Articles

James Elliott Construction (C-613/14) : A "New(ish) Approach" to judicial review of standardization

A. VAN WAEYENBERGE, D. RESTREPO AMARILES

European Law Review

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Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Leadership and the Logic of Absurdity

D. NEWARK

Academy of Management Review

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Départements : Management et Ressources Humaines

http://amr.aom.org/content/early/2017/02/02/amr.2015.0186.abstract


Leaders are often thought to be instrumental to the performance of the organizations they lead. However, considerable research suggests that their influence over organizational performance might actually be minimal. These claims of leader irrelevance pose a puzzle: If leaders are relatively insignificant, why would someone commit to leading? Applying decision-making theory, this paper first considers justifying the decision to lead according to the Logics of Consequence and Appropriateness—the two principal decision-making logics underlying previous work on the motivation to lead. The paper then presents the Logic of Absurdity, a decision-making logic in which decision-makers knowingly choose to dedicate themselves to an irrational course of action. In terms of the decision to lead, a decision-maker employing the Logic of Absurdity acknowledges the likely futility of leading but decides to commit to leading, nonetheless. The paper concludes by considering when leaders are most likely to decide to lead according to the Logic of Absurdity and why doing so may result in leadership of exceptional originality, foolishness, intelligence, and madness

Leveraging strengths to learn, grow, and change: An evidence-based approach to development

S. FOSTER, R. WHITE, L. CLARK, G. DAI, P. LLOYED

Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice & Research

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Life-Cycle Asset Allocation with Ambiguity Aversion and Learning

K. PEIJNENBURG

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Linear-Rational Term Structure Models

D. FILIPOVIC, M. LARSSON, A. TROLLE

The Journal of Finance

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Départements : Finance


Marking to Market and Inefficient Investment Decisions

C. OTTO, P. F. VOLPIN

Management Science

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Marking to Market, Investment Decisions, Reputation, Agency Problem


We examine how mark-to-market accounting affects the investment decisions of managers with reputation concerns. Reporting the current market value of a firm's assets can help mitigate agency problems because it provides outsiders (e.g., shareholders) with new information against which the management's decisions can be evaluated. However, the fact that the assets' market value is informative can also have a negative side effect: Managers may shy away from investments that indicate conflicting private information and would damage their reputation. This effect can lead to inefficient investment decisions and make marking to market less desirable when market prices are more informative

More haste less speed? Signaling through investment timing

R. LEVY, C. BOBTCHEFF

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20160200


We consider a cash-constrained firm learning on the value of an irreversible project at a privately-known speed. Under perfect information, the optimal date of investment may be non-monotonic in the learning speed: better learning increases the value of experimenting further, but also the speed of updating. Under asymmetric information, the firm uses its investment timing to signal confidence in the project and raise cheaper capital from uninformed investors, which may generate timing distortions: investment is hurried when learning is sufficiently fast, and delayed otherwise. The severity of the cash constraint affects the magnitude of the distortion, but not its direction

Non-additivity in accounting valuation: Theory and applications

L. PAUGAM, Jean-François CASTA, H. STOLOWY

Abacus

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Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Organization Design, Proximity, and Productivity Responses to Upward Social Comparison

T. OBLOJ, T. ZENGER

Organization Science

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Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Incentives, Social Comparison Costs, Envy, Productivity, Organization Design

https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxwdWJsaXNoZWRwYXBlcnMxMjM0fGd4OjVmOGU0MTIwNWZkNzQ2Zjc


We investigate the mechanisms that shape social comparison in organizations and generate socialcomparison costs. In particular, we focus on heterogeneity in the strength and type of incentivesand argue that, from an efficient design perspective, such variance in rewards is a double edgedsword. While the sorting and incentive effects that result may increase productivity, the socialcomparison processes that arise may dampen it. We posit that the mechanisms underlying thesebehavioral costs are shaped not only by the magnitude of reward variance, but by the formal andinformal design elements shaping the distance of advantaged peers. In other words, the moreproximate socially, structurally or geographically are those to whom one socially compares, thelarger the behavioral response. Empirically, we use an unanticipated event during which outlets ofa bank, previously operating under essentially homogenous incentives, were assigned totournament groups with differing ex ante probabilities of winning a prize—an event that increasesvariance in awards and hence generates an impetus for social comparison. We find that units withmore socially, geographically, and structurally proximate peers assigned to ‘advantaged’tournament groups decreased their productivity. We discuss implications of these results fororganizational design and boundaries

Payment Evasion

D. HALBHEER, S. BUEHLER, M. LECHNER

Journal of Industrial Economics

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Départements : Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)



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