Séminaires de Recherche

Accounting for Mismatch Unemployment

Economie - Sciences de la Décision

Intervenant : Thijs VAN RENS
University of Warwick

16 octobre 2012 - Campus HEC, salle t025 - De 11:45 à 13:00

Structural unemployment is due to mismatch between available jobs and workers. We formalize this concept in a simple model of a segmented labor market with search frictions within segments. Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining costs across segments generate structural unemployment. We estimate the contribution of these costs to fluctuations in US unemployment, operationalizing segments as states or industries. Most structural unemployment is due to wage bargaining costs, which are large but nevertheless contribute to little to unemployment fluctuations. Structural unemployment is as cyclical as overall unemployment and no more persistent, both in the current and in previous recessions.

Finance

Intervenant : Xavier Gabaix

13 juin 2019 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Adriano Rampini

23 mai 2019 - T105 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Luke Taylor

16 mai 2019 - T105 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Jessica Jeffers

18 avril 2019 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Emil Verner

4 avril 2019 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Niels Gormsen

28 mars 2019 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Ramona Dagostino

14 mars 2019 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


titre : TBA

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Harry Di Pei
Northwestern

12 février 2019


titre : TBA

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : François Geerolf
UCLA

18 décembre 2018


“Welfare Effects of Housing Transaction Taxes: A Quantitative Analysis with an Assignment Model” (joint work with Niku Määttänen)

Economie et Sciences de la décision

Intervenant : Marko Tervio
Aalto

13 décembre 2018 - Bâtiment T - Salle T004 - De 14h00 à 15h15


We evaluate the welfare cost of housing transaction taxes with a new assignment model based framework, where welfare effects are driven by distortions in the matching of houses and households. We calibrate the model with data from the Helsinki metropolitan region to assess the impact of a reform where we replace an ad valorem transaction tax with a revenue equivalent property tax. The aggregate welfare gain from this reform increases rapidly with the initial transaction tax rate, with the Laffer curve peaking at about 10\%. The proportion of households that lose out from the reform is nevertheless increasing in the tax rate. We compare our model-based counterfactual aggregate welfare results with welfare calculations based on reduced-form estimates from previous policy evaluation studies; they are broadly in line, despite the latter using data from different housing markets at various levels and changes of the tax rate.


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