Two-sided matching with interdependent values

A. CITANNA, M. Ostrovskyc, A. Chakrabortya

Journal of Economic Theory

janvier 2010, vol. 145, n°1, pp.85-105

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision

Mots clés : Interdependent values, Stability, Matching

We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observe only their own matches, a stable mechanism exists if students have identical preferences over colleges, but may not exist if students have different preferences.Keywords: Interdependent values; Stability; Matchingaccepté le 21 juillet 2009