Articles

Debt decisions in deregulated industries

A. OVTCHINNIKOV

Journal of Corporate Finance: Contracting, Governance and Organization

février 2016, vol. 36, pp.230-254

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Debt decisions, Debt maturity, Public and private debt issues, Deregulation

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2314302


Deregulation significantly affects firms’ debt decisions. Prior to deregulation, regulated firms depend more on long-term and public debt but reduce this dependence considerably during deregulation. Cross-sectional analysis shows that the lower use of long-term and public debt results from changing firm sensitivities to determinants of debt decisions triggered by deregulation. Consistent with credit and liquidity risk theories of debt maturity, the concave relation between firm quality and debt maturity is attenuated among regulated firms. Inconsistent with these theories, the convex relation between firm quality and public debt issues exists only among regulated firms. I find limited support for other theories

Fed Funds Futures Variance Futures

D. FILIPOVIC, A. TROLLE

Quantitative Finance

2016, vol. 16, n°9, pp.1413-1422

Départements : Finance

Mots clés : fed funds futures, Funding costs, Unsecured interbank money market

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14697688.2016.1152391


We develop a novel contract design, the fed funds futures (FFF) variance futures, which reflects the expected realized basis point variance of an underlying FFF rate. The valuation of short-term FFF variance futures is completely model-independent in a general setting that includes the cases where the underlying FFF rate exhibits jumps and where the realized variance is computed by sampling the FFF rate discretely. The valuation of longer-term FFF variance futures is subject to an approximation error which we quantify and show is negligible. We also provide an illustrative example of the practical valuation and use of the FFF variance futures contract

Information asymmetry, the cost of debt, and credit events: Evidence from quasi-random analyst disappearances

F. DERRIEN, A. KECSKÉS, S. A. MANSI

Journal of Corporate Finance: Contracting, Governance and Organization

2016, vol. 39, pp.295-311

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Information asymmetry, Cost of debt, Default, Bankruptcy, Natural experiment, Matching estimators, Difference-in-differences, Equity research analysts, Creditors

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2038896


We hypothesize that greater information asymmetry causes greater losses to debtholders. To test this, we identify exogenous increases in information asymmetry using the loss of an analyst that results from broker closures and broker mergers. We find that the loss of an analyst causes the cost of debt to increase by 25 basis points for treatment firms compared to control firms, and the rate of credit events (e.g., defaults) is roughly 100–150% higher. These results are driven by firms that are more sensitive to changes in information (e.g., less analyst coverage). The evidence is broadly consistent with both financing and monitoring channels, although only a financing channel explains the impact of the loss of an analyst on firms' cost of debt

News Trading and Speed

T. FOUCAULT, J. HOMBERT, I. ROSU

The Journal of Finance

février 2016, vol. 71, n°1, pp.335-382

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : News, Liquidity, Volume, Price discovery, High frequency trading

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2188822


We compare the optimal trading strategy of an informed speculator when he can trade ahead of incoming news (is “fast”), versus when he cannot (is “slow”). We find that speed matters: the fast speculator's trades account for a larger fraction of trading volume, and are more correlated with short-run price changes. Nevertheless, he realizes a large fraction of his profits from trading on long-term price changes. The fast speculator's behavior matches evidence about high frequency traders. We predict that stocks with more informative news are more liquid even though they attract more activity from informed high frequency traders

Organizational and Epistemic Change: The Growth of the Art Investment Field

E. H. COSLOR, C. SPAENJERS

Accounting Organizations and Society

novembre 2016, vol. 55, pp.48 - 62

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Accounting and financial knowledge claims; Art investment; Epistemic cultures; Performance measurement; Technical fields; Valuation practices


What can studying the creation of knowledge tell us about how new technical fields emerge and develop? This paper shows how a knowledge community may be necessary to support the legitimacy of new products that undergo performance evaluation before purchase. Using historical and ethnographic data covering half a century, we review the growth of the art investment field through an epistemic cultures lens. Technical knowledge about the financial characteristics of art has been developed alongside practical knowledge about how best to structure investment ventures. Investment venture success has been determined by legitimacy as much as by profitability, given durable expectations about the evaluation and monitoring of investments. The growth of knowledge, practices and tools was thus a necessary condition for the recognition of artwork as an asset class. Crucially, the epistemic cultures approach highlights deepening knowledge, resources and professional expertise, and their development through experimentation, failures and negative knowledge. This shows accounting issues contributing to technical field legitimacy and emergence, such as the role of knowledge production, valuation practices and receptive environments, and the distinction between legitimate investments that can be valued and investment venture profitability

Risk-Sharing or Risk-Taking? Counterparty Risk, Incentives, and Margins

B. BIAIS, F. HEIDER, M. HOEREVA

The Journal of Finance

aout 2016, vol. 71, n°4, pp.1669-1698

Départements : Finance


Derivatives activity, motivated by risk-sharing, can breed risk-taking. Bad news about the risk of an asset underlying a derivative increases protection sellers’ expected liability and undermines their risk-prevention incentives. This limits risk-sharing, creates endogenous counterparty risk, and can lead to contagion from news about the hedged risk to the balance sheet of protection sellers. Margin calls after bad news can improve protection sellers’ incentives and in turn enhance risk-sharing. Central clearing can provide insurance against counterparty risk but must be designed to preserve risk-prevention incentives

The Annuity Puzzle Remains a Puzzle

K. PEIJNENBURG, Theo NIJMAN, Bas WERKER

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

septembre 2016, vol. 70, pp.18-35

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Asset allocation; Life-cycle portfolio choice; Annuity; Savings

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188916301002


We examine incomplete annuity menus, background risk, bequest motives, and default risk as possible drivers of divergence from full annuitization. Contrary to what is often suggested in the literature, we find that full annuitization remains optimal if saving is possible after retirement. This holds irrespective of whether real or only nominal annuities are available. Whenever liquidity is desired, individuals save sizeable amounts out of their annuity income to smooth consumption shocks. Similarly, adding equity-linked annuities to the menu does not increase welfare significantly, since individuals can invest in stocks in order to get the desired equity exposure

The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies

M. K. BRUNNERMEIER, L. GARICANO, P. R. LANE, M. PAGANO, R. REIS, T. SANTOS, D. THESMAR, S. VAN NIEUWERBURGH, D. VAYANOS

American Economic Review

mai 2016, vol. 106, n°5, pp.508-512

Départements : Finance


We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. Second, equity requirements can be lowered if banks only hold senior domestic sovereign debt. Third, such requirements shrink even further if banks only hold the senior tranche of an internationally diversified sovereign portfolio known as ESBies in the euro-area context. Finally, ESBies generate more safe assets than domestic debt tranching alone; and, insofar as the diabolic loop is defused, the junior tranche generated by the securitization is itself risk-free


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