How Do Firm Political Connections Impact Foreign Acquisitions? The Effects of Decision Makers’ Political and Firm Embeddedness


Global Strategy Journal

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Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : political connections, non-market strategies, foreign acquisitions, French firms, mental models

Research summary: We examine how firm political connections established through the political embeddedness of senior decision makers affect firms’ foreign acquisition strategy. We argue that such political embeddedness affects the mental models of decision makers and, in turn, influences their preferences for particular strategies. We propose that political embeddedness leads to the formation of mental models that favor foreign acquisition strategies. We further argue that the firm embeddedness of politically-embedded decision makers alters their mental models, thereby mitigating their inclination for such strategies. We find evidence consistent with our mental models explanation using a sample of foreign acquisitions made by French publicly-traded firms during the 2009-2014 period. Overall, this study contributes to a better understanding of the mechanisms through which political connections impact global strategy. Managerial summary: We investigate how firm political connections affect firms’ foreign acquisition strategies. We argue that when firms have top decision makers with close connections to the government, they will make more foreign acquisitions. We further argue that this inclination towards foreign acquisitions is primarily driven by non-executive board members, with politically-connected executives appearing to be more reluctant to engage in such strategies. We find evidence consistent with these ideas when examining foreign acquisitions made by French publicly-traded firms managed by graduates of the prestigious ENA government school, which trains many government and senior civil servants in France

How Much Do Means Tested Benefits Reduce the Demand for Annuities?


Journal of Pension Economics and Finance

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Means-Tested Benefits, Occupational Pension, Annuity

We analyze the effect of means-tested benefits on annuitization decisions using an administrative dataset of pension wealth cash-out choices. Availability of means-tested payments creates an incentive to cash out pension wealth for low and middle income earners, instead of taking the annuity. Agents trade off the advantages from annuitization, receiving longevity risk insurance, to the disadvantages, giving up “free” wealth in the form of means-tested supplemental income. Our life-cycle model demonstrates that the availability of means-tested benefits substantially reduces the desire to annuitize especially for low and intermediate levels of pension wealth. In our empirical analysis we show that the model’s predicted fraction of retirees choosing the annuity is able to match the annuitization pattern of occupational pension wealth observed in Switzerland

Impact of Average Rating on Social Media Endorsement: The Moderating Role of Rating Dispersion and Discount Threshold


Information Systems Research

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Départements : Information Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Incentive programs for reducing readmissions when patient care is co-produced


Production and Operations Management

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Départements : GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : co-productive services, hospital readmissions, pay-for-performance, bundled payment

To reduce preventable readmissions, many healthcare systems are transitioning from Fee-for-Service (FFS) to other reimbursement schemes such as Pay-for-Performance (P4P) or Bundled Payment (BP) so that the funder of a healthcare system can transfer to the hospital some of the financial risks associated with patient re-hospitalizations. To examine the effectiveness of different schemes (FFS, P4P, and BP), we develop a "health co-production" model in which the patient's readmissions can be "jointly controlled" by the efforts exerted by both the hospital and the patient. Our analysis of the equilibrium outcomes reveals that FFS cannot entice the hospital and the patient to exert readmission-reduction efforts. Relative to BP, we find that P4P is more "robust" in the sense that it can induce readmission-reduction efforts under milder conditions. However, BP can induce greater efforts compared to P4P. More importantly, we characterize the conditions under which BP (or P4P) is the dominant scheme from the funder's perspective. Finally, we find that patient cost-sharing can generate two benefits: (a) it provides incentive for patients to exert efforts; and (b) if not excessive, it can reduce the readmission rate

Inventory allocation models for a two-stage, twoproduct, capacitated supplier and retailer problem with random demand


International Journal of Production Economics

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Départements : Information Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : supply chain management, inventory management, capacity allocation, heuristic methods

The objective of this research is to develop an optimal inventory allocation methodology for a supply chain consisting of a capacitated retailer with limited shelf space, and two unreliable capacitated suppliers in an uncertain environment. We develop conceptual and analytical models that provide allocation preferences between shelf-space and warehouse in both deterministic and stochastic demand cases, and develop managerial insights based on them. For each case, we provide both a closed-form solution and a heuristic method, and illustrate the bounds on the optimal solution. Further, we show that the cost function is L-convex in some cases. Finally, we prove that the expected profit decreases as the variance of demand increases

Life-Cycle Asset Allocation with Ambiguity Aversion and Learning


Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Making a Niche: The Marketization of Management Research and the Rise of “Knowledge Branding”


Journal of Management Studies

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Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Marking to Market and Inefficient Investment Decisions


Management Science

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Marking to Market, Investment Decisions, Reputation, Agency Problem

We examine how mark-to-market accounting affects the investment decisions of managers with reputation concerns. Reporting the current market value of a firm's assets can help mitigate agency problems because it provides outsiders (e.g., shareholders) with new information against which the management's decisions can be evaluated. However, the fact that the assets' market value is informative can also have a negative side effect: Managers may shy away from investments that indicate conflicting private information and would damage their reputation. This effect can lead to inefficient investment decisions and make marking to market less desirable when market prices are more informative

Non-additivity in accounting valuation: Theory and applications



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Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Choquet capacities, Goodwill, Growth options, Non-additive accounting-based valuation, Productive efficiency, Synergies

This paper has three objectives. First, to introduce a theoretical solution to the issue of non-additivity between assets in place, relying on an accounting-based valuation approach. Second, to explain how such an approach can be implemented empirically by measuring synergies between assets. Third, to present the properties of this non-additive valuation technique. We use Choquet capacities, that is, non-additive aggregation operators, to measure the interactions between assets and apply our methodology to a sample of US firms from the capital goods industry. To operationalize our approach we examine the relationships between synergies-captured by Choquet capacities-and the market-to-book ratio (proxying for growth options), and show how interactions between assets are consistently linked to a firm's market-to-book ratio. We also measure firm-specific productive efficiency relative to the industry and firm size. For large firms, efficiency, as defined by our approach, is positively associated with higher future operating cash flows. For small firms, efficiency is positively associated with higher future sales growth. We document that the non-additive approach appears to be better able to identify expected relationships between efficiency and future performance than a simpler approach based on the market-to-book ratio. © 2018 Accounting Foundation, The University of Sydney

Organization Design, Proximity, and Productivity Responses to Upward Social Comparison


Organization Science

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Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Incentives, Social Comparison Costs, Envy, Productivity, Organization Design

We investigate the mechanisms that shape social comparison in organizations and generate socialcomparison costs. In particular, we focus on heterogeneity in the strength and type of incentivesand argue that, from an efficient design perspective, such variance in rewards is a double edgedsword. While the sorting and incentive effects that result may increase productivity, the socialcomparison processes that arise may dampen it. We posit that the mechanisms underlying thesebehavioral costs are shaped not only by the magnitude of reward variance, but by the formal andinformal design elements shaping the distance of advantaged peers. In other words, the moreproximate socially, structurally or geographically are those to whom one socially compares, thelarger the behavioral response. Empirically, we use an unanticipated event during which outlets ofa bank, previously operating under essentially homogenous incentives, were assigned totournament groups with differing ex ante probabilities of winning a prize—an event that increasesvariance in awards and hence generates an impetus for social comparison. We find that units withmore socially, geographically, and structurally proximate peers assigned to ‘advantaged’tournament groups decreased their productivity. We discuss implications of these results fororganizational design and boundaries