Financial problems of small businesses


Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis

mai-juin 1998

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Finite row-column exchangeable arrays

B. Bassan, M. SCARSINI

Commentationes Mathematicae Universitatis Carolinae

1998, vol. 39, pp.137-145

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision

Floors, Limit Order Markets and Dealer Markets


Journal of Financial Markets

1998, vol. 1, n°3-4, pp.253-284

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

pas sous affiliation hecIn dealer markets, liquidity suppliers have entire flexibility to bargain on the price with their customers. In limit order markets, they are restricted to convex schedules: they cannot sell the first share at a higher price than the second. Floor traders simply respond to the liquidity demand conveyed by brokers by crying out one price. In floor markets risk-sharing is inefficient and spreads are large. In dealer markets, risk-sharing can be efficient, but spreads tend to be large. In limit order markets, the unique equilibrium entails efficient risk-sharing and competitive spreads. Hence there is a non-monotonic relation between the efficiency of the market and the extent to which the offers of the liquidity suppliers are restricted. Author Keywords: Floor markets; Dealer markets; Limit orders; Market design; Tacit collusion

From Organizational Learning to the Learning Organization

A. Edmondson, B. MOINGEON

Management Learning

1998, vol. 29, n°1, pp.5-20

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

This article reviews theories of organizational learning and presents a framework with which to organize the literature. We argue that unit of analysis provides one critical distinction in the organizational learning literature and research objective provides another. The resulting two-by-two matrix contains four categories of research, which we have called: (2) residues (organizations as residues of past learning); (2) communities (organizations as collections of individuals who can learn and develop); (3) participation (organizational improvement gained through intelligent activity of individual members), and (4) accountability (organizational improvement gained through developing individuals' mental models). We also propose a distinction between the terms organizational learning and the learning organization. Our subsequent analysis identifies relationships between disparate parts of the literature and shows that these relationships point to individual mental models as a critical source of leverage for creating learning organizations. A brief discussion of the work of two of the most visible researchers in this field, Peter Senge and Chris Argyris, provides additional support for this type of change strategy.

General Equilibrium Under Imperfect Competition: A Comment


Scandinavian Journal of Economics


Départements : Finance

Global Asset Management


Journal of Portfolio Management

été 1998, pp.43-51

Départements : Finance

Currency risk is low in the long term, as exchange rates tend to revert to fundamentals over the very long run, but the contribution of currencies to the longterm performance of a global portfolio never gets to be nil. Currency risk premiums exist in the long run and are consistent with world market equilibrium and finance theory. The author argues that if the plan sponsor sets a benchmark for a very long-term horizon (say, fifty years), it should probably be unhedged as currency returns provide only a small, positive or negative, contribution to total return, while systematic currency hedging is a cumbersome process. If the plan sponsor has in mind a shorter strategic horizon (say, five years), the ideal currency allocation in the strategic benchmark is, and will remain, a question open to debate. Applying some universal hedging rule is questionable in the presence of the complex,correlation structure of stock prices, interest rates, and exchange rates. Finally, the author explains that if the plan sponsor believes in active management, currencies should be an integral part of the tactical asset allocation and security valuation process.

Implied volatility functions: Empirical test

B. DUMAS, R. Whaley, J. Fleming

The Journal of Finance

1998, vol. 53, n°6, pp.2059-2106

Départements : Finance

Intelligence économique et désinformation


Progrès du Management

juillet 1998, n°32

International Accounting Education in Western Europe


European Accounting Review

1998, vol. 7, n°2, pp.289-314

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS), Economie et Sciences de la décision

Irrational Entry, Rational Exit

B. Hazari, M. CHESNEY

Journal of Mathematical Economics

1998, n°29, pp.1-13

Départements : Finance