Articles

The Effects of IFRS Adoption on Observed Earnings Smoothing Properties: The Confounding Effects of Changes in TimelyGain and Loss Recognition

V. CAPKUN

European Accounting Review

A paraître

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)


The effects of investment bank rankings: Evidence from M&A league tables

F. DERRIEN, O. DESSAINT

Review of Finance

A paraître

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


The Petrilli cases - A new approach of the EU courts in damages claims ?

A. VAN WAEYENBERGE

European Public Law

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Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)


The Role of Cultural Communication Norms in Social Exclusion Effects

J. LEE, L.-J. SHRUM, Y. YI

Journal of Consumer Psychology

A paraître

Départements : Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)


The Whisteblower: An Important Person in Corporate Life?

N. STOLOWY, L. PAUGAM, A. LONDERO

Journal of Business Law

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Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS), Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion


Time Compression (Dis)Economies: An Empirical Analysis

A. HAWK, G. PACHECO DE ALMEIDA

Strategic Management Journal

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Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


To investigate time compression diseconomies (TCD), this study estimated time-cost elasticities using 459 oil and gas global investment projects (1997-2010). Results show that the average cost of accelerating investments is negative: a firm could cut $6.3 million in costs of a single project by accumulating asset stocks one month faster. About 88 percent of the projects exhibit negative time-cost elasticities with over 39 percent of unrealized economies of time compression. Only 12 percent of the projects are subject to TCD. These time inefficiencies or frictions do not negate the existence of TCD, but suggest they are less prevalent than assumed in the literature. Management experience, R&D investment, firm size, economic development and political stability are shown to be associated with greater time compression efficiency

Two-sided reputation in certification markets

M. BOUVARD, R. LEVY

Management Science

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Certification, Reputation, Credit rating agencies

https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2742


In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but sometimes repels low-quality sellers. As a consequence, reputational concerns may induce the certifier to reduce information quality, thus depressing welfare. The entry of a second certifier impacts reputational incentives: when sellers only solicit one certifier, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this region may expand when sellers hold multiple certifications

U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Corporate Compliance of Foreign Banks

D. RESTREPO AMARILES, M. M. WINKLER

The International Lawyer

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Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)


In the last decade, the U.S. has dramatically increased the enforcement of its economic sanctions arsenal against foreign banks. While this arsenal continues to expand, legal scholarship tends to overlook one of its crucial consequences: a radical change in the compliance functions of the targeted banks. In fact, after entering into specific agreements with the U.S. government, non-U.S. banks commit to reforming their compliance functions according to U.S. standards. The depth of the relationship between the extraterritoriality of U.S. laws and banks’ compliance functions demands further inquiry. This article fills that gapby expounding how economic sanctions legislation drives developments in substantial compliance efforts by foreign banks, discussing the current economic sanctions regime and analyzing important enforcement cases. This Article concludes that, as non-U.S. banks manage the heavy burden of U.S. sanctions more deftly than before, a process of Americanization of corporate compliance is underway in the banking industry and beyond

Who’s Watching? Accountability in Different Audit Regimes and the Effects on Auditors’ Professional Skepticism

F. HOOS, J. L. PRUIJSSERS, M. LANDER

Journal of Business Ethics

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Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, Management et Ressources Humaines, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Accountability, Auditors, Professional skepticism, Joint audit, Judgment, Experiment

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10551-017-3603-6.pdf


The European Commission has suggested that the use of joint audits should lead to improved auditor skepticism and—by extension—audit quality, throughincreased accountability. However, archival research does not find support for improved audit quality in a joint audit setting. To better understand the relationship between accountability in different review regimes and auditors’judgments, we examine the behavioral effect of implementing a joint audit relative to other review regimes based on a 1 9 3 experimental design. Forty-seven senior auditors and partners from a Big Four firm performed a goingconcern evaluation task under one of three review regimes: the joint audit, the internal review, and the no review regime. Notwithstanding the difference in the audiences to which auditors are accountable, there is no difference in thejudgment process. In terms of their judgment outcome, however, auditors in the joint audit setting were the least skeptical in their judgment of the going concern assumption. Overall, we suggest that the joint audit may lead tounintended behavioral consequences

Why the Empty Shells Were Not Fired: A Semi-Bibliographical Note

I. GILBOA

Episteme

A paraître

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)



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