Séminaires de Recherche

​Size Discovery


Intervenant : Darrell Duffie

10 décembre 2015

A Tough Act to Follow: Contrast Effects in Financial Markets


Intervenant : Kelly Shue
Chicago Booth

3 décembre 2015

Status Rebellion: When Lower Status Firms Differentiate Pro Bono Reward Strategy

Management et Ressources Humaines

Intervenant : Wooseok Jung
Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University

2 décembre 2015 - T008 - De 10h45 à 12h15

Model Use in Sustainability Negotiations and Decisions

Informations Systems and Operations Management

Intervenant : Ellen Czaika
Post Doctoral Researcher , Institute for Data, Systems and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

1 décembre 2015 - HEC Paris - Campus Jouy en Josas - Bâtiment V - Salle Bernard Ramanantsoa - De 11h30 à 12h30

Sustainability negotiations and decisions require the integration of scientific information with stakeholder interests. Mathematical models help elucidate the physical world and therefore may orient the negotiators in a shared understanding of the physical world. Many researchers suggest collaborative modeling to facilitate integrating scientific information and stakeholder interests. In this thesis, I use methods that enable repeated instances of the same decision; the exploration of alternatives to model use (e.g. learning of a model’s logic, relevant information, or irrelevant information); and the exploration of alternatives to collaborative modeling (e.g. using an expert model or not using a model). This thesis comprises two studies that use serious game role-play simulations. The first study is a computer-driven role-play simulation of governmental policy creation and the second is a five-party role-play simulation to negotiate a more sustainable end-of-life for used paper coffee cups. In the first study, model users reached the Pareto Frontier—the set of non-dominated points—more readily (13%) than non-model-users (2.5%) and model users discovered the win-win nature of electricity access with higher frequency (63%) than non-model users (9%). Participants who learned of the model’s logic through presentation performed nearly as well as model users. In the second study, model use shortened the (mean) duration of the negotiation from 55 minutes to 45 minutes. Negotiating tables that co-created a model had a higher likelihood of reaching favorable agreements (44% compared to 25%). Model use did not significantly alter the value distribution among parties. Tables of negotiators used the model in two predominant manners: to test alternatives as they generated potential agreements and to verify a tentative agreement. The former resulted in higher mean table values than the latter. Together, these studies demonstrate: that mathematical models can be used in sustainability negotiations and decisions with good effect; that learning about the insights of a model is beneficial in decision making—but using a model is more beneficial; and that collaborative model building can provide better negotiation outcomes than using an expert model and can be faster than not using a model.

Indecision and the Construction of Self

Management et Ressources Humaines

Intervenant : Daniel NEWARK
University of Southern Denmark

1 décembre 2015 - T041 - De 13h45 à 15h15



Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Mark W. NELSON
Cornell University

27 novembre 2015 - HEC Paris T030 - De 14h00 à 16h00

Doing More in Less Time: How Multitasking Increases Creativity

Management et Ressources Humaines

Intervenant : Tali KAPADIA
Kenan-Flagler Business School University of North Carolina

27 novembre 2015 - T103 - De 11h00 à 12h30

Homophily and Influence: Pricing to Harness Word-of-Mouth on Social Networks


Intervenant : Peter Zubcsek
Professeur Assistant de Marketing , University of Florida

27 novembre 2015 - Bâtiment T, Salle T201 - De 13h30 à 15h00

Large-scale social platforms have enabled marketers to obtain rich data on the structure of word-of-mouth (WOM) networks and the correlation of friends’ preferences (network assortativity). We study how the similarity or difference of friends’ reservation prices for a product should affect the optimal price and advertising levels for that product. To this end, we build an analytical model of informative advertising and pricing over a social network. Connections between consumers are added in a way that allows neighbors’ preferences to be positively or negatively correlated, thereby introducing homophily or heterophily in the model. Consumers may learn about products either directly via advertising, or via WOM spread by their peers who have adopted a product. We find that in the typical scenario when blanket advertising is not affordable, firms set a price lower than the naïve optimum in order to leverage the social value of more price-sensitive customers. We also characterize the relationship between assortativity and the marketing instruments (price and advertising) of the firm, to find that either instrument may be substitutes or complements with assortativity depending on the cost of advertising relative to the market’s valuation for the product, the overall connectivity, and the assortativity of the network.

Motivating Action and Effort: Stimulating Online Reviews by Combining Financial Incentives and Social Norms

Informations Systems and Operations Management

Intervenant : Ravi Bapna
Directeur académique, Directeur de Programme , Carlson

27 novembre 2015 - HEC - Campus Jouy en Josas Bâtiment S Salle 210 - De 14h00 à 15h00

Online reviews enable consumers to learn more about products, yet a majority of products have very few reviews, and those that are provided are often brief and lack useful information. In hopes of motivating consumers to provide useful reviews, we test two influence strategies: (a) offering financial incentives – i.e., a small payment and (b) social norms, wherein we inform people about the volume of reviews authored by peers. We test the effectiveness of these strategies in two randomized experiments, one in the field, conducted in partnership with a large online clothing retailer based in China, and a second on Amazon Mechanical Turk. We find that financial incentives are more effective at getting people to write a review, but they do not lead people to expend effort, thus resulting in reviews that are not particularly useful. In contrast, social norms, while less effective at getting people to write a review, are more effective at motivating people to dedicate effort, leading to more useful reviews. Importantly, we show that the combination of financial incentives and social norms yields the greatest overall benefit, motivating both action and effort. We also provide evidence for the mechanism underlying this joint effect: the presence of a social norm provides people with a plausible rationalization for their decision to write a review as one of intrinsic goodwill, rather than as one of effort for payment. This enables us to circumvent the well-known undermining effect of financial incentives on intrinsic motivation.

The Independent and Combined Effects of External Endorsements on Equity Investments: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment

Informations Systems and Operations Management

Intervenant : Sofia BAPNA
PhD candidate Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship , Carlson School of Management

27 novembre 2015 - HEC - Campus Jouy-en-Josas Bâtiment S Salle 210 - De 15h00 à 16h00

This study employs a randomized field experiment to causally identify which signals of external endorsement are most important to equity investors in early stage firms. The three external endorsements examined are: product certification by expert intermediaries; affiliation with prominent others; and social proof, that is, others’ interest in investing in a particular venture. The study, in the context of equity crowdfunding, randomly assigns who is able to view these endorsements and their combinations to make causal inferences about their impact. I find that experienced investors who were able to view the combined product certification and prominent affiliate signals have a 72% higher likelihood of indicating an interest in investing, than those who received no signal. Similarly, experienced investors who were able to view the combined product certification and social proof signals have a 65% higher likelihood of indicating an interest in investing. This suggests that experienced investors follow others (the crowd or high status others) when they have a concrete signal of quality. In contrast, for inexperienced investors, I find that the three endorsements and their combinations are not significantly associated with interest in investing, suggesting a lack of agreement in this group about what factors identify a high potential venture.