Before You Make That Big Decision


Harvard Business Review

2011, vol. June 2011

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

When an executive makes a big bet, he or she typically relies on the judgment of a team that has put together a proposal for a strategic course of action. After all, the team will have delved into the pros and cons much more deeply than the executive has time to do. The problem is, biases invariably creep into any team’s reasoning—and often dangerously distort its thinking. A team that has fallen in love with its recommendation, for instance, may subconsciously dismiss evidence that contradicts its theories, give far too much weight to one piece of data, or make faulty comparisons to another business case.That’s why, with important decisions, executives need to conduct a careful review not only of the content of recommendations but of the recommendation process. To that end, the authors—Kahneman, who won a Nobel Prize in economics for his work on cognitive biases; Lovallo of the University of Sydney; and Sibony of McKinsey—have put together a 12-question checklist intended to unearth and neutralize defects in teams’ thinking. These questions help leaders examine whether a team has explored alternatives appropriately, gathered all the right information, and used well-grounded numbers to support its case. They also highlight considerations such as whether the team might be unduly influenced by self-interest, overconfidence, or attachment to past decisions.By using this practical tool, executives will build decision processes over time that reduce the effects of biases and upgrade the quality of decisions their organizations make. The payoffs can be significant: A recent McKinsey study of more than 1,000 business investments, for instance, showed that when companies worked to reduce the effects of bias, they raised their returns on investment by seven percentage points.Executives need to realize that the judgment of even highly experienced, superbly competent managers can be fallible. A disciplined decision-making process, not individual genius, is the key to good strategy

Better Vision for the Poor

B. GARRETTE, A. Karnani, J. Kassalow, M. Lee

Stanford Social Innovation Review

printemps 2011, pp.66-71

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Several social enterprises are attempting to provide eyeglasses to the 500 million to 1 billion poor people in the world who need them. Some enterprises see the provision of trained optometrists as the key to solving the problem; others are focused on cost reduction; others still are focused on technological innovations. Why haven't any of these approaches succeeded on a large scale?

Cooperation among competitors as status-seeking behavior: Network ties and status differentiation

V. Perrone, M. TORTORIELLO, B. McEvily

European Management Journal

octobre 2011, vol. 29, pp.335-346

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Entrepreneurial Initiative Selling within Organizations: Towards a More Comprehensive Motivational Framework


Journal of Management Studies

septembre 2011, vol. 48, n°6, pp.1269-1290

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

We develop and test a motivational framework to explain the intensity with which individuals sell entrepreneurial initiatives within their organizations. Initiative selling efforts may be driven by several factors that hitherto have not been given full consideration: initiative characteristics, individuals' anticipation of rewards, and their level of dissatisfaction. On the basis of a survey in a mail service firm of 192 managers who proposed an entrepreneurial initiative, we find that individuals' reported intensity of their selling efforts with respect to that initiative is greater when they (1) believe that the organizational benefits of the initiative are high, (2) perceive that the initiative is consistent with current organizational practices (although this effect is weak), (3) believe that their immediate organizational environment provides extrinsic rewards for initiatives, and (4) are satisfied with the current organizational situation. These findings extend previous expectancy theory-based explanations of initiative selling (by considering the roles of initiative characteristics and that of initiative valence for the proponent) and show the role of satisfaction as an important motivational driver for initiative selling.

Heterogeneous Motives and the Collective Creation of Value

F. Bridoux, R. Coeurderoy, R. DURAND

Academy of Management Review

octobre 2011, vol. 36, n°4, pp.711-730

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Value, Motivation (Psychology), Behavior economics, Social psychology, Monetary incentives, Cooperation

The collective creation of value has remained underexplored in management research. Drawing on social psychology and behavioral economics, we analyze the impact of the mix of employee motives to cooperate and compare the collective value generated by three motivational systems: individual monetary incentives, benevolent cooperation, and disciplined cooperation. Aligning the motivational system with the mix of motives in the workforce allows firms to foster cooperation and realize the value creation potential of their resources

Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis


Management Science

mai 2011, vol. 57, n°5, pp.843-863

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Mots clés : Innovation contests, Uncertainty, Innovation, Problem solving, Tournaments

