Articles

Bank Performance Around the Introduction of a Section 20 Subsidiary

M. Comett, E. ÖRS, H. Tehranian

The Journal of Finance

février 2002, vol. 57, n°1, pp.501-521

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


As of 1987, commercial banks in the United States were allowed to establish Section 20 subsidiaries to conduct investment-banking activities. A concern of regulators was that these activities would result in a decrease in performance of commercial banks relative to the risk being undertaken. This paper examines the performance of commercial banks around the establishment of a Section 20 subsidiary. We find that Section 20 activities undertaken by banks result in increased industry-adjusted operating cash flow return on assets, due mainly to revenues from noncommercial-banking activities. Further, risk measures for the sample banks do not change significantly.

Bargaining Over an Uncertain Outcome: The Role of Beliefs

A. Billot, A. Chateauneuf, I. GILBOA, J. Tallon

Decisions in Economics and Finance

2002, vol. 25, pp.33-45

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Behavioural decision theory and the gains debate in international politics

M. MULFORD, J. BEREJIKIAN

Political Studies

juin 2002, vol. 50, n°2, pp.209-229


Blackwell Optimality in Markov Decision Processes with Partial Observation

D. ROSENBERG, E. Solan, N. VIEILLE

Annals of Statistics

août 2002, vol. 30, n°4, pp.1178-1193

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Business Taxation Distorting the Common Market - An Important Ruling on State Aids by the Court of First Instance

J. KLEINHEISTERKAMP, A. Barberá del Rosal

Competition Policy Newsletter

juin 2002, n°2, pp.61-64

Départements : Droit et fiscalité


Can the distribution channels explain differences in marketing and sales performance measurement systems?

H. LONING, M. Besson

European Management Journal

décembre 2002, vol. 20, n°6, pp.597-609

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion


Competitive Advantages Exist: A response to Powell

R. DURAND

Strategic Management Journal

2002, vol. 23, n°9, pp.867-872

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


This response is a plea for considering cautiously the use of formal logic and philosophy in strategic management. In a recent article, logical and philosophical considerations on the relationship between competitive advantage and superior returns led to a pragmatic view of competitive advantage. First, we propose a different logical analysis of the links between competitive advantage and superior performance. Using the scarce premises, this analysis leads to different conclusions. Second, our commentaries suggest that philosophy should be employed for opening discussions and perspectives rather than as an instrument for conviction

Competitive Equilibrium with Moral Hazard in Economies with Multiple Commodities

A. Villanacci, A. CITANNA

Journal of Mathematical Economics

septembre 2002, vol. 38, n°1-2, pp.117-147

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision


We study an economy with competitive commodity markets and exclusive pairwise contractual relations with moral hazard, where both the principal and the agent can be risk averse. We show existence of equilibria and their generic constrained suboptimality, by means of a change in the compensation schemes. Such suboptimality occurs provided the number of commodities is sufficiently large relative to the number of states and pair types, and there are at least three future states of the world

Consumers' Number Sense for Prices of Consumer Goods

M. Vanhuele, G. LAURENT, X. Drèze

Advances in Consumer Research

2002, vol. 29, pp.143-144

Départements : Marketing


Continuous-time Dynkin Games with Mixed Strategies

N. Touzi, N. VIEILLE

SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization

2002, vol. 41, n°4, pp.1073-1088

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Let (X,Y,Z) be a triple of payoff processes defining a Dynkin game \tilde R(\sigma,\tau) &=& E\left[ X_\sigma\1_{\{\tau > \sigma\}} +Y_\tau \1_{\{\tau < \sigma\}} +Z_\tau \1_{\{\tau=\sigma\}}\right] , where $\sigma$ and $\tau$ are stopping times valued in [0,T]. In the case Z=Y, it is well known that the condition X $\leq$ Y is needed in order to establish the existence of value for the game, i.e., $\inf_{\tau}\sup_{\sigma}\tilde R(\sigma,\tau)$ $=$ $\sup_{\sigma}\inf_{\tau}\tilde R(\sigma,\tau)$.In order to remove the condition X $\leq$ Y, we introduce an extension of the Dynkin game by allowing for an extended set of strategies, namely, the set of mixed strategies. The main result of the paper is that the extended Dynkin game has a value when $Z\leq Y$, and the processes X and Y are restricted to be semimartingales continuous at the terminal time T.


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