Articles

"Court Save the Queen:" The European Court of Justice Quashes Another Deeply-Rooted Common Law Remedy in Transnational Parallel Litigation

M. M. WINKLER

Transnational Dispute Management

2009, n°1

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1399


In the decision rendered on February 10, 2009 in Allianz S.p.A., Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. v. West Tankers Inc. (Case C-185/07) ("West Tankers"), the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") quashed another procedural remedy which is typical of common law countries only and deeply rooted in such countries' history: the anti-suit injunction. Under such remedy, the court issues an order, directed to one of the parties to the proceedings pending before it, not to begin or continue another proceedings before a foreign court. The lack of performing the order results in heavy sanctions ...

A Dual-Process Model of Interactivity Effects

Y. LIU, Lj SHRUM

Journal of Advertising

Summer 2009, vol. 38, n°2, pp.53-68

Départements : Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Although interactivity is often considered to have a positive influence on persuasion, research on interactivity effects is actually very mixed. This paper argues that under certain circumstances, interactivity may either enhance or inhibit persuasion. A dual-process model of interactivity effects is proposed and tested that posits differential effects of interactivity on persuasion depending on person and situation factors. Results of an experiment that manipulated level of Web site interactivity and task involvement, and measured user ability (Internet usage experience), show that under low-involvement conditions, the mere presence of interactivity served as a peripheral cue that led to more positive attitudes regardless of ability (experience). Under high-involvement conditions, however, interactivity elicited more positive attitudes for experienced users but less positive attitudes for inexperienced users. Implications for the use of interactivity in advertising and promotions are discussed

A Dynamic Model of the Limit Order Book

I. ROSU

Review of Financial Studies

novembre 2009, vol. 22, n°11, pp.4601-4641

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


pas sous affiliation hecThis paper presents a model of an order-driven market where fully strategic, symmetrically informed liquidity traders dynamically choose between limit and market orders, trading off execution price and waiting costs. In equilibrium, the bid and ask prices depend only on the numbers of buy and sell orders in the book. The model has a number of empirical predictions: (i) higher trading activity and higher trading competition cause smaller spreads and lower price impact; (ii) market orders lead to a temporary price impact larger than the permanent price impact, therefore to price overshooting; (iii) buy and sell orders can cluster away from the bid-ask spread, generating a hump-shaped order book; (iv) bid and ask prices display a comovement effect: after, e.g., a sell market order moves the bid price down, the ask price also falls, by a smaller amount, so the bid-ask spread widens; (v) when the order book is full, traders may submit quick, or fleeting, limit orders.

A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

A. LANDIER, Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix

Review of Financial Studies

décembre 2009, vol. 22, n°12, pp.4881-4917

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : D3 - Distribution G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs D2 - Production and Organizations

https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/22/12/4881/1574895/A-Multiplicative-Model-of-Optimal-CEO-Incentives


This paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium, by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model. By considering multiplicative specifications for the CEO's utility and production functions, we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models. First, both the CEO's low fractional ownership (the Jensen–Murphy incentives measure) and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting, and thus need not reflect rent extraction. Second, the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value, divided by annual pay, is independent of firm size, and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives. Third, incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value, such as strategy choice. However, additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring

Absorbing games with compact action spaces

J. Mertens, D. ROSENBERG, A. Neyman

Mathematics of Operations Research

mai 2009, vol. 34, n°2, pp.257-262

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


pas sous affiliation HEC

Analysis and Optimization of a Combined Make-to-Stock and Make-to-Order Multiproduct Manufacturing System

K. Hadj Youssef, C. VAN DELFT, Y. Dallery

Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences

2009, vol. 2009, n°ID 716059

Départements : Information Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)

http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2009/716059


We consider a single-stage multiproduct manufacturing facility producing several end-products for delivery to customers with a required customer lead-time. The end-products can be split in two classes: few products with high volume demands and a large number of products with low-volume demands. In order to reduce inventory costs, it seems efficient to produce the high-volume products according to an MTS policy and the low volume products according to an MTO policy. The purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare the impact of the scheduling policy on the overall inventory costs, under customer lead-time service level constraints. We consider two policies: the classical FIFO policy and a priority policy (PR) which gives priority to low volume products over high volume products. We show that for some range of parameters, the PR rule can significantly outperform the FIFO rule. In these ranges, the service level constraints are satisfied by the PR rule with much lower inventory costs.

Are There Waves in Merger Activity After All?

D. GÄRTNER, D. HALBHEER

International Journal of Industrial Organization

2009, vol. 27, n°6, pp.708-718

Départements : Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Behavior in the loss domain: An experiment using the probability trade-off consistency condition

O. L'HARIDON

Journal of Economic Psychology

août 2009, vol. 30, n°4, pp.540-551

Départements : GREGHEC (CNRS)


Abstract: In gambles with two or more outcomes, the two versions of prospect theory, i.e., original prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory, make use of different composition rules and therefore yield different valuations of gambles. We test these composition rules in the loss domain using the probability trade-off consistency condition. The probability trade-off consistency condition offers a convenient and efficient way to compare gambles under risk and decision makers' behavior. Experimental findings suggest that the rank dependent version of prospect theory, or cumulative prospect theory, cannot be rejected in the loss domain while original prospect theory is clearly rejected when a certainty effect is taken into account.

Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information

J. Hörner, S. LOVO

Econometrica

mars 2009, vol. 77, n°2, pp.453-487

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as se- quential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a setof payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.Keywords: repeated game with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; belief-free equilibria.

Capital Market Imperfections and the Sensitivity of Investment to Stock Prices

A. V. OVTCHINNIKOV, J. McConnell

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

juin 2009, vol. 44, pp.551-578

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)



JavaScriptSettings