Articles

The Effects of IFRS Adoption on Observed Earnings Smoothing Properties: The Confounding Effects of Changes in TimelyGain and Loss Recognition

V. CAPKUN

European Accounting Review

A paraître

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion, GREGHEC (CNRS)


The effects of investment bank rankings: Evidence from M&A league tables

F. DERRIEN, O. DESSAINT

Review of Finance

A paraître

Départements : Finance, GREGHEC (CNRS)


The Petrilli cases - A new approach of the EU courts in damages claims ?

A. VAN WAEYENBERGE

European Public Law

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Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)


The Role of Cultural Communication Norms in Social Exclusion Effects

J. LEE, L.-J. SHRUM, Y. YI

Journal of Consumer Psychology

A paraître

Départements : Marketing, GREGHEC (CNRS)


The Whisteblower: An Important Person in Corporate Life?

N. STOLOWY, L. PAUGAM, A. LONDERO

Journal of Business Law

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Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS), Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion


Time Compression (Dis)Economies: An Empirical Analysis

A. HAWK, G. PACHECO DE ALMEIDA

Strategic Management Journal

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Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


To investigate time compression diseconomies (TCD), this study estimated time-cost elasticities using 459 oil and gas global investment projects (1997-2010). Results show that the average cost of accelerating investments is negative: a firm could cut $6.3 million in costs of a single project by accumulating asset stocks one month faster. About 88 percent of the projects exhibit negative time-cost elasticities with over 39 percent of unrealized economies of time compression. Only 12 percent of the projects are subject to TCD. These time inefficiencies or frictions do not negate the existence of TCD, but suggest they are less prevalent than assumed in the literature. Management experience, R&D investment, firm size, economic development and political stability are shown to be associated with greater time compression efficiency

Two-sided reputation in certification markets

M. BOUVARD, R. LEVY

Management Science

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Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Certification, Reputation, Credit rating agencies

https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2742


In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but sometimes repels low-quality sellers. As a consequence, reputational concerns may induce the certifier to reduce information quality, thus depressing welfare. The entry of a second certifier impacts reputational incentives: when sellers only solicit one certifier, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this region may expand when sellers hold multiple certifications

U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Corporate Compliance of Foreign Banks

D. RESTREPO AMARILES, M. M. WINKLER

The International Lawyer

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Départements : Droit et fiscalité, GREGHEC (CNRS)


In the last decade, the U.S. has dramatically increased the enforcement of its economic sanctions arsenal against foreign banks. While this arsenal continues to expand, legal scholarship tends to overlook one of its crucial consequences: a radical change in the compliance functions of the targeted banks. In fact, after entering into specific agreements with the U.S. government, non-U.S. banks commit to reforming their compliance functions according to U.S. standards. The depth of the relationship between the extraterritoriality of U.S. laws and banks’ compliance functions demands further inquiry. This article fills that gapby expounding how economic sanctions legislation drives developments in substantial compliance efforts by foreign banks, discussing the current economic sanctions regime and analyzing important enforcement cases. This Article concludes that, as non-U.S. banks manage the heavy burden of U.S. sanctions more deftly than before, a process of Americanization of corporate compliance is underway in the banking industry and beyond

Who are the value and growth investors?

S. BETERMIER, L. CALVET, P. SODINI

The Journal of Finance

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Départements : Finance

Mots clés : Asset pricing, value premium, household finance, portfolio allocation, human capital, factor-based investing

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2426823


This paper investigates value and growth investing in a large administrative panel of Swedish residents. We show that over the life-cycle, households progressively shift from growth to value as they become older and their balance sheets improve. Furthermore, investors with high human capital and high exposure to macroeconomic risk tilt their portfolios away from value. While several behavioral biases seem evident in the data, the patterns we uncover are overall remarkably consistent with the portfolio implications of risk-based theories of the value premium

Wholesale Price Contracts for Reliable Supply

Woonam HWANG, Nitin BAKSHI, Victor DEMIGUEL

Production and Operations Management

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Mots clés : Supplier reliability, random capacity, random yield, wholesale price contracts

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/poms.12848/full


Firms can enhance the reliability of their supply through process improvement and overproduction. In decentralized supply chains, however, these mitigating actions may be the supplier's responsibility yet are often not contractible. We show that wholesale price contracts, despite their simplicity, can perform well in inducing reliable supply, and we identify when and why they perform well. This could explain the widespread use of wholesale price contracts in business settings with unreliable supply. In particular, we investigate how the performance of wholesale price contracts depends on the interplay between the nature of supply risk and the type of procurement process. Supply risk is classified as random capacity when events such as labor strike disrupt the firm's ability to produce, or as random yield when manufacturing defects result in yield losses. The procurement process is classified as control when the buyer determines the production quantity, or as delegation when instead the supplier does. Analyzing the four possible combinations, we find that for random capacity, irrespective of the procurement process type, contract performance monotonically increases with the supplier's bargaining power; thus, wholesale price contracts perform well when the supplier is powerful. However, this monotonic trend is reversed for random yield with control: in that case, wholesale price contracts perform well when instead the buyer is powerful. For random yield with delegation, wholesale price contracts perform well when either party is powerful.


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