Value Added in Financial Accounting: A Comparative Study of Germany and France

H. STOLOWY, A. Haller

Advances in International Accounting

1998, vol. 11, pp.23-51

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning

D. Bergemann, U. HEGE

Journal of Banking and Finance

1998, vol. 22, n°3, pp.703-735

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model. The value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project. The allocation of the funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard. The optimal contract is a time-varying share contract which provides intertemporal risk-sharing between venture capitalist and entrepreneur. The share of the entrepreneur reflects the value of a real option. The option itself is based on the control of the funds. The dynamic agency costs may be high and lead to an inefficient early stopping of the project. A positive liquidation value explains the adoption of strip financing or convertible securities. Finally, relationship financing, including monitoring and the occasional replacement of the management improves the efficiency of the financial contracting.

Virtues of bad times - Interaction between productivity growth and economic fluctuations

G. SAINT-PAUL, P. Aghion

Macroeconomics Dynamics

septembre 1998, vol. 2, n°3, pp.322-344

Départements : Finance

We develop a model of optimal productivity growth under demand fluctuations. We consider two alternative hypotheses. First, we assume that productivity growth is costly in terms of current production. Second, we assume that the cost of productivity improvements is independent of current production. It is shown that, in the first case, productivity improvements will be countercyclical whereas, in the second case, they will be procyclical. The model then is used to study the impact of the frequency and amplitude of fluctuations on long-run growth. The results corresponding to the first hypothesis are shown to be consistent with recent empirical work

We Are McWorld: The Globalization of Consumer Culture and its Discontents


North Dakota Quarterly

1998, vol. 65, n°2, pp.91-101

Départements : Langues et Cultures

Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders


Journal of Political Economy

février 1998, vol. 106, n°1, pp.172-204

Départements : GREGHEC (CNRS)

Work Hard, Play Hard: An Analysis of Organizational Cliche in Two Accountancy Firms



novembre 1998

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)