Articles

Ambiguity and the Bayesian Approach

I. GILBOA, M. MARINACCI

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Belief-free price formation

S. LOVO, T. TOMALA, J. HÖRNER

Journal of Financial Economics

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS), Economie et Sciences de la décision


Deciding about human lives: an experimental measure of risk attitudes under prospect theory

E. KEMEL, C. PARASCHIV

Social Choice and Welfare

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-018-1111-y


For public policies in the health, security or safety domains, the main consequences concern the number of human lives that are saved or lost, and are uncertain ex-ante. In classic economic evaluations of such policies, losses and gains of human lives are often monetized and aggregated with other costs and benefits. Uncertainty about human lives is thus treated as uncertainty about monetary consequences. In this paper, we question whether people risk human lives as they risk money.We present an experiment comparing risk attitudes towards human lives and towards money under prospect theory. The results show that respondents treat the two attributes differently when losses are involved. Specifically, the decisions involving human lives are characterizedby less elevated probability weighting in the loss domain and higher loss aversion compared to decisions involving money. These findings suggest that public preferences may differ from the cost-benefit analysis recommendations

Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows

M. SCARSINI, M. SCHÔDER, T. TOMALA

Operations Research

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Network games, dynamic flows, price of seasonality, price of anarchy, max-flow min-cut

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2278203


We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We give a precise description of the dynamics induced by the individual strategies of players and of the corresponding costs, either when the traffic is controlled by a planner, or when players act selfishly. In parallel networks, optimal and equilibrium behavior eventually coincides, but the selfish behavior of the first players has consequences that cannot be undone and are paid by all future generations. In more general topologies, our main contributions are three-fold. First, we show that equilibria are usually not unique. In particular, we prove that there exists a sequence of networks such that the price of anarchy is equal to n-1, where n is the number of vertices, and the price of stability is equal to 1.Second, we illustrate a new dynamic version of Braess's paradox: the presence of initial queues in a network may decrease the long-run costs in equilibrium. This paradox may arise even in networks for which no Braess's paradox was previously known.Third, we propose an extension to model seasonalities by assuming that departure flows fluctuate periodically over time. We introduce a measure that captures the queues induced by periodicity of inflows. This measure is the increase in costs compared to uniform departures for optimal and equilibrium flows in parallel networks

Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring

T. TOMALA, Marie LACLAU

Journal of Economic Theory

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Two-sided reputation in certification markets

M. BOUVARD, R. LEVY

Management Science

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Certification, Reputation, Multihoming


In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but sometimes repels low-quality sellers. As a consequence, reputational concerns may induce the certifier to reduce information quality, thus depressing welfare. The entry of a second certifier impacts reputational incentives: when sellers only solicit one certifier, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this region may expand when sellers hold multiple certifications

Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish

O. EVREN, S. MINARDI

Economic Journal

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision


Why the Empty Shells Were Not Fired: A Semi-Bibliographical Note

I. GILBOA

Episteme

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Zero-sum revision games

F. GENSBITTEL, S. LOVO, J. RENAULT, T. TOMALA

Games and Economic Behavior

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS), Economie et Sciences de la décision



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