Articles

Inventory allocation models for a two-stage, twoproduct, capacitated supplier and retailer problem with random demand

K. LUO, R. BOLLAPRAGADA, L. KERBACHE

International Journal of Production Economics

A paraître

Départements : Informations Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : supply chain management, inventory management, capacity allocation, heuristic methods

http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0925527316303930/1-s2.0-S0925527316303930-main.pdf?_tid=e3dcdf78-c36d-11e6-ab1d-00000aacb362&acdnat=1481878922_0f8e1cce572aa5799576c97c7d14f216


The objective of this research is to develop an optimal inventory allocation methodology for a supply chain consisting of a capacitated retailer with limited shelf space, and two unreliable capacitated suppliers in an uncertain environment. We develop conceptual and analytical models that provide allocation preferences between shelf-space and warehouse in both deterministic and stochastic demand cases, and develop managerial insights based on them. For each case, we provide both a closed-form solution and a heuristic method, and illustrate the bounds on the optimal solution. Further, we show that the cost function is L-convex in some cases. Finally, we prove that the expected profit decreases as the variance of demand increases

James Elliott Construction (C-613/14) : A "New(ish) Approach" to judicial review of standardization

A. VAN WAEYENBERGE, D. RESTREPO AMARILES

European Law Review

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Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Life-Cycle Asset Allocation with Ambiguity Aversion and Learning

K. PEIJNENBURG

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Marking to Market and Inefficient Investment Decisions

C. OTTO, P. F. VOLPIN

Management Science

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Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Marking to Market, Investment Decisions, Reputation, Agency Problem


We examine how mark-to-market accounting affects the investment decisions of managers with reputation concerns. Reporting the current market value of a firm's assets can help mitigate agency problems because it provides outsiders (e.g., shareholders) with new information against which the management's decisions can be evaluated. However, the fact that the assets' market value is informative can also have a negative side effect: Managers may shy away from investments that indicate conflicting private information and would damage their reputation. This effect can lead to inefficient investment decisions and make marking to market less desirable when market prices are more informative

More haste less speed? Signaling through investment timing

R. LEVY, C. BOBTCHEFF

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20160200


We consider a cash-constrained firm learning on the value of an irreversible project at a privately-known speed. Under perfect information, the optimal date of investment may be non-monotonic in the learning speed: better learning increases the value of experimenting further, but also the speed of updating. Under asymmetric information, the firm uses its investment timing to signal confidence in the project and raise cheaper capital from uninformed investors, which may generate timing distortions: investment is hurried when learning is sufficiently fast, and delayed otherwise. The severity of the cash constraint affects the magnitude of the distortion, but not its direction

Non-additivity in accounting valuation: Theory and applications

L. PAUGAM, Jean-François CASTA, H. STOLOWY

Abacus

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Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Organization Design, Proximity, and Productivity Responses to Upward Social Comparison

T. OBLOJ, T. ZENGER

Organization Science

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Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Incentives, Social Comparison Costs, Envy, Productivity, Organization Design

https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxwdWJsaXNoZWRwYXBlcnMxMjM0fGd4OjVmOGU0MTIwNWZkNzQ2Zjc


We investigate the mechanisms that shape social comparison in organizations and generate socialcomparison costs. In particular, we focus on heterogeneity in the strength and type of incentivesand argue that, from an efficient design perspective, such variance in rewards is a double edgedsword. While the sorting and incentive effects that result may increase productivity, the socialcomparison processes that arise may dampen it. We posit that the mechanisms underlying thesebehavioral costs are shaped not only by the magnitude of reward variance, but by the formal andinformal design elements shaping the distance of advantaged peers. In other words, the moreproximate socially, structurally or geographically are those to whom one socially compares, thelarger the behavioral response. Empirically, we use an unanticipated event during which outlets ofa bank, previously operating under essentially homogenous incentives, were assigned totournament groups with differing ex ante probabilities of winning a prize—an event that increasesvariance in awards and hence generates an impetus for social comparison. We find that units withmore socially, geographically, and structurally proximate peers assigned to ‘advantaged’tournament groups decreased their productivity. We discuss implications of these results fororganizational design and boundaries

Payment Evasion

D. HALBHEER, S. BUEHLER, M. LECHNER

Journal of Industrial Economics

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Départements : Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Priority optimization and make-to-stock/make-to-order decision in multiproduct manufacturing systems

K. Hadj Youssef, C. VAN DELFT, Y. Dallery

International Transactions in Operational Research

A paraître, pp.1-21

Départements : Informations Systems and Operations Management, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : make-to-stock (MTS); make-to-order (MTO); priority level; heterogeneous multiproduct produc-tion/inventory system; queuing model

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/itor.12464/epdf


We consider a single-stage multiproduct manufacturing facility producing a large number of end products.In order to reduce overall inventory costs, an efficient approach is to produce some items according to amake-to-stock (MTS) policy and others according to a make-to-order (MTO) policy. Items priority levelsplay a key role in the optimal MTO/MTS decisions for such typical large-scale systems. To tackle this issue,the manufacturing facility is modeled as a multiproduct multipriority classes queuing system. We proposea general optimization procedure that selects near-optimal priority classes, gives the associated flow controlmode (MTO or MTS) for each product, and provides a lower bound and an upper bound with respect to theoptimal cost. First, we illustrate efficiency of our optimization procedure for this class of nonlinear integerprograms via several examples and by a numerical analysis, including a comparison with two alternativeheuristics given in the literature. In addition, we provide managerial insights by exhibiting, under variousparameter settings, the significant impact of an efficient priority level allocation among items on the inventorycosts and on optimal splitting between MTO and MTS product

Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring

T. TOMALA, Marie LACLAU

Journal of Economic Theory

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)



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