Articles

Consolidation et Fragmentation des Marchés Financiers: Coûts et Bénéfices

T. FOUCAULT

La Documentation Française

août 2007, vol. 67, pp.103-128

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Control and Change. Analysing the Process of Institutionalisation

C. DAMBRIN, C. LAMBERT, S. Sponem

Management Accounting Research

juin 2007, vol. 18, n°2, pp.172-208

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion


This paper studies the process by which a change in the institutional logic of an organisational field is institutionalised in management control systems of a firm. In particular, three elements of organisational control, inspired by the control mix defined by Abernethy and Chua (1996), are studied: management culture, division of powers between functions, and accountability principles. The theoretical framework proposed by Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000) enables us to describe the institutionalisation process of management control systems in more detail by observing how ideals are translated into discourse and in turn control techniques. The paper also investigates the internalisation and 'decoupling' occurring between the implementation of control systems, and their actual use when applied for monitoring operational managers. Indeed, the empirical findings, based on a field study conducted in the French subsidiary of a pharmaceutical laboratory, enable us to identify a persistent decoupling. Our results show it stems from ambiguous managerial choices and the resistance of the actors to the new norm. However, it appears that, when discourse can not be heard, it can be partially bypassed using techniques. In fact, these techniques enable an insidious institutionalisation of the new institutional logics when 'what can be done can not be said

Die Geburt des Kapitalismus aus der Idee der doppelten Buchführung

E. CHIAPELLO

WestEnd

2007, n°2, pp.64-93

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion


Differences between Domestic Accounting Standards and IAS: Measurement, Determinants and Implications

Y. DING, T. JEANJEAN, H. STOLOWY

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

janvier 2007, vol. 26, n°1, pp.1-38

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : International accounting differences, Institutional factors, Earnings management, Synchronicity

http://ssrn.com/abstract=869844


This study analyzes determinants and effects of accounting differences between Domestic Accounting Standards (DAS) and International Accounting Standards (IAS). Based on an extensive list of differences between DAS and IAS, we create two indices, 'absence' and 'divergence.' 'Absence' measures the difference between DAS and IAS as the extent to which the rules regarding certain accounting issues are missing in DAS while covered in IAS. 'Divergence' represents the differences between DAS and IAS as the extent to which the rules regarding the same accounting issue differ in DAS and IAS. Using a sample of more than 30 countries for the year 2001, we show that 'absence' is mainly determined by the legal system and the sophistication of the financial system, while 'divergence' is positively associated with the level of economic development and constrained by the importance of equity markets. Our analysis also provides evidence that a higher level of 'absence' creates more opportunities for earnings management and decreases firm-specific information to investors. A larger 'divergence' from IAS offers richer firm-specific information to the capital markets

Diminishing Returns from Reputation: Do Followers have a Competitive Advantage?

T. OBLOJ, K. Oblój

Corporate Reputation Review: an International Review

hiver 2007, vol. 9, n°4, pp.213-224

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Competitive advantage, Competitive dynamics, Reputation, Strategy


The paper addresses the value of reputation as a strategic, intangible resource. We hypothesize that a high reputation of an exchange partner will result in the ability to command a premium price during a transaction because it lowers the transaction costs of the other party. We also hypothesize that the smaller the differences in the level of reputation of competing parties, the more valuable a unit of reputation becomes. We test these hypotheses by empirical analysis of pairs of transactions on the Polish electronic exchange Allegro. Our analysis shows that if the differences in the levels of reputation decrease, the value of a unit of difference increases. We also extrapolate the results of our research into a more general model that shows the conditions in which a strategy based on high reputation (price premium per unit of reputation) is the most effective one and indicates the process of reputation development by stimulating the dynamics of leader and follower behavior.

Discipliner les autres et agir sur soi. La double vie du contrôleur de gestion

C. LAMBERT, E. Pezet

Finance - Contrôle - Stratégie

mars 2007, vol. 10, n°1, pp.183-208

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion


Dans le courant dit critique, de nombreux travaux montrent que le contrôle des individus est obtenu en ayant recours à des effets de domination. En nous intéressant à la conception et au maintien du panoptique plutôt qu'à sa mise en oeuvre, nous montrons ainsi qu'il est possible de dépasser la métaphore disciplinaire et de mettre en évidence l'engagement du sujet dans des jeux de vérité (Foucault, 1984b). De plus, nous choisissons une perspective très rarement adoptée, celle d'observer le panoptique du point de vue du gardien, i.e., le contrôleur de gestion Mots clés : Foucault, subjectivation, épreuve de vérité, contrôleur de gestion, automobile

Discourse and institutional change: ‘giving accounts’ and accountability

M. EZZAMEL, K. ROBSON, P. STAPLETON

Management Accounting Research

juin 2007, vol. 18, n°2, pp.150-171

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Does anonymity matter in electronic limit order markets ?

T. FOUCAULT, S. Moinas, E. Theissen

Review of Financial Studies

septembre 2007, vol. 20, n°5, pp.1707-1747

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


We develop a model in which limit order traders possess volatility information. We show that in this case the size of the bid'ask spread is informative about future volatility. Moreover, if volatility information is in part private, we establish that (i) the size of the bid'ask spread and (ii) its informativeness about future volatility should change in the same direction when limit order traders' identifiers stop being disclosed. We test these predictions using data from the Paris Bourse. As expected, we find that the average quoted spread and its informativeness are significantly smaller when limit order traders' identifiers are concealed. These findings suggest that the limit order book is a channel for volatility information

Down or out: Assessing the welfare costs of household investment mistakes

L. E. CALVET, J. Campbell, P. Sodini

Journal of Political Economy

octobre 2007, vol. 115

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


This paper investigates the efficiency of household investment decisions in a unique dataset containing the disaggregated wealth and income of the entire population of Sweden. The analysis focuses on two main sources of inefficiency in the financial portfolio: underdiversification of risky assets ("down") and nonparticipation in risky asset markets ("out"). We find that while a few households are very poorly diversified, the cost of diversification mistakes is quite modest for most of the population. For instance, a majority of participating Swedish households are sufficiently diversified internationally to outperform the Sharpe ratio of their domestic stock market. We document that households with greater financial sophistication tend to invest more efficiently but also more aggressively, so the welfare cost of portfolio inefficiency tends to be greater for these households. The welfare cost of nonparticipation is smaller by almost one half when we take account of the fact that nonparticipants would be unlikely to invest efficiently if they participated in risky asset markets Keywords: Asset allocation, diversification, familiarity, participation

Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications

B. BIAIS, T. MARIOTTI, G. PLANTIN, J-C. ROCHET

Review of Economic Studies

avril 2007, vol. 74, n°2, pp.345-390

Départements : Finance

https://www.jstor.org/stable/4626144


An entrepreneur with limited liability needs to finance an infinite horizon investment project. An agency problem arises because she can divert operating cash flows before reporting them to the financiers. We first study the optimal contract in discrete time. This contract can be implemented by cash reserves,debt, and equity. The latter is split between the financiers and the entrepreneur and pays dividends when retained earnings reach a threshold. To provide appropriate incentives to the entrepreneur, the firm is downsized when it runs short of cash. We then study the continuous-time limit of the model. We provethe convergence of the discrete-time value functions and optimal contracts. Our analysis yields rich implications for the dynamics of security prices. Stock prices follow a diffusion reflected at the dividend barrier and absorbed at 0. Their volatility, as well as the leverage ratio of the firm, increase after badperformance. Stock prices and book-to-market ratios are in a non-monotonic relationship. A more severe agency problem entails lower price-earning ratios and firm liquidity and higher default risk


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