Articles

The “napsterization” of the European content industry: a scenario for 2005

L. RAPP

INFO, The journal of policy, regulation and strategy for telecommunications, information and media

2000, vol. 2, n°6, pp.551-572

Départements : Droit et fiscalité

Mots clés : Telecommunications industry, Scenario planning, Europe


Considers the development of the content industry in Europe by 2005, with the anticipation of new applications such as tele-education, tele-medicine, tele-detection and tele-surveillance. Examines the interplay of the various political and industrial interests involved, using the technique of “scenario-mapping” in particular

Towards a Stoic Interpretation of Controllability

Y. PESQUEUX

Management Decision

2000, n°38/1, pp.5-12

Départements : Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion


Two-player Stochastic Games I: A Reduction

N. VIEILLE

Israël Journal of Mathematics

2000, vol. 119, pp.55-91

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Two-player Stochastic Games II: The Case of Recursive Games

N. VIEILLE

Israël Journal of Mathematics

2000, vol. 119, pp.93-126

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Use of PLS Path Modeling to Estimate the European Consumer Satisfaction Index (ECSI) Model

A. de la Foye, C. Tellier, M. Bayol, M. TENENHAUS

Statistica Applicata

2000, vol. 12, n°3, pp.361-375

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision


Voir autrement le monde

A. SOLE

AGIR

mars 2000, vol. 3

http://www.societestrategie.fr/?agir=la-crise-du-politique


Vznik jazyka - Od gest po syntax

D. SHANAHAN

Vesmir

décembre 2000, n°79, pp.676-677

Départements : Langues et Cultures


You decide: controversial cases in American politics

M. MULFORD

Political Studies

juin 2000, vol. 48, n°3


Zero sum absorbing games with incomplete infor- mation on one side : Asymptotic Analysis

D. ROSENBERG

SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization

2000, vol. 39, n°1, pp.208-225

Départements : Economie et Sciences de la décision, GREGHEC (CNRS)


We prove the existence of the limit of the values of finitely repeated (resp., discounted) absorbing games with incomplete information on one side, as the number of repetitions goes to infinity (resp., the discount factor goes to zero). The main tool is the study of the Shapley operator, for which the value of the $\lambda$-discounted game is a fixed point, and of its derivative with respect to $\lambda$.


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