How Much Better Is Better Regulation? Assessing the Impact of the Better Regulation Package on the European Union – A Research Agenda


European Journal of Risk Regulation

2015, vol. 6, n°3, pp.344-356

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Emboldened by the Spitzenkandidaten process, the new European Commission emerges as the most political yet. The Commission asks EU citizens to judge its operation by its ability ‘to deliver solutions to the big issues that cannot be addressed by the Member States alone’. The Better Regulation Package translates this political commitment into an actionable approach assuring EU citizens that the Commission will remain ‘big on big things, small on small things’. To deliver on this promise, the Commission extends the Impact Assessment system, renews its consultation procedures and adds a few institutional mechanisms so as to enhance its ‘ability to deliver’ throughout the policy cycle. But in order to do so the Commission needs to bind – and somehow control – the European Parliament and the Council, on the one hand, and the Member States, on the other, in relation to their commitment to openness, participation and evidence-based policymaking. While legitimate, this attempt raises serious doubts about the compatibility of this reform with the principle of separation of powers and, in particular, that of institutional balance. A closer look at the Better Regulation Package reveals an entirely new understanding of the Commission’s own prerogatives and the way it intends to exercise its legislative and regulatory powers. And this in spite of the apparent continuity between the new and old Better Regulation initiatives and the instruments it had chosen to attain the declared objectives. With a view to lay out a future research agenda on EU Better Regulation, this article identifies the most immediate questions raised by the publication of the Package and makes a first timid attempt at addressing some of them. It aims at determining how much better, if any, is the new Better Regulation Package. It does so by discussing, first, the major novelties enacted by the Commission within its own Better Regulation system and, second, those proposed in the framework of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Regulation

La protection juridictionnelle effective en Europe ou l’histoire d’une procession d’Echternach


Cahiers de Droit Européen

2015, vol. 51, n°1, pp.113-150

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

La transformation de la méthode communautaire, quels impacts pour la procédure?


Revue Internationale de Droit Economique (RIDE)

2015, vol. 4, n°XXIX, pp.417-428

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

L’étude de différentes politiques publiques européennes au moyen d’une approche pragmatique du droit centrée sur les instruments d’action publique démontre que la méthode communautaire se trouve actuellement concurrencée dans les faits par de nouveaux instruments qui, loin de constituer des initiatives isolées, participent d’un modèle alternatif de gouvernance communautaire qui la transforme en profondeur. Cette transformation de l’action publique européenne repose sur l’utilisation abondante de nouveaux instruments d’action publique – plus techniques que politiques et plus incitatifs que contraignants – qui impliquent systématiquement une collaboration entre acteurs publics et privés et où le mode de sanction est devenu de plus en plus une « contrainte par l’image » reposant sur la figure du « mauvais élève de la classe ». Cette évolution n’est pas sans conséquences sur la dynamique de production de droit de l’Union européenne dans la mesure où l’on constate des changements aussi bien au niveau de son contenu que de sa production et de sa mise en œuvre

Legal indicators, global law and legal pluralism: an introduction


The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law

mars 2015, vol. 47, n°1, pp.9-21

Départements : Droit et fiscalité

Mots clés : Mathematical turn, Global law, Indicators, Management

This article explores the development of legal metrics by focusing on the links between legal indicators, global law and legal pluralism. In particular, it addresses the question of the performative role that legal indicators convey in a situation of legal pluralism in global law. First, I argue that indicators are not only a set of socio-legal research methods conducted periodically and systematically with the aim of describing the evolution of a socio-legal reality over time. From a pluralistic perspective, indicators are also devices factually constraining the behaviour of individuals and institutions at different geographical scales. I show that as legal indicators become entrenched in managerial modes of governance, they adopt the role of performance measures. As such, they bridge the factual, normative and behavioural dimensions of social normativity. They rely on data gathering, benchmarking and auditing practices to attempt framing legally relevant behaviour. Second, I argue that legal indicators are triggering a mathematical turn in legal thinking, and so transforming the analytical dimension of legal analysis. The mathematical reasoning underpinning indicators increasingly attempts to supersede, in practice, linguistic and conceptual modes of legal reasoning in the mission of constructing legal concepts, relating them to one another and giving them sense in a specific context. In brief, this article attempts to show that legal indicators are introducing to the legal field a set of practices which are central to any contemporary approach to public and private management, transforming en passant, the way we experience, see and think about law in the context of globalisation

Mesures à vocation extraterritoriale et lois de police: un revers à l'hégémonie juridique outre-Atlantique?


Recueil Dalloz

11 juin 2015, vol. 2015, n°21, pp.1260-1263

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Conflit de lois, Contrat et obligations, Loi applicable, Embargo à destination de l’Iran, Loi de police

En application de l’article 9 du règlement « Rome I » il ne peut être donné effet à une loi de police étrangère que s’il s’agit d’une loi de police du lieu d’exécution du contrat et si cette loi de police rend illégale l’exécution du contrat. En l’espèce, sans avoir à se prononcer sur la qualification de loi de police des dispositions du code des réglementations fédérales (CFR), instituant un embargo sur les exportations à destination de l’Iran, la cour ne peut donner d’effet à la loi américaine, qui n’est ni une loi de police française, ni une loi de police iranienne

The corporate domicile: is the "real seat" theory always pertinent?


