Séminaires de Recherche

Les Nouveaux Instruments Juridiques de la gouvernance européenne

Droit et Fiscalité

Intervenant : Arnaud Van Waeyenberge
Directeur du Centre Perelman de Philosophie du Droit - Université Libre de Bruxelles

26 janvier 2012 - Campus HEC Salle 33 - De 14.00 à 15.00

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Les nouveaux instruments juridiques de la gouvernance européenne
Arnaud VAN WAEYENBERGE
Centre Perelman de philosophie du droit
Faculté de droit
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)

Ma recherche doctorale part de l’hypothèse générale selon laquelle la méthode communautaire classique serait concurrencée dans les faits par de nouveaux instruments juridiques qui, loin de constituer des initiatives isolées, participent d’un modèle alternatif de gouvernance communautaire qui la transforme en profondeur.

Afin d’identifier les caractéristiques, les contours et les nouvelles formes de normativités de ce modèle alternatif, cette recherche a adopté une approche pragmatique de l’étude droit dans la droite ligne de l’« École de Bruxelles » et étudie empiriquement et systématiquement six politiques publiques européennes au moyen d’une approche par les instruments d’action publique qui s’inspire de la démarche et des recherches effectuées par Michel Foucault sur la « gouvernementalité ».

Cette analyse nous aura permis de démontrer que la transformation de la méthode communautaire classique se constate à au moins trois niveaux. Au niveau des acteurs, on assiste à un renforcement de la place des acteurs privés et de la société civile dans les politiques publiques étudiées. La transformation de l’action publique européenne réside également dans l’utilisation abondante de nouveaux instruments d’action publique - plus techniques que politiques et plus incitatifs que contraignants - qui impliquent systématiquement une collaboration entre acteurs publics et privés à différents niveaux du processus décisionnel (coproduction normative). Enfin le mode de sanction est une « contrainte par l’image » reposant sur la figure du « mauvais élève de la classe » véhiculée principalement par des publications de classements basées sur une classification des bonnes pratiques.

Si ce nouveau modèle peut prétendre, comme nous le verrons, à une certaine légitimité ou nécessité et s’il n’apparaît pas envisageable de revenir en arrière, sa non-concordance avec le traité est problématique. En effet, ce modèle pose une série de questions relatives au manque de contrôle sur l’activité des institutions de l’Union et à la sauvegarde de l’ordre juridique constitutionnel européen. Plus précisément, l’étude de la question de la protection juridictionnelle effective et du respect du principe de l’équilibre des pouvoirs permet d’identifier un certains nombre d’écueils et de proposer des suggestions d’amélioration pragmatique du modèle décisionnel européen au regard des nouveaux instruments juridiques de la gouvernance européenne.

Un des mérites de cette approche est de mettre entre parenthèses les lignes de démarcation du type secteur public/ privé, soft law/hard law, contraignant/non-contraignant et d’être ainsi en mesure d’apporter un regard différent sur les multiples normativités qui traversent l’Union européenne. En effet, l’Union européenne constitue un laboratoire particulièrement fécond pour la théorie du droit contemporaine. Dotée d’une structure qui fait qu’elle échappe par nature aux paradigmes explicatifs des structures étatiques et internationales, elle produit des instruments qui ne répondent pas non plus à la logique juridique classique sur laquelle, pourtant, l’Union européenne fonde une part de sa légitimité. Forte de son indétermination congénitale quant à sa nature, l'Union européenne, moins chargée par l’histoire que les ordres juridiques nationaux, n'hésite pas à innover au point de constituer un véritable laboratoire normatif voire un « miroir grossissant » des transformations générales du droit au premier rang desquelles on constate le mouvement général de régression du juridique au profit de processus normalisateurs

A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Paul Pronobis
ESCP Europe Business School

19 octobre 2018 - HEC Paris - Salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


The Visual Judgment of Performance

Management et Ressources Humaines

Intervenant : Chia-Jung TSAY
UCL School of Management

5 octobre 2018 - Bernard Ramanantsoa room - De 10h00 à 11h30


Social judgments and impressions are often made on the basis of minimal information. In the domain of music, people consistently report that the most important source of information in evaluating performance is sound; nonetheless, a first set of experiments demonstrated that people actually rely on visual information when making judgments about music performance. These findings were extended through additional sets of studies elaborating on the generalizability and persistence of these effects, such as in the judgment of entrepreneurial pitch competitions, analyst forecasts of firm performance, and in service operations in the food industry. Works in progress discuss the role of expertise in decision making and implications for organizational performance.

A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Kalle Kraus
Stockholm School of Economics

14 septembre 2018 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


Disclosure and Financing Choice: PIPEs vs. SEOs

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Shiva Sivaramakrishnan
Rice University

15 juin 2018 - HEC Paris - salle X120 - De 14h00 à 16h00


Firms in competitive industries have natural incentives to avoid wide dissemination of proprietary information. We test this proprietary cost hypothesis (PCH) by examining the impact of corporate disclosure policy on a firm’s equity financing choice between Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) and Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs). PIPEs offer firms a way to share proprietary information privately with a small group of investors. We employ several concentration and competition constructs to proxy for proprietary costs, but fail to find support to this hypothesis. Consistent with the literature, our results indicate that an “urgent need for cash” explains firms’ choice of PIPEs over SEOs. We also find that firms that choose SEOs over PIPEs are characterized by higher holdings by dedicated institutions, transient institutions and quasi-indexers. However, the PCH does not receive support even after controlling for these other determinants of the financing choice. Finally, we estimate a two-stage endogenous treatment-effect model to explain discounts associated with PIPEs and SEOs. Preliminary results indicate that discounts are lower when unobservables (e.g., private information) seem to influence the choice of PIPE over SEO.