Contests are a historically important and increasingly popular mechanism for encouraging innovation. A central concern in designing innovation contests is how many competitors to admit. Using a unique data set of 9,661 software contests, we provide evidence of two coexisting and opposing forces that operate when the number of competitors increases. Greater rivalry reduces the incentives of all competitors in a contest to exert effort and make investments. At the same time, adding competitors increases the likelihood that at least one competitor will find an extreme-value solution. We show that the effort-reducing effect of greater rivalry dominates for less uncertain problems, whereas the effect on the extreme value prevails for more uncertain problems. Adding competitors thus systematically increases overall contest performance for high-uncertainty problems. We also find that higher uncertainty reduces the negative effect of added competitors on incentives. Thus, uncertainty and the nature of the problem should be explicitly considered in the design of innovation tournaments. We explore the implications of our findings for the theory and practice of innovation contests. Innovation contests tournaments

Les mouvements sociaux, organisations et stratégies ? / Social movements, organizations and strategies

D. Golsorkhi, H. Bergeron, P. Castem, R. DURAND, B. Leca

Revue Française de Gestion

octobre 2011, vol. 37, n°217, pp.79-91

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

On Intersecting Ground: the Changing Structure of U.S. Corporate Networks

D. Knoke, D. MANI

Social Network Analysis and Mining

2011, vol. 1, n°1, pp.43-58

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Mots clés : R&D, Research joint venture, Social rate of return welfare analysis, Innovation, Game theory

Water demand for different applications is increasing year by year, while on the contrary, its availability, due to various reasons, tends to decrease. Also, districts that are historically rich in such resource have to deal with this new situation and give great attention and care to water management. Good examples of an integrated approach to water management in the Veneto Region are the 'Modello strutturale degli Acquedotti del Veneto' and the 'Progetto integrato Fusina'. The first project aims at managing water resources of a district with 4,500,000 inhabitants for the next 30 years, while the second one intends to realise an integrated plant capable of purifying wastewaters produced by a great industrial and urban area of 600,000 inhabitants and to supply purified waters instead of clean fresh water for industrial needs

Personal networks and knowledge transfer in inter-organizational networks

N. Rejeb, L. Mezghani, B. QUÉLIN

Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development

2011, vol. 18, n°2, pp.278-297

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Knowledge transfer, Best practice, Learning organizations, Information management

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to test the transfer of good practices under the effect of various aspects of personal networks. Whereas, the majority of former work considers a direct effect of networks on knowledge transfer, the authors examined two intermediate mechanisms: the access to strategic resources and the individual's absorptive capacity.Design/methodology/approach– A quantitative study was used to collect data, via a face-to-face questionnaire with key individuals in small and medium entreprises members of consortia in Tunisia. Data were analysed with a structural equations approach, based on partial least squared-path modelling techniques.Findings– Results emphasize the impact of network size, strength of ties and absorptive capacity on the strategic resource access and the impact of indirect ties, strength and range of ties on the absorptive capacity. Moreover, while absorptive capacity positively impacts good practice transfer, no support was found to the effect of resource access.Research limitations/implications– The main limitation of this study concerns the measuring of good practice transfer, since in literature there are often imprecise proxies. Also, while the authors have investigated the global impact of strategic resources, future research needs to treat them separately. Finally, a longitudinal study allows better capture of the evolution of the phenomenon studied.Practical implications– Top management and directors at a consortium level need to pay careful attention to the social context within which knowledge transfer efforts occur. Resources exchanged and the absorptive capacity developed through social interactions must be designed to increase knowledge flows between firms.Originality/value– The paper links two bodies of research often studied separately in inter-organizational research: literature on social networks and that on inter-organizational learning. It is hoped that the paper contributes to a cross-fertilization of the two fields

Red and Blue: The Relationship between the Institutional Context and the Performance of Leveraged Buyout Investments


Strategic Management Journal

décembre 2011, vol. 32, n°12, pp.1356-1367

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Institutional theory, Private equity, Political views

This paper advances the debate concerning the relationship between politics and business conduct by investigating the influence of the institutional context on leveraged buyout investments. We propose that the formal and informal institution context in 'red' states (those dominated by the U.S. Republican Party) is more aligned with the principal strategies through which leveraged buyout investors create value than such a context is in 'blue' states (those dominated by the Democratic Party). Therefore, according to institutional theory, one would expect, ceteris paribus, a higher likelihood of buyout transactions in red states and vice versa. We analyze a sample of 10,746 U.S. buyout investments in 4,633 distinct target companies made by 2,396 different funds managed by 1,300 private equity firms from 1980 to 2003. The results indicate strong evidence of a positive association between a more aligned institutional context and both the volume of buyout activity and different measures of performance for these buyouts