À la découverte du lien organisationnel : avez-vous lu A. O. Hirschman ?


Management International

hiver 2018, vol. 22, n°2, pp.9-12

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Théorie des organisations, Hirschman, sortie, voix, loyauté

Le dossier spécial consacré par la revue Management International à la pensée de Albert O. Hirschman est issu d’une journée organisée par i3-CRG, le LIRSA (CNAM) et SnO d’HEC. Il s’agit de revenir sur l’importance des concepts de Hirschman pour la théorie des organisations, notamment exit, voice et loyalty. Économiste de formation, spécialiste notamment de l’économie du développement, Hirschman a pratiqué toute sa vie durant le dépassement des frontières disciplinaires (trespassing) ce qui l’a amené à la théorie des organisations et il reste un exemple pour les chercheurs actuels

A Model of Trading in the Art Market


American Economic Review

mars 2018, vol. 108, n°3, pp.744-774

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : art; auctions; endogenous trading; price indexes; private values; returns

We present an infinite-horizon model of endogenous trading in the art auction market. Agents make purchase and sale decisions based on the relative magnitude of their private use value in each period. Our model generates endogenous cross-sectional and time-series patterns in investment outcomes. Average returns and buy-in probabilities are negatively correlated with the time between purchase and resale (attempt). Idiosyncratic risk does not converge to zero as the holding period shrinks. Prices and auction volume increase during expansions. Our model finds empirical support in auction data and has implications for selection biases in observed prices and transaction-based price indexes

A Universe of Stories: Mobilizing Narrative Practices During Transformative Change


Strategic Management Journal

mars 2018, vol. 39, n°3, pp.664-696

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : strategic change, narrative, strategyaspractice, storytelling, reflection

Constructing narratives of transformative change is an important but challenging practice through which strategy makers attempt to influence acceptance of an ongoing transformation. To understand whether and how strategy makers can construct a steady influx of captivating narratives of transformative change, we analyzed how one noted strategy maker assisted the successful transformation of his organization over three decades by orchestrating the production of change narratives. Our analysis reveals that the strategy maker constructed and reconstructed meanings of change over time using three sets of distinct but interconnected narrative practices. We develop a dynamic model linking the simultaneous mobilization of these practices to strategy makers’ ability to harness the persistent tension between novelty and familiarity in a transformative change, and thereby win endorsement from key audiences. This paper was accepted for publication on Strategic Management Journal Special Issue on "Strategy Processes and Practices: Dialogues and Intersections"

An Integrated Revenue Management Framework for a Firm's Greening, Pricing and Inventory Decisions


International Journal of Production Economics

janvier 2018, vol. 195, pp.373-390

Départements : GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Environment, Newsvendor problem, Pricing, Market segmentation, Distribution-free approach

There is a growing interest on developing efficient ways of incorporating environmental considerations into business practices in order to meet both consumers' demand for green products/services, and the firms' sustainable profitability. The main contribution of this article is in developing an integrated revenue management framework to address a firm's greening (investment) effort, pricing and inventory decisions. It is assumed that the firm inaugurates a green product along with its existing product. Even though the firm offers both the green and regular product at differentiated prices, the market segmentation as a result of this price differentiation is regarded as imperfect. This imperfect market segmentation causes a demand leakage mainly due to the heterogeneity among the customers' willingness-to-pay. These effects are included in our proposed model and simplified analytical solutions are developed to solve the same. Additional scenarios where a firm experiences a price-dependent stochastic demand with an unknown distribution is also modeled. This scenario is addressed using a distribution-free approach based on Scarf' s rule. The performance of the proposed methods and the significance of the modeling framework are finally corroborated through several simulations. This analysis provides a sustainable environment, production and retailing framework while still augmenting profitability using fundamental tools from revenue management

Belief-free price formation


Journal of Financial Economics

février 2018, vol. 127, n°2, pp.342-365

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS), Economie et Sciences de la décision

Mots clés : Financial market microstructure, Informed dealers, Price volatility, Belief-free equilibria

We analyze security price formation in a dynamic setting in which long-lived dealers re- peatedly compete for the opportunity to trade with short-lived retail traders. We charac- terize equilibria in which dealers’ pricing strategies are optimal irrespective of the private information that each dealer may possess. Thus, our model’s predictions are robust to dif- ferent specifications of the dealers’ information structure. These equilibria reconcile, in a unified and parsimonious framework, price dynamics that are reminiscent of well-known stylized facts: excess price volatility, price to trading flow correlation, stochastic volatility and inventory-related trading

Collaborative Prototyping of Alternative Designs Under a Target Costing Scheme


Production and Operations Management

mars 2018, vol. 27, n°3, pp.496–515

Mots clés : Collaborative prototyping, Parallel and sequential testing, Supplier involvement, Target costing

Prototyping allows firms to evaluate the technical feasibility of alternative product designs and to better estimate their costs. We study a collaborative prototyping scenario in which a manufacturer involves a supplier in the prototyping process by letting the supplier make detailed design choices for critical components and provide prototypes for testing. While the supplier can obtain private information about the costs, the manufacturer uses target costing to gain control over the design choice. We show that involving the supplier in the prototyping process has an important influence on the manufacturer's optimal decisions. The collaboration results in information asymmetry, which makes parallel prototyping less attractive and potentially reverses the optimal testing sequence under sequential prototyping: It may be optimal to test designs in increasing order of attractiveness to avoid that the supplier does not release technically and economically feasible prototypes for strategic reasons. We also find that the classical target costing approaches (cost- and market-based) need to be adjusted in the presence of alternative designs: Due to the strategic behavior of suppliers, it is not always optimal to provide identical target costs for designs with similar cost and performance estimates, nor to provide different target costs for dissimilar designs. Furthermore, the timing is important: While committing upfront to carefully chosen target costs reduces the supplier's strategic behavior, in some circumstances, the manufacturer can take advantage of this behavior by remaining flexible and specifying the second prototype's target costs later

