Séminaires de Recherche

A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Paul Pronobis
ESCP Europe Business School

19 octobre 2018 - HEC Paris - Salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


Finance

Intervenant : Michael Hasler

11 octobre 2018 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


The Visual Judgment of Performance

Management et Ressources Humaines

Intervenant : Chia-Jung TSAY
UCL School of Management

5 octobre 2018 - Bernard Ramanantsoa room - De 10h00 à 11h30


Social judgments and impressions are often made on the basis of minimal information. In the domain of music, people consistently report that the most important source of information in evaluating performance is sound; nonetheless, a first set of experiments demonstrated that people actually rely on visual information when making judgments about music performance. These findings were extended through additional sets of studies elaborating on the generalizability and persistence of these effects, such as in the judgment of entrepreneurial pitch competitions, analyst forecasts of firm performance, and in service operations in the food industry. Works in progress discuss the role of expertise in decision making and implications for organizational performance.

Finance

Intervenant : Cecilia Bustamente

4 octobre 2018 - T004 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Martin Schmalz

27 septembre 2018 - T104 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Finance

Intervenant : Xavier Giroud

21 septembre 2018 - T105 - De 14h00 à 15h15


A déterminer

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Kalle Kraus
Stockholm School of Economics

14 septembre 2018 - HEC Paris - salle T004 - De 14h00 à 16h00


Finance

Intervenant : Jean-Charles Rochet

13 septembre 2018 - T105 - De 14h00 à 15h15


Disclosure and Financing Choice: PIPEs vs. SEOs

Comptabilité et Contrôle de Gestion

Intervenant : Shiva Sivaramakrishnan
Rice University

15 juin 2018 - HEC Paris - salle X120 - De 14h00 à 16h00


Firms in competitive industries have natural incentives to avoid wide dissemination of proprietary information. We test this proprietary cost hypothesis (PCH) