A Contraction-free and Cut-free Sequent Calculus for Propositional Dynamic Logic

B. HILL, F. Poggiolesi

Studia Logica

2010, vol. 94, n°1, pp.1-26

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

A Model of Financial Market Liquidity Based on Intermediary Capital


Journal of the European Economic Association

avril-mai 2010, vol. 8, n°2-3, pp.456-466

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

A Note on the Evaluation of Information in Zero-Sum Repeated Games


Journal of Mathematical Economics

juillet 2010, vol. 46, n°4, pp. 393–399

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Repeated games, Zero-sum games, Value-of-information

Two players play a zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information. Before the game starts one player receives a private signal that depends on the realized state of nature. The rules that govern the choice of the signal are determined by the information structure of the game. Different information structures induce different values. The value-of-information function of a game associates every information structure with the value it induces. We characterize those functions that are value-of-information functions for some zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information

A Pattern-Based Approach to Protocol Mediation for Web Service Composition


Information and Software Technology

2010, vol. 52, n°3, pp.304-323

Départements : Information Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)

An additively separable representation in the Savage framework


Journal of Economic Theory

septembre 2010, vol. 145, n°5, pp.2044-2054

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

accepté le 22/04/2010 (scopus)This paper proposes necessary and sufficient conditions for an additively separable representation of preferences in the Savage framework (where the objects of choice are acts: measurable functions from an infinite set of states to a potentially finite set of consequences). A preference relation over acts is represented by the integral over the subset of the product of the state space and the consequence space which corresponds to the act, where this integral is calculated with respect to an evaluation measure on this space. The result requires neither Savage's P3 (monotonicity) nor his P4 (weak comparative probability). Nevertheless, the representation it provides is as useful as Savage's for many economic applications. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Author Keywords Additive representation; Expected utility; Monotonicity; State-dependent utility

An Interpretive Account of Logical Aggregation Theory

P. MONGIN, F. Dietrich

Revue d'Economie Politique

novembre-décembre 2010, vol. 120, n°6, pp.929-972

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Abstract: Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds whatever, and not barely judgments of preference. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager's doctrinal paradox and Pettit's discursive dilemma, two problems that we restate by emphasizing their conceptual differences. Henceforth, we follow the main technical advances of the theory, from the first impossibility theorem proved by List and Pettit to the completely general results of Dietrich and Mongin. We stress the collective achievement of the canonical theorem - by Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, Nehring and Puppe - which provided the theory with a specific method of analysis: it consists in mathematically characterizing the impossibility agendas of a given aggregator - i.e., the sets of propositions such that no collective judgment function exists with a certain list of axiomatic properties. The presentation is unified here by the use of formal logic, for which we claim relevance at every step, and by the above-mentioned distinction between the doctrinal paradox and the discursive dilemma, which we reelaborate upon technically.Author Keywords: Judgment Aggregation; Logical Aggregattion; Doctrinal Paradox; Discursive Dilemma; General Logic; Premiss-Based vs Conclusion; Based Approach; Social Choice TheoryKeyWords Plus: JUDGMENT AGGREGATION; ARROWS THEOREM; COLLEGIAL COURTS; IMPOSSIBILITY; PROPOSITIONS; CONSTRAINTS; LANGUAGE; AGENDAS; CHOICE; BELIEF

Analyzing the Performance of Data Loading and Processing in Relational Databases

I. Lungu, V. Diaconita, A. Bara, C. PARASCHIV

Journal of Economic Computation and Economic Cybernetics Studies and Research

2010, vol. 3, pp.109-122

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Abstract. In this paper we are analyzing the performance of XML processing in different scenarios involving receiving large quantity of such documents. We are analyzing the loading and processing speed in four different scenarios involving an adapter written in an universal programming language and a relational database.Keywords: multi-thread; XML; integration; distributed systems

Another victim of the banana war - Some Reflections on the Status of the Principle of Liability in the Absence of Unlawful Conduct in the European Union Legal System


US-China Law Review

2010, vol. 7, pp.7-19

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Auctioned IPOs: The U.S. Evidence

F. Degeorge, F. DERRIEN, K. Womack

Journal of Financial Economics

novembre 2010, vol. 98, n°2, pp.177-194

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Initial public offerings, Investment banking, Auctions

accepté le 29 juillet 2009Between 1999 and 2007, WR Hambrecht completed 19 initial public offerings (IPOs) in the US using an auction mechanism. We analyze investor behavior and mechanism performance in these auctioned IPOs using detailed bidding data. The existence of some bids posted at high prices suggests that some investors (mostly retail) try to free-ride on the mechanism. But institutional demand in these auctions is very elastic, suggesting that institutional investors reveal information in the bidding process. Investor participation is largely predictable based on deal size, and demand is dominated by institutions. Flipping is at most as prevalent in auctions as in bookbuilt deals. But, unlike in bookbuilding, investors in auctions do not flip their shares more in 'hot' deals. Finally, we find that institutional investors, who provide more information, are rewarded by obtaining a larger share of the deals that have higher ten-day underpricing. Our results therefore suggest that auctioned IPOs can be an effective alternative to traditional bookbuilding.Keywords: Initial public offerings; Investment banking; Auctions

Awareness Dynamics


Journal of Philosophical Logics

avril 2010, vol. 39, n°2, pp.113-137

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

In recent years, much work has been dedicated by logicians, computer scientists and economists to understanding awareness, as its importance for human behaviour becomes evident. Although several logics of awareness have been proposed, little attention has been explicitly dedicated to change in awareness. However, one of the most crucial aspects of awareness is the changes it undergoes, which have countless important consequences for knowledge and action. The aim of this paper is to propose a formal model of awareness change, and to derive from it logics of awareness change. In the first part of the paper, the model of epistemic states of bounded agents proposed in Hill (Stud Log 89(1):81'109, 2008a) is extended with operations modelling awareness change. In the second part of the paper, it is shown how this model naturally extends the 'standard' logic of awareness to yield a logic of awareness change. Keywords Awareness - Knowledge - Logic of awareness - Awareness change - Belief revision - AGM belief revision - Dynamic epistemic logic