Construction of Relations with Distant Suppliers on the Cognitive and Relational Dimensions to Co-Explore Discontinuous Innovations / Construction des relations avec des fournisseurs distants sur les plans cognitifs et relationnels pour co-explorer des in


Innovations, Revue d’économie et de management de l'innovation

2018, vol. 1, n°55, pp.61-87

Départements : GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : innovation discontinue, implication des fournisseurs, fournisseurs distants, open innovation, exploration, organisation ambidextre / discontinuous innovation, suppliers contribution, distant suppliers, open innovation, exploration, organizational ambidextry

Co-explorer des concepts avec des fournisseurs distants, sur les plans cognitifs et relationnels, favorise l’identification d’innovations discontinues. Cependant, peu de travaux s’intéressent aux modalités de construction de ces relations. Sur la base d’une étude longitudinale d’une entreprise qui a co-exploré des innovations discontinues avec des fournisseurs distants, nous mettons en évidence de manière inductive deux caractéristiques du processus et de l’organisation adoptée pour construire ces relations. Nous soulignons la transparence du processus de co-exploration qui soutient un engagement progressif mutuel. Ce processus est porté par un acteur dédié, ayant accès à la fois aux experts techniques ainsi qu’aux dirigeants de l’entreprise qui prennent les décisions stratégiques en matière de domaines d’innovation et de développement. Cet acteur est ainsi un des vecteurs de l’ambidextrie organisationnelle de l’entreprise puisqu’il permet le développement de ces relations parallèlement aux relations de long terme avec des partenaires privilégiés

Differential Firm Commitment to Industries Supported by Social Movement Organizations


Organization Science

janvier-février 2018, vol. 29, n°1, pp.154-171

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : organization and management theory, strategy and policy, sustainability/corporate environmentalism, economic sociology, nonmarket/political environment

This article theorizes about and tests the conditions under which firms’ commitment to an industry is influenced by social movement organizations (SMOs) that favor the industry. We argue that the more prominent SMOs are within an industry, the more a firm increases its commitment to that industry by expanding its operations; yet, this main effect should be moderated substantially by a firm’s idiosyncratic characteristics. The current research predicts that a firm’s location, its sensitivity to information about the industry’s potential, and its history of associations with activists determine the magnitude of the effect of SMO prominence on its strategic commitment to the industry. We test and find support for these hypotheses using a longitudinal data set of European manufacturers of solar photovoltaic cells between 1990 and 2011. The findings offer new insights for literature on social movements and organizations, as well as strategic management research

Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows


Operations Research

mars-avril 2018, vol. 66, n°2, pp.327-339

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : network games, dynamic flows, price of anarchy, price of stability, Braess ratio, max-flow min-cut

We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We give a precise description of the dynamics induced by the individual strategies of players and of the corresponding costs, either when the traffic is controlled by a planner, or when players act selfishly. In parallel networks, optimal and equilibrium behavior eventually coincides, but the selfish behavior of the first players has consequences that cannot be undone and are paid by all future generations. In more general topologies, our main contributions are three-fold. First, we show that equilibria are usually not unique. In particular, we prove that there exists a sequence of networks such that the price of anarchy is equal to n-1, where n is the number of vertices, and the price of stability is equal to 1.Second, we illustrate a new dynamic version of Braess's paradox: the presence of initial queues in a network may decrease the long-run costs in equilibrium. This paradox may arise even in networks for which no Braess's paradox was previously known.Third, we propose an extension to model seasonalities by assuming that departure flows fluctuate periodically over time. We introduce a measure that captures the queues induced by periodicity of inflows. This measure is the increase in costs compared to uniform departures for optimal and equilibrium flows in parallel networks

Financing Capacity Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: An Optimal Contracting Approach


Manufacturing & Service Operations Management

hiver 2018, vol. 20, n°1, pp.85-96

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Capacity, Optimal Contracts, Financial Constraints, Newsvendor Model

We study the capacity choice problem of a firm whose access to capital is hampered by financial frictions in the form of moral hazard. The firm must therefore optimize not only its capacity investment under demand uncertainty, but also its sourcing of funds. Ours is the first study of this problem to follow an optimal contracting approach, where feasible source of funds are derived endogenously from fundamentals and include standard financial claims (debt, equity, convertible debt, call and put warrants, etc.) and combinations thereof. We characterize the optimal capacity level. First, we find conditions under which a feasible financial contract exists that achieves first-best. When no such contract exists, we find that under optimal financing, the choice of capacity sometimes exceeds strictly the efficient level. This runs counter to the literature on financing capacity investment in funds and the intuition that by raising the cost of external capital and hence the unit capacity cost, financial market frictions lower the optimal capacity level. We trace the value of increasing capacity beyond the efficient level to a bonus effect and a demand differentiation effect. In contrast to most of the literature on financing capacity, our results are robust to a change of financial contract