Effects of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in Research and Innovation: Indirect Legislation in EU Policy-Making?


Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law

2015, vol. 47, n°1, pp.22-38

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : legal philosophy, European union, Jeremy Bentham, indirect legislation, pragmatic approach, research and innovation

This study offers new insights on the open method of coordination (OMC) of the European Union (EU) by focusing on the effects of this new method for producing EU regulation. The starting points here are that the OMC is not a radically new method of governance, and that it must be seen as an application of the theory of indirect legislation – as developed by Bentham. With the concept of indirect legislation, Bentham thinks a system of governing individuals that does not rest only on the fear of legal punishment, but is backed by the prospect of rewards and the fear of public censure. For the purpose of the comparison between the OMC and indirect legislation, the latter is considered as a system of social control, which – whether it be categorised as legal or not – is first and foremost normative and has effects, i.e. is applied, followed and enforced in a given community without resorting to the binding force of the law. Thanks to the input of indirect legislation, this study aims to understand what have been the real effects of the OMC and more particularly of the OMC applied to the research and innovation policy in Belgium

Global Shipping Alliances: What Prospects After the Rejection of the P3 Project by China's Competition Authority


The Journal of International Maritime Law

2015, vol. 21, n°3, pp.203-215

Départements : Droit et fiscalité

How Much Better is Better Regulation?


European Journal of Risk Regulation

2015, vol. 3

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

How Much Better Is Better Regulation? Assessing the Impact of the Better Regulation Package on the European Union – A Research Agenda


European Journal of Risk Regulation

2015, vol. 6, n°3, pp.344-356

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Emboldened by the Spitzenkandidaten process, the new European Commission emerges as the most political yet. The Commission asks EU citizens to judge its operation by its ability ‘to deliver solutions to the big issues that cannot be addressed by the Member States alone’. The Better Regulation Package translates this political commitment into an actionable approach assuring EU citizens that the Commission will remain ‘big on big things, small on small things’. To deliver on this promise, the Commission extends the Impact Assessment system, renews its consultation procedures and adds a few institutional mechanisms so as to enhance its ‘ability to deliver’ throughout the policy cycle. But in order to do so the Commission needs to bind – and somehow control – the European Parliament and the Council, on the one hand, and the Member States, on the other, in relation to their commitment to openness, participation and evidence-based policymaking. While legitimate, this attempt raises serious doubts about the compatibility of this reform with the principle of separation of powers and, in particular, that of institutional balance. A closer look at the Better Regulation Package reveals an entirely new understanding of the Commission’s own prerogatives and the way it intends to exercise its legislative and regulatory powers. And this in spite of the apparent continuity between the new and old Better Regulation initiatives and the instruments it had chosen to attain the declared objectives. With a view to lay out a future research agenda on EU Better Regulation, this article identifies the most immediate questions raised by the publication of the Package and makes a first timid attempt at addressing some of them. It aims at determining how much better, if any, is the new Better Regulation Package. It does so by discussing, first, the major novelties enacted by the Commission within its own Better Regulation system and, second, those proposed in the framework of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Regulation

La protection juridictionnelle effective en Europe ou l’histoire d’une procession d’Echternach


Cahiers de Droit Européen

2015, vol. 51, n°1, pp.113-150

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

La transformation de la méthode communautaire, quels impacts pour la procédure?


Revue Internationale de Droit Economique (RIDE)

2015, vol. 4, n°XXIX, pp.417-428

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

L’étude de différentes politiques publiques européennes au moyen d’une approche pragmatique du droit centrée sur les instruments d’action publique démontre que la méthode communautaire se trouve actuellement concurrencée dans les faits par de nouveaux instruments qui, loin de constituer des initiatives isolées, participent d’un modèle alternatif de gouvernance communautaire qui la transforme en profondeur. Cette transformation de l’action publique européenne repose sur l’utilisation abondante de nouveaux instruments d’action publique – plus techniques que politiques et plus incitatifs que contraignants – qui impliquent systématiquement une collaboration entre acteurs publics et privés et où le mode de sanction est devenu de plus en plus une « contrainte par l’image » reposant sur la figure du « mauvais élève de la classe ». Cette évolution n’est pas sans conséquences sur la dynamique de production de droit de l’Union européenne dans la mesure où l’on constate des changements aussi bien au niveau de son contenu que de sa production et de sa mise en œuvre

Legal indicators, global law and legal pluralism: an introduction


The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law

mars 2015, vol. 47, n°1, pp.9-21

Départements : Droit et fiscalité

Mots clés : Mathematical turn, Global law, Indicators, Management

This article explores the development of legal metrics by focusing on the links between legal indicators, global law and legal pluralism. In particular, it addresses the question of the performative role that legal indicators convey in a situation of legal pluralism in global law. First, I argue that indicators are not only a set of socio-legal research methods conducted periodically and systematically with the aim of describing the evolution of a socio-legal reality over time. From a pluralistic perspective, indicators are also devices factually constraining the behaviour of individuals and institutions at different geographical scales. I show that as legal indicators become entrenched in managerial modes of governance, they adopt the role of performance measures. As such, they bridge the factual, normative and behavioural dimensions of social normativity. They rely on data gathering, benchmarking and auditing practices to attempt framing legally relevant behaviour. Second, I argue that legal indicators are triggering a mathematical turn in legal thinking, and so transforming the analytical dimension of legal analysis. The mathematical reasoning underpinning indicators increasingly attempts to supersede, in practice, linguistic and conceptual modes of legal reasoning in the mission of constructing legal concepts, relating them to one another and giving them sense in a specific context. In brief, this article attempts to show that legal indicators are introducing to the legal field a set of practices which are central to any contemporary approach to public and private management, transforming en passant, the way we experience, see and think about law in the context of globalisation

Mesures à vocation extraterritoriale et lois de police: un revers à l'hégémonie juridique outre-Atlantique?


Recueil Dalloz

11 juin 2015, vol. 2015, n°21, pp.1260-1263

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Conflit de lois, Contrat et obligations, Loi applicable, Embargo à destination de l’Iran, Loi de police

En application de l’article 9 du règlement « Rome I » il ne peut être donné effet à une loi de police étrangère que s’il s’agit d’une loi de police du lieu d’exécution du contrat et si cette loi de police rend illégale l’exécution du contrat. En l’espèce, sans avoir à se prononcer sur la qualification de loi de police des dispositions du code des réglementations fédérales (CFR), instituant un embargo sur les exportations à destination de l’Iran, la cour ne peut donner d’effet à la loi américaine, qui n’est ni une loi de police française, ni une loi de police iranienne

The corporate domicile: is the "real seat" theory always pertinent?


Journal of Business Law

2015, vol. 8, pp.620-633

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Companies, Company incorporation, Comparative law, Domicile, EU law, France, Netherlands, Place of effective management, Registered offices, United States

Discusses the different rules used in jurisdictions such as France, the UK, the US and the Netherlands concerning a company's registered office, and whether the "real seat" theory or the incorporation theory is now most influential. Reviews the continuing relevance of the real seat in many EU states, its key features, and its application in case law. Examines the factors contributing to the growing influence of the incorporation theory in Europe.

The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process Toward a Global Policy Laboratory


Law and Contemporary Problems

2015, vol. 78, n°4, pp.103-136

Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : TTIP, Regulatory Cooperation, Convergence, Divergence, Mutual Recognition, Equivalence, MRA, US-EU, race to the bottom

At the time of the negotiations of 'new generation' trade agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, this article focuses on an important consideration that may be neglected in current efforts to attain international regulatory convergence (IRC): The benefits of learning from regulatory variation, and the design of institutions