Articles

A Concept of Progress for Normative Economics

P. MONGIN

Economics and Philosophy

2006, vol. 22, pp.19-54

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


The paper discusses the sense in which the changes undergone by normative economics in the 20th century can be said to be progressive. A simple criterion is proposed to decide whether a sequence of normative theories is progressive. This criterion is put to use on the historical transition from the new welfare economics to social choice theory. The paper reconstructs this classic case, and eventually concludes that the latter theory was progressive compared with the former. It also briefly comments on the recent developments in normative economics and their connection with the previous two stages

A Cross-National Investigation of Incentive Sales Compensation

M. SEGALLA, D. ROUZIES, M. Besson, B. Weitz

International Journal of Research in Marketing

décembre 2006, vol. 23, n°4, pp.419-433

Départements : Management et Ressources Humaines, Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Why do managers choose one sales compensation form rather than another? Theoretical answers typically focus on the type of plans managers should design, not on the factors that managers actually consider. Managers from various national origins pursue and weigh objectives through experience in a way that theoretical models may not capture. Incorporating conceptualizations from a wide range of disciplines, we specify a model examining the influence of cultural factors on sales compensation decisions of managers (incentive vs. fixed pay and parity vs. equity allocation). The model, tested with data collected from bank managers across six European countries, illustrates the importance of considering national culture when designing sales force compensation policies applied across multiple countries. We also find evidence that most European bank managers accept incentive pay to motivate salespeople but, perhaps paradoxically, overwhelmingly reject equity allocations to achieve control and parity. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on international governance systems and the diffusion of sales force management practices Keywords: Distributive justice; Compensation; Performance pay; Sales force management; National culture

A Marketing Maturity Model for IT: Building a Customer-Centric IT Organization

R. HIRSCHHEIM, A. SCHWARZ, P. A. TODD

IBM Systems Journal

avril 2006, vol. 45, n°1, pp.181-199

Départements : Information Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)

http://domino.research.ibm.com/tchjr/journalindex.nsf/9fe6a820aae67ad785256547004d8af0/d5511d41b843f4aa85257100007c6a0f!OpenDocument


Despite a variety of management tools, valuable management prescriptions, and the desire of information technology (IT) managers and business managers alike to build a better relationship, the current state of the IT-business relationship is far from ideal. Although many believe the difficulty in managing this relationship is rooted in differences in knowledge, culture, motivation, and language, we argue in this paper that the key to managing relationships is in the frame of reference and that a marketing perspective can prove valuable. We outline how concepts from marketing (e.g., price, product, customer, place, and promotion) are useful within an IT context and propose a marketing maturity model for IT executives to assess how to enhance their relationship with their business counterparts

A Note on Risk Aversion and Herd Behavior in Financial Markets

J. Decamps, S. LOVO

Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory

juillet 2006, vol. 31, n°1

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


We show that differences in market participants risk aversion can generate herd behavior in stock markets where assets are traded sequentially. This in turn prevents learning of market's fundamentals. These results are obtained without introducing multidimensional uncertainty or transaction cost

Arbitration Without Privity and Russian Oil: the Yukos Case before the Houston Court

M. M. WINKLER

U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. (University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law)

2006, vol. 27, pp.115-153

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design

G. Albano, F. Germano, S. LOVO

Economic Theory

août 2006, vol. 28, n°2, pp.331-355

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects, namely, an English and a Japanese auction, and derive a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the Japanese auction by exploiting its strategic equivalence with the survival auction, which consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. Thus an equilibrium of a continuous time game is derived by means of backward induction in finitely many steps. We then show that all equilibria of the Japanese auction induce equilibria of the English auction, but that many collusive or signaling equilibria of the English auction do not have a counterpart in the Japanese auction

Bid Ask Price Competition with Asymmetric Information Between Market Makers

R. Calcagno, S. LOVO

Review of Economic Studies

avril 2006, vol. 73, n°2, pp.329-355

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


This paper studies the effect of asymmetric information on the price formation process in a quote-driven market. One market maker receives private information on the value of the quoted asset, and repeatedly competes with market makers who are uninformed. We show that despite the fact that the informed market maker's quotes are public, the market is never strong-form efficient with certainty until the last stage. We characterize a reputational equilibrium in which the informed market-maker influences and possibly misleads the uninformed market makers' beliefs. At this equilibrium, a price leadership effect arises, the informed market maker's expected payoff is positive and the rate of price discovery increases in the last stages of trade

Complexity of Outsourcing Contracts and ex post Transaction Costs: An Empirical Investigation

J. Barthélemy, B. QUÉLIN

Journal of Management Studies

décembre 2006, vol. 43, n°8, pp.1775–1797

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

http://ssrn.com/abstract=950074


In this article, we use Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm to study outsourcing agreements. We develop an original approach of contract complexity and analyse the links among exchange hazards (i.e. specificity and environmental uncertainty), the contractual aspects of outsourcing (control, incentives, penalties, price and flexibility clauses) and the level of ex post transaction costs. Both contract complexity and ex post transaction costs are operationalized and measured. Our empirical research analyses 82 outsourcing contracts. This article uses three different dimensions (proximity to the core business, switching costs and adaptation costs) to assess the strategic importance of an outsourced activity. Our findings extend TCE's validity for the outsourcing of activities with a strategic value. Finally, this study offers an indirect measurement of ex post transaction costs. In short, to restrict vendor opportunism, contracts must contain incentives and penalties, as well as pricing and monitoring clauses

Conception d'un système d'aide multicritère pour l'aide à la décision médicale

O. Belmokhtar, Y. Kerboua Ziari, L. KERBACHE, E. Baraka

Santé et systémique

2006, vol. 9, n°1-2, pp.147-155

Départements : Information Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)


La décision médicale en cancérologie est sous incertitude du fait de la multiplicitédes traitements d'une part, et l'absence de résultats efficaces d'autre part. Le médecin estalors confronté au choix du traitement le mieux adapté à l'état du patient et de cefait, l'aideà la décision devient indispensable pour améliorer les soins. L'objectif de cet article est laprésentation d'un système d'aide à la décision médicale dans le cas du cancer du cavum(SAMD-ADM) .. celui-ci a été développé pour l'unité « tête et cou» du service d'oncologiemédicale du Centre Pierre et Marie Curie d'AlgerMOTS-CLÉS:aide à la décision médicale, oncologie médicale, systèmes d'informationhospitalier, cancer du cavum, programmation mathématique.

Consumers' Immediate Memory for Prices

M. VANHUELE, G. LAURENT, X. Drèze

Journal of Consumer Research

septembre 2006, vol. 33, n°2, pp.163-172

Départements : Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Cognitive Processes, Pricing, Language


We examine the cognitive mechanics involved in keeping prices in short-term memory for subsequent recall. Consumers code and store prices verbally, visually, and in terms of their magnitude. The encoding used influences immediate recall performance. The memorability of prices depends on their verbal length, usualness, and overall magnitude. We find that the performance of consumers is affected by their pronunciation speed and price abbreviation habits. Overall, consumers recall prices better that what previous digit span studies with simple numbers have suggested


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