Articles

Ambiguity and the Bayesian Approach

I. GILBOA, M. MARINACCI

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Belief-free price formation

S. LOVO, T. TOMALA, J. HÖRNER

Journal of Financial Economics

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS), Economie et Sciences de la décision


Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows

M. SCARSINI, M. SCHÔDER, T. TOMALA

Operations Research

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Network games, dynamic flows, price of seasonality, price of anarchy, max-flow min-cut

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2278203


We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We give a precise description of the dynamics induced by the individual strategies of players and of the corresponding costs, either when the traffic is controlled by a planner, or when players act selfishly. In parallel networks, optimal and equilibrium behavior eventually coincides, but the selfish behavior of the first players has consequences that cannot be undone and are paid by all future generations. In more general topologies, our main contributions are three-fold. First, we show that equilibria are usually not unique. In particular, we prove that there exists a sequence of networks such that the price of anarchy is equal to n-1, where n is the number of vertices, and the price of stability is equal to 1.Second, we illustrate a new dynamic version of Braess's paradox: the presence of initial queues in a network may decrease the long-run costs in equilibrium. This paradox may arise even in networks for which no Braess's paradox was previously known.Third, we propose an extension to model seasonalities by assuming that departure flows fluctuate periodically over time. We introduce a measure that captures the queues induced by periodicity of inflows. This measure is the increase in costs compared to uniform departures for optimal and equilibrium flows in parallel networks

More haste less speed? Signaling through investment timing

R. LEVY, C. BOBTCHEFF

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20160200


We consider a cash-constrained firm learning on the value of an irreversible project at a privately-known speed. Under perfect information, the optimal date of investment may be non-monotonic in the learning speed: better learning increases the value of experimenting further, but also the speed of updating. Under asymmetric information, the firm uses its investment timing to signal confidence in the project and raise cheaper capital from uninformed investors, which may generate timing distortions: investment is hurried when learning is sufficiently fast, and delayed otherwise. The severity of the cash constraint affects the magnitude of the distortion, but not its direction

Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring

T. TOMALA, Marie LACLAU

Journal of Economic Theory

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Banks and International Trade

Banu DEMIR-PAKEL, T. K. MICHALSKI, E. ORS

Review of Financial Studies

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS), Finance


Two-sided reputation in certification markets

M. BOUVARD, R. LEVY

Management Science

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Certification, Reputation, Multihoming


In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but sometimes repels low-quality sellers. As a consequence, reputational concerns may induce the certifier to reduce information quality, thus depressing welfare. The entry of a second certifier impacts reputational incentives: when sellers only solicit one certifier, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this region may expand when sellers hold multiple certifications

Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish

O. EVREN, S. MINARDI

Economic Journal

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision


Why the Empty Shells Were Not Fired: A Semi-Bibliographical Note

I. GILBOA

Episteme

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Zero-sum revision games

F. GENSBITTEL, S. LOVO, J. RENAULT, T. TOMALA

Games and Economic Behavior

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS), Economie et Sciences de la décision



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