Operating Leverage, Risk Taking and Coordination Failures

Finance

Intervenant : Matthieu Bouvard
Desautels Faculty of Management

14 juin 2018 - S125 - De 14h00 à 15h15

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We study an economy with demand spillovers where firms' decisions to produce are strategic complements. Firms have access to an increasing returns to scale technology and choose their operating leverage trading off higher fixed costs for lower variable costs. Operating leverage raises the sensitivity of firms' profits to an aggregate labor productivity shock, thereby magnifying systematic risk. We show that firms take excessive risk as they do not internalize that higher operating leverage increases the likelihood of a coordination failure where output is infficiently depressed across the economy. More generally, our analysis suggests that individual risk-taking decisions aggregate into excessive output volatility in the presence of strategic complementarities among agents.

Make-and-Ally and Performance: Evidence from the Korean TV Drama Industry

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Evan Rawley
Associate Professor of Strategic Management & Entrepreneurship , Carlson School of Business- University of Minnesota

14 juin 2018 - Room #S218 - De 14h00 à 15h30


Make-and-ally governance, where integrated firms develop new products internally while simultaneously collaborating on new product development with suppliers, is becoming increasingly common in knowledge-based industries. Yet, there is little theory or evidence to explain the prevalence of this governance mode. In this paper, we propose that, when downstream commercialization is concentrated relative to upstream product development, make-and-ally governance improves market performance of knowledge-based products and facilitates value capture for the integrated firm. Using data from the Korean TV drama industry, we find qualitative and quantitative evidence that collaborative development between network companies and independent production companies improves viewership ratings of TV dramas. The results suggest that make-and-ally governance is driven partly by efficiency and partly by market power considerations.

Parent−Subsidiary Common Managers and Corporate Tax Planning

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Xin Wang
Hong Kong University

8 juin 2018 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


As an interesting but neglected governance mechanism of a firm’s subsidiaries, corporate headquarters managers often take a position in significant subsidiaries (“parent-subsidiary common manager” hereafter), either as the board member or the operations manager. These parent-subsidiary common managers have direct access to divisional information and, therefore, possess greater knowledge useful for them to identify tax opportunities and coordinate tax-motivated activities across business units. Using senior executives’ subsidiary positions disclosed in Chinese listed firms’ annual reports, we examine the impact of parent-subsidiary common managers on corporate tax planning and find a lower effective income tax rate for firms appointing common managers. Additional analyses show that the tax-avoiding effect of common managers is more pronounced for firms with more intangible assets, more related-party transactions involving subsidiaries, and more diversified business. Moreover, we find stronger effects for those common managers who take a position in economically significant subsidiaries or subsidiaries entitled to preferential tax treatments. The effect is also stronger when common managers work as operations managers of the subsidiaries. Collectively, our study is the first to analyze the appointment of parent-subsidiary common managers and to show the impact of such an appointment on corporate decisions.

The Origins and Real Effects of the Gender Gap: Evidence from CEOs’ Formative Years∗

Finance

Intervenant : Mikhail Simutin
Rotman School of Management

7 juin 2018 - T004 - De 10h00 à 12h30

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CEOs allocate more investment capital to male than female division managers. Using data from individual Census records, we find that this gender gap is driven by CEOs who grew up in male-dominated families—those where the father was the only income earner and had more education than the mother. The gender gap also increases for CEOs who attended all-male high schools and grew up in neighborhoods with greater gender inequality. The effect of gender on capital budgeting introduces frictions and erodes investment efficiency. Overall, the gender gap originates in CEO preferences developed during formative years and produces significant real effects.

Disclosure, Competition, and Learning from Asset Prices

Finance

Intervenant : Liyan Yang
Rotman School of Management

31 mai 2018 - T027 - De 14h00 à 15h15

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This paper studies the classic information-sharing problem in a duopoly setting in which firms learn information from a financial market. By disclosing information, a firm incurs a proprietary cost of losing competitive advantage to its rival firm but benefits from learning from a more informative asset market. Firms' disclosure decisions can exhibit strategic complementarity, which is strong enough to support both a disclosure equilibrium and a nondisclosure equilibrium. Allowing minimal learning from asset prices dramatically changes firms' disclosure behaviors: without learning from prices, firms do not disclose at all; but with minimal learning from prices, firms can almost fully disclose their information. Learning from asset prices benefits firms, consumers, and liquidity traders, but harms financial speculators.

Rationalizing Outcomes: Mental-Model-Guided Learning in Competitive Markets

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Anoop Menon
Assistant Professor of Management , The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

31 mai 2018 - Room #T105 - De 13h30 à 15h00


This paper explores how competitive market interactions between agents with different mental models can lead to dysfunctional learning which can, in turn, have significant implications for an agent’s performance. We build a simulation model where two agents with different mental models about their demand environment compete over many periods, with the decisions of one period leading to market outcomes that are then used to recalibrate the mental models which, in turn, are used to make the decisions in the following period. Three model variants, exploring different mental models about the demand structure, the cost structure, and the market are studied. Dysfunctional learning occurs through dynamic mechanisms involving rationalization of observations within flexible mental models and misinterpretation of observations because of poor understanding of rival mental models. These mechanisms sometimes lead to distortion of an agent’s own initially correct mental model of the demand environment and to superior relative performance by the agent with an incorrect model of that environment. The insights from the models are used to interpret the ascension of GM over Ford in the late 1920’s, the slow adoption of radial tires in the U.S., and the rise of Nirma over incumbent Hindustan Lever in the Indian detergent market.


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