Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics



2006, vol. 72, pp.257-286

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

The paper analyzes economic evaluations by distinguishing evaluative statements from value judgments proper. Building on this basis, it compares four solutions to the value-neutrality problem in economics. After rebutting the strong theses about neutrality (normative economics is illegitimate) and non-neutrality (the social sciences are value-impregnated), the paper settles the case between the weak neutrality thesis (common in welfare economics) and a novel, weak non-neutrality thesis that extends the realm of normative economics more widely than the other weak thesis does

Value-based differentiation in business relationships: Gaining and sustaining key supplier status

A. Eggert, W. ULAGA

Journal of Marketing

janvier 2006, vol. 70, n°1, pp.119-136

Départements : Marketing

Many business customers today consolidate their supply bases and implement preferred supplier programs. Consequently, vendors increasingly face the alternative of either gaining a key supplier status with their customers or being pushed into the role of a backup supplier. As product and price become less important differentiators, suppliers of routinely purchased products search for new ways to differentiate themselves in a buyer-seller relationship. This research investigates avenues for differentiation through value creation in business-to-business relationships. The results suggest that relationship benefits display a stronger potential for differentiation in key supplier relationships than cost considerations. The authors identify service support and personal interaction as core differentiators, followed by a supplier's know-how and its ability to improve a customer's time to market. Product quality and delivery performance, along with acquisition costs and operation costs, display a moderate potential to help a firm gain and maintain key supplier status. Finally, price shows the weakest potential for differentiation. KeyWords Plus: BUYER-SELLER RELATIONSHIPS; CUSTOMER VALUE; COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; INDICATORS; DECISIONS; PARADIGM; QUALITY; MARKETS

Virtuele connecties tussen consumenten: netwerken van consumptiekennis en kameraadschap

K. DE VALCK, B. Wierenga, G. Van Bruggen

Ontwikkelingen in het Marktonderzoek

2006, vol. 31, pp.27-43

Départements : Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Consumers increasingly interact with other consumers through the Internet. Electronically based discussion forums, bulletin boards, list servers, chat rooms, newsgroups, and web logs provide consumers worldwide with the ability to share their knowledge, experiences, and opinions. The popularity of electronic consumer exchanges is reflected in the vast number of virtual communities that specifically focus on consumption-related interests. These virtual communities of consumption represent substantial networks of consumer knowledge and companionship that affect consumer behavior. In this article, we address several new insights with respect to the functioning of virtual communities that will enable community managers, marketers, and market researchers to strategically use the opportunities that are oftentimes left unexploited. We discuss various community platforms and point out how the organizational structure may reinforce their potential as an online reference group. Furthermore, we give a classification of virtual community member types based on their participation behavior that allows marketers to locate interesting target groups and that gives them insight in how to address them. Finally, we show how market researchers can use netnographic research to gain insight not only in the functioning of the virtual community as an information source and reference group, but also in the processes that underlie the buying decisions of the community members

Visionnary Knowledge Management: The Case of Eisai Transformation


International Journal of Learning and Intellectual Capital

2006, vol. 13, n°2, pp.109-129

Départements : Management et Ressources Humaines

Volatility Comovement: A Multifrequency Approach

L. E. CALVET, A. Fisher, S. Thompson

Journal of Econometrics

mars-avril 2006, vol. 131, n°1-2, pp.179-215

Départements : Finance

Mots clés : Multivariate MSM, Maximum likelihood, Particle filter, Markov-switching, Stochastic volatility, Multifrequency volatility decomposition, Value-at-risk, Quantile forecasts

We implement a multifrequency volatility decomposition of three exchange rates and show that components with similar durations are strongly correlated across series. This motivates a bivariate extension of the Markov-Switching Multifractal (MSM) introduced in Calvet and Fisher (J. Econ. 105 (2001) 27, J. Financ. Econ. 2 (2004) 49). Bivariate MSM is a stochastic volatility model with a closed-form likelihood. Estimation can proceed by maximum likelihood for state spaces of moderate size, and by simulated likelihood via a particle filter in high-dimensional cases. We estimate the model and confirm its main assumptions in likelihood ratio tests. Bivariate MSM compares favorably to a standard multivariate GARCH both in- and out-of-sample. A parsimonious multifrequency factor structure is finally proposed for multivariate settings with potentially many assetsKeywords: Multivariate MSM; Maximum likelihood; Particle filter; Markov-switching; Stochastic volatility; Multifrequency volatility decomposition; Value-at-risk; Quantile forecasts

What Does it Take to Sell Environmental Policy? An Empirical Analysis of Referendum Data


Environmental and Resource Economics

2006, vol. 33, n°4, pp.441-462

Départements : Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)

What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information ?


Journal of Mathematical Economics

juin 2006, vol. 42, n°3, pp.343-357

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Bayesian games, Information structure, Symmetric information, One-sided information, Value-of-information function

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs. In two-person zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers for two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided, where only one player is informed