A Genuine Rank-dependent Generalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem



2002, vol. 70, n°2, pp.717-736

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Probability weighting, Expected utility, Rank-dependent utility, Probability trade-offs, Probabilistic risk attitude

A Cognitive Foundation of Probability

I. GILBOA, D. Schmeidler

Mathematics of Operations Research

2002, vol. 27, pp.68-81

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Alliances with Competitors: How to Combine and Protect Key Resources ?


Creativity and Innovation Management

septembre 2002, vol. 11, n°3, pp.203-223

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Our study addresses two main questions: First, what types of alliances do firms tend to create when combining different kinds of resources? Second, what governance mechanisms do firms set up to coordinate and protect resources when they use them for different alliances? We examine 227 alliances between competitors in Asia, North America, and Europe. We first identify two types of alliances: scale alliances in which the partner firms contribute similar resources, and link alliances in which the partners contribute complementary resources. We find that firms contributing R&D and production resources tend to form scale alliances, while firms contributing marketing resources tend to enter into link alliances. We also find that firms are more likely to choose stronger protection mechanisms for link alliances, which create greater appropriation risks, while they tend to seek higher levels of coordination in scale alliances

Analyse des règles de priorités dans un système de pilotage mixte - production à la commande-production par anticipation

C. VAN DELFT, K. Youssef, Y. Dallery

Journal Européen des Systèmes Automatisés

2002, n°36, pp.79-96

Départements : Information Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Assessing Start-up Business Risk

T. B. ASTEBRO, S. Hucal

Journal of Credit Risk

2002, pp.29-31

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Bank Performance Around the Introduction of a Section 20 Subsidiary

M. Comett, E. ÖRS, H. Tehranian

The Journal of Finance

février 2002, vol. 57, n°1, pp.501-521

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

As of 1987, commercial banks in the United States were allowed to establish Section 20 subsidiaries to conduct investment-banking activities. A concern of regulators was that these activities would result in a decrease in performance of commercial banks relative to the risk being undertaken. This paper examines the performance of commercial banks around the establishment of a Section 20 subsidiary. We find that Section 20 activities undertaken by banks result in increased industry-adjusted operating cash flow return on assets, due mainly to revenues from noncommercial-banking activities. Further, risk measures for the sample banks do not change significantly.

Bargaining Over an Uncertain Outcome: The Role of Beliefs

A. Billot, A. Chateauneuf, I. GILBOA, J. Tallon

Decisions in Economics and Finance

2002, vol. 25, pp.33-45

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Blackwell Optimality in Markov Decision Processes with Partial Observation


Annals of Statistics

août 2002, vol. 30, n°4, pp.1178-1193

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Competitive Advantages Exist: A response to Powell


Strategic Management Journal

2002, vol. 23, n°9, pp.867-872

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Competitive advantage, Logic, Philosophy, Resource-based view

This response is a plea for considering cautiously the use of formal logic and philosophy in strategic management. In a recent article, logical and philosophical considerations on the relationship between competitive advantage and superior returns led to a pragmatic view of competitive advantage. First, we propose a different logical analysis of the links between competitive advantage and superior performance. Using the scarce premises, this analysis leads to different conclusions. Second, our commentaries suggest that philosophy should be employed for opening discussions and perspectives rather than as an instrument for conviction

Continuous-time Dynkin Games with Mixed Strategies

N. Touzi, N. VIEILLE

SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization

2002, vol. 41, n°4, pp.1073-1088

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Let (X,Y,Z) be a triple of payoff processes defining a Dynkin game \tilde R(\sigma,\tau) &=& E\left[ X_\sigma\1_{\{\tau > \sigma\}} +Y_\tau \1_{\{\tau < \sigma\}} +Z_\tau \1_{\{\tau=\sigma\}}\right] , where $\sigma$ and $\tau$ are stopping times valued in [0,T]. In the case Z=Y, it is well known that the condition X $\leq$ Y is needed in order to establish the existence of value for the game, i.e., $\inf_{\tau}\sup_{\sigma}\tilde R(\sigma,\tau)$ $=$ $\sup_{\sigma}\inf_{\tau}\tilde R(\sigma,\tau)$.In order to remove the condition X $\leq$ Y, we introduce an extension of the Dynkin game by allowing for an extended set of strategies, namely, the set of mixed strategies. The main result of the paper is that the extended Dynkin game has a value when $Z\leq Y$, and the processes X and Y are restricted to be semimartingales continuous at the terminal time T.