the partner firms contribute similar resources, and link alliances in which the partners contribute complementary resources. We find that firms contributing R&D and production resources tend to form scale alliances, while firms contributing marketing resources tend to enter into link alliances. We also find that firms are more likely to choose stronger protection mechanisms for link alliances, which create greater appropriation risks, while they tend to seek higher levels of coordination in scale alliances

An Optimal IPO Mechanism

B. BIAIS, P. BOSSAERTS, J-C. ROCHET

Review of Economic Studies

janvier 2002, vol. 69, n°1, pp.117-146

Départements : Finance

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2695955


We analyse the optimal Initial Public Offering (IPO) mechanism in a multidimensional adverse selection setting where institutional investors have private information about the market valuation of the shares, the intermediary has private information about the demand, and the institutional investors and intermediary collude. Theorem 1 states that uniform pricing is optimal (all agents pay the same price) and characterizes the IPO price in terms of conditional expectations. Theorem 2 states that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a non-linear price schedule decreasing in the quantity allocated to retail investors. This is similar to IPO procedures used in the U.K. and France. Relying on French IPO data we perform a GMM structural estimation and test of the model. The price schedule is estimated and the conditions characterizing the optimal mechanism are not rejected

Analyse des règles de priorités dans un système de pilotage mixte - production à la commande-production par anticipation

C. VAN DELFT, K. Youssef, Y. Dallery

Journal Européen des Systèmes Automatisés

2002, n°36, pp.79-96

Départements : Informations Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Analyse factorielle multiple et approche PLS

M. TENENHAUS, J. Pagès

Revue de Statistique Appliquée

mars 2002, vol. 50, pp.5-33

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision


Assessing Start-up Business Risk

T. B. ASTEBRO, S. Hucal

Journal of Credit Risk

2002, pp.29-31

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Assessment of Sun Reactive Skin Type With Multiple Correspondence Analysis, Hierarchical and Tree-Structured Classification Methods

C. Guinot, M. TENENHAUS

International Journal of Cosmetic Science

2002, vol. 24, pp.207-216

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision



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