Articles

Payment Evasion

S. BUEHLER, D. HALBHEER, M. LECHNER

Journal of Industrial Economics

décembre 2017, vol. 67, n°4, pp.804-832

Départements : Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joie.2017.65.issue-4/issuetoc


This paper shows that a firm can use the purchase price and the fine imposedon detected payment evaders to discriminate between unobservable con-sumer types. Assuming that consumers self-select into regular buyers andpayment evaders, we show that the firm typically engages in second-degreeprice discrimination in which the purchase price exceeds the expected fine.In addition, we find that higher fines do not necessarily reduce paymentevasion. We illustrate with data from fare dodging on public transportation


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