What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information ?


Journal of Mathematical Economics

juin 2006, vol. 42, n°3, pp.343-357

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Bayesian games, Information structure, Symmetric information, One-sided information, Value-of-information function

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs. In two-person zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers for two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided, where only one player is informed