Are intellectual property rights unfair?


Labour Economics

février 2004, vol. 11, n°1, pp.129-144

Départements : Finance

If redistribution is distortionary, and if the income of skilled workers is due to knowledge-intensive activities and depends positively on intellectual property, a social planner which cares about income distribution may in principle want to use a reduction in intellectual property rights (IPRs) rather than redistributive transfers. On the one hand, such a reduction reduces static inefficiency. On the other hand, standard redistribution also reduces the level of R and D because it distorts occupational choice. We study this possibility in the context of a model with horizontal innovation, where the government, in addition to taxes and transfers, controls the fraction of innovations that are granted patents. The model predicts that standard redistribution always dominates limitations to IPRs

Asymmetric Performance: The Market Share Impact of Scale and Link Alliances in the Global Auto Industry


Strategic Management Journal

juillet 2004, vol. 25, n°7, pp.701-711

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

This study investigates how participating in strategic alliances with rivals affects the relative competitive positions of the partner firms. The paper builds on studies that show significant differences in the outcomes of scale and link alliances. The study argues that the more asymmetric outcomes of link alliances translate into greater changes in the relative market shares of the partner firms, due to unbalanced opportunities for inter-partner learning and learning by doing. We find support for this argument by examining 135 alliances among competing firms in the global automobile industry, from 1966 to 1995

Bayesian inference and state number determination for hidden Markov models: an application to the information content of the yield curve about inflation

N. CHOPIN, F. Peigrin

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B - Statistical Methodology

décembre 2004, vol. 123, n°2, pp.327-344

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision

Mots clés : Hidden Markov models, Information content of the yield curve, Particle filters, State number determination, Switching regression models

This paper is concerned with Bayesian inference in hidden Markov models. Focusing on switching regression models, we propose a new methodology that delivers a joint estimation of the parameters and the number of regimes that have actually appeared in the studied sample. The only prior information that is required on the latter quantity is an upper bound. We implement a particle filter algorithm to compute the corresponding estimates. Applying this methodology to the information content of the yield curve regarding future inflation in four OECD countries, we show that the predictive content for given country and combination of maturities is subject to regime switching.

Better late than never: A study of late entrants in household electrical equipment

J. Shamsie, C. C. PHELPS, J. Kuperman

Strategic Management Journal

janvier 2004, vol. 25, n°1, pp.69-84

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Abstract: Studies on entry timing have largely attempted to determine the benefits that early entrants can obtain over subsequent entrants. Given that a large number of firms enter late in the development of markets, it is surprising that little research has examined the performance differences among late entrants. In this paper, we focus exclusively on late movers and examine the extent to which their post-entry performance is related to their resources, strategic positioning and market conditions around the time of entry. We analyze 165 late entrants in household electrical equipment markets and find that while market entry conditions don't significantly impact late movers' performance, their resources and strategic positioning at the time of entry do effect their subsequent performance. Keywords: Entry timing, late movers, resource based view, strategic positioning

CEO charisma, compensation and firm performance

H. Tosi, V. Misangyi, D. Waldman, F. Yammarino, A. FANELLI

Leadership Quarterly

juin 2004, vol. 15, n°3, pp.405-420

Départements : Management et Ressources Humaines

We examined the relationships among CEO perceived charisma, CEO compensation packages, and firm performance in a sample of Fortune 500 companies over a 10-year period. CEO charisma ratings obtained from company CFOs and VPs for HRM were directly related to total CEO pay but not to any firm performance measures. CEO perceived charisma also was related to shareholder value, under highly uncertain conditions. In essence, charismatic CEOs seem able to influence their compensation packages and stock prices but not other indicators of firm performance. Implications for future charismatic leadership research and CEO compensation'firm performance work are discussed

Changes in the Functional Structure of Firms and the Demand for Skill

E. Maurin, D. THESMAR

Journal of Labor Economics

juillet 2004, vol. 22, n°3

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

We analyze recent changes in the occupational structure of French manufacturing firms. Firms employ a greater proportion of engineers working on the design and marketing of new products and a lower proportion of high-skill experts working in administration-related activities. Firms have also reduced the share of production-related activities at both the levels of high-skill and low-skill workers. We develop a labor demand model that shows the role played by technological change. New technologies make it possible to allocate more human resources to the activities that are the most difficult to program in advance

Chine : l'incomplète réforme par le droit



février 2004, vol. 2, pp.122-136

Départements : Droit et fiscalité

Coase and hotelling: A meeting of the minds

J. HÖRNER, M Kamien

Journal of Political Economy

juin 2004, vol. 112, n°3, pp.718-723

Départements : Finance

In this paper we tie together the two literatures of durable goods monopoly and exhaustible resource pricing. We show that the inter-temporal no-arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good mo-nopolist seller can commit to a price path mirrors the intertemporal no-arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of an exhaustible resource can commit to a price path. The intuition is that the durable good monopolist initially announces high future prices to get high-valuation buyers to buy early and subsequently lowers the price to attract additional buyers. On the other hand, the monopsonist buyer of the exhaustible resource initially announces low future prices to encourage sellers to supply their units early and subsequently, as the stock of the resource declines, raises the price to call forth additional supply. As the period of commitment shrinks to zero, the durable good's price drops to its marginal cost and the exhaustible resource's price jumps to its choke level, all in a twinkling of the eye, as Coase hypothesized.

Collective vs Individual sale of TV rights in league sports

F. PALOMINO, J. Sakovics, S. Falconieri

Journal of the European Economic Association

septembre 2004, vol. 2, n°5, pp.833-862

Départements : Finance

In many countries, the collective sale of television rights by sports leagues has been challenged by the antitrust authorities. In several cases, however, the leagues won in court, on the ground that sport is not a standard good. In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which the sale of television rights collectively by sports leagues, rather than individually by teams, is preferred from a social welfare point of view. We find that collective sale is socially preferable when (a) leagues are small and relatively homogeneous in terms of clout and (b) teams get little performance-related revenues

Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring

J. Renault, T. TOMALA

Games and Economic Behavior

novembre 2004, vol. 49, n°2, pp.313-344

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Keywords Plus: 2-PLAYER REPEATED GAMES; PLAYER REPEATED GAMES; NASH EQUILIBRIA; INFORMATION Abstract: We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer's (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this paper is to extend this characterization to the n-player case. The proof of the characterization relies on an analogy with an auxiliary 2-player repeated game with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We use Kohlberg's (Int. J. Game Theory (1975) 7) result to construct explicitly a canonical communication device for each communication equilibrium payoff