Articles

Incentive programs for reducing readmissions when patient care is co-produced

A. ANDRITSOS, C. S. TANG

Production and Operations Management

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Départements : GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : co-productive services, hospital readmissions, pay-for-performance, bundled payment

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2666215


To reduce preventable readmissions, many healthcare systems are transitioning from Fee-for-Service (FFS) to other reimbursement schemes such as Pay-for-Performance (P4P) or Bundled Payment (BP) so that the funder of a healthcare system can transfer to the hospital some of the financial risks associated with patient re-hospitalizations. To examine the effectiveness of different schemes (FFS, P4P, and BP), we develop a "health co-production" model in which the patient's readmissions can be "jointly controlled" by the efforts exerted by both the hospital and the patient. Our analysis of the equilibrium outcomes reveals that FFS cannot entice the hospital and the patient to exert readmission-reduction efforts. Relative to BP, we find that P4P is more "robust" in the sense that it can induce readmission-reduction efforts under milder conditions. However, BP can induce greater efforts compared to P4P. More importantly, we characterize the conditions under which BP (or P4P) is the dominant scheme from the funder's perspective. Finally, we find that patient cost-sharing can generate two benefits: (a) it provides incentive for patients to exert efforts; and (b) if not excessive, it can reduce the readmission rate

Introduction to Global Law, Legal Indicators and Legal Pragmatism

D. RESTREPO AMARILES

Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law

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Départements : Droit et fiscalité


Inventory allocation models for a two-stage, twoproduct, capacitated supplier and retailer problem with random demand

K. LUO, R. BOLLAPRAGADA, L. KERBACHE

International Journal of Production Economics

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Départements : Information Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : supply chain management, inventory management, capacity allocation, heuristic methods

http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0925527316303930/1-s2.0-S0925527316303930-main.pdf?_tid=e3dcdf78-c36d-11e6-ab1d-00000aacb362&acdnat=1481878922_0f8e1cce572aa5799576c97c7d14f216


The objective of this research is to develop an optimal inventory allocation methodology for a supply chain consisting of a capacitated retailer with limited shelf space, and two unreliable capacitated suppliers in an uncertain environment. We develop conceptual and analytical models that provide allocation preferences between shelf-space and warehouse in both deterministic and stochastic demand cases, and develop managerial insights based on them. For each case, we provide both a closed-form solution and a heuristic method, and illustrate the bounds on the optimal solution. Further, we show that the cost function is L-convex in some cases. Finally, we prove that the expected profit decreases as the variance of demand increases

Leadership and the Logic of Absurdity

D. NEWARK

Academy of Management Review

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Départements : Management et Ressources Humaines

http://amr.aom.org/content/early/2017/02/02/amr.2015.0186.abstract


Leaders are often thought to be instrumental to the performance of the organizations they lead. However, considerable research suggests that their influence over organizational performance might actually be minimal. These claims of leader irrelevance pose a puzzle: If leaders are relatively insignificant, why would someone commit to leading? Applying decision-making theory, this paper first considers justifying the decision to lead according to the Logics of Consequence and Appropriateness—the two principal decision-making logics underlying previous work on the motivation to lead. The paper then presents the Logic of Absurdity, a decision-making logic in which decision-makers knowingly choose to dedicate themselves to an irrational course of action. In terms of the decision to lead, a decision-maker employing the Logic of Absurdity acknowledges the likely futility of leading but decides to commit to leading, nonetheless. The paper concludes by considering when leaders are most likely to decide to lead according to the Logic of Absurdity and why doing so may result in leadership of exceptional originality, foolishness, intelligence, and madness

Legal Indicators in Transnational Law Practice: A Methodological Assessment

D. RESTREPO AMARILES

Jurimetrics, The Journal of Law, Science, and Technology

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Départements : Droit et fiscalité


Leveraging strengths to learn, grow, and change: An evidence-based approach to development

S. FOSTER, R. WHITE, L. CLARK, G. DAI, P. LLOYED

Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice & Research

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Life-Cycle Asset Allocation with Ambiguity Aversion and Learning

K. PEIJNENBURG

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Marking to Market and Inefficient Investment Decisions

C. OTTO, P. F. VOLPIN

Management Science

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Marking to Market, Investment Decisions, Reputation, Agency Problem


We examine how mark-to-market accounting affects the investment decisions of managers with reputation concerns. Reporting the current market value of a firm's assets can help mitigate agency problems because it provides outsiders (e.g., shareholders) with new information against which the management's decisions can be evaluated. However, the fact that the assets' market value is informative can also have a negative side effect: Managers may shy away from investments that indicate conflicting private information and would damage their reputation. This effect can lead to inefficient investment decisions and make marking to market less desirable when market prices are more informative

More haste less speed? Signaling through investment timing

R. LEVY, C. BOBTCHEFF

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20160200


We consider a cash-constrained firm learning on the value of an irreversible project at a privately-known speed. Under perfect information, the optimal date of investment may be non-monotonic in the learning speed: better learning increases the value of experimenting further, but also the speed of updating. Under asymmetric information, the firm uses its investment timing to signal confidence in the project and raise cheaper capital from uninformed investors, which may generate timing distortions: investment is hurried when learning is sufficiently fast, and delayed otherwise. The severity of the cash constraint affects the magnitude of the distortion, but not its direction

Non-additivity in accounting valuation: Theory and applications

L. PAUGAM, Jean-François CASTA, H. STOLOWY

Abacus

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Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)



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