Journal of Business Law

2015, vol. 8, pp.620-633

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Companies, Company incorporation, Comparative law, Domicile, EU law, France, Netherlands, Place of effective management, Registered offices, United States

Discusses the different rules used in jurisdictions such as France, the UK, the US and the Netherlands concerning a company's registered office, and whether the "real seat" theory or the incorporation theory is now most influential. Reviews the continuing relevance of the real seat in many EU states, its key features, and its application in case law. Examines the factors contributing to the growing influence of the incorporation theory in Europe.

The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process Toward a Global Policy Laboratory


Law and Contemporary Problems

2015, vol. 78, n°4, pp.103-136

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : TTIP, Regulatory Cooperation, Convergence, Divergence, Mutual Recognition, Equivalence, MRA, US-EU, race to the bottom

At the time of the negotiations of 'new generation' trade agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, this article focuses on an important consideration that may be neglected in current efforts to attain international regulatory convergence (IRC): The benefits of learning from regulatory variation, and the design of institutions

The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Institutional Structures and Democratic Consequences


Journal of International Economic Law

septembre 2015, vol. 18, n°3, pp.625-640

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has the potential to remake political and legal relationships between the European Union (EU) and the USA and pave the way to a new form of global economic governance based on internationalregulatory cooperation. In particular, TTIP presents an historic opportunity for the EU and the USA to remove regulatory divergence—today’s most prominent obstacle to trade exchanges—thereby increasing economic growth for the citizens of both polities. Yet, the EU and the USA have been attempting to reduce trade barriers since the 1970s. Despite decades of cooperation, EU and US policymakers too often fail to mutually understand each other’s positions, giving rise to regulatory differences. As an international agreement predicted to contain a Horizontal Chapter—an innovative approach to international trade treaty-making containing a framework for future bilateral regulatory cooperation—TTIP has the potential to transform this impasse, if approached correctly. The envisaged chapter would provide a ‘gateway’ for handling sectoral regulatory issues between the EU and the USA, including by addressing both legislation and non-legislative acts, regardless of the level at which they are adopted and by whom. Yet with great promises come challenges too.This article focusses on the structure, scope, discipline, institutional design, enforcement,and implementation of the envisaged horizontal chapter, often defined Regulatory Cooperation Chapter. In so doing, it addresses some of the concerns currently raised by civil society, in particular the fear of a ‘race to the bottom’ that may stem from the operation of this chapter and provides some recommendations

The Sanctity of Borderland: The Ukraine-Related Sanction Programs


Diritto del Commercio Internazionale

2015, vol. 1, pp.239-257

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

In October 2014 the Russian press agency ITAR-TASS has published a curious table picturing the Russian business entities targeted with international economic sanctions in relation to the political crisis in Ukraine (1). The table shows that these entities change depending on the country enacting the sanctions. For example Gazprombank, the third largest Russian bank, is targeted by the United States, the European Union, and Canada, while Bank Rossiya, which is the private bank of President Putin’s inner circle, is not subject to any sanction by the EU (2). By the same token, no sanction is established by the EU against privately owned companies, while the US, Canada and Australia target some, like Rosneft, the world’s largest oil producer. Moreover, while the EU addresses some entities making business in Crimea, like the sea transport company Sevastopol Commercial Seaport, the US does it only marginally, and so do Canada and Australia. Finally, only the US is active against companies operating in the military sector; in this regard, the EU targets only Concern Almaz-Antey, a firm specialized in anti-aircraft defence systems. As a whole, the table raises concerns as to the effectiveness of these «targeted sanctions», when they work in such an intermittent fashion.At the center of our analysis stand the economic sanctions adopted against certain private subjects participating in the uprising of the Eastern part of Ukraine against Kyiv’s central government (3). These sanctions are grounded on the alleged violation of the «sanctity» of Ukrainian borders—a quite curious qualification, though, given that Ukraine’s name itself means, in fact, «on the edge», «borderland» (4). If these sanctions represent the typical reaction to violations of international law perpetrated by the Russian Federation, why are they applied selectively? Which are the policies behind the choice of targeting one entity but not another? Arguably, a lack of coordination globally might ultimately frustrate the sanctions’ genuine goals and create inconsistencies in their enforcement.This article examines the reasons and consequences of such lack of coordination (5). It proceeds along with three lines. First, it investigates the factual premises that triggered the adoption of targeted sanctions (§ 2); second, it delineates the scope and effects of the targeted sanction regimes elaborated in the US and the EU (§ 3); finally, it highlights some flaws in the sanctions regimes as a whole (§ 4). In doing this, it tries to challenge the common impression that no one is doing anything with the Ukrainian crisis: someone is definitely doing something about the violations committed against Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The problem, yet, is that the system continues to be imperfect due to the existing differences among States in approaching individual targeted sanctions

Free Trade Agreements after the Treaty of Lisbon in the Light of the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union


European Law Journal

novembre 2014, vol. 20, n°6, pp.749-762

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are increasingly employed by the European Union (EU) as a tool of its internal market and external relations policy. This article addresses the evolution of FTAs through the jurisprudential lens of the Court of Justice of the EU. To this end, and after clarifying key constitutional issues (competence, substance and hierarchy), it discusses the Court's case-law on the direct effect of certain measures, and addresses a selection of cross-functional questions regarding the interpretation of material law founded in the Court's case-law. As a matter of general tendency, the jurisprudence takes a rather liberal stance in recognising direct effects of FTAs concerning analogical interpretation of economic freedom. By contrast, a more restrictive approach appears to have been applied to the interpretation of provisions having an impact on the possibility of third states' citizens to reside in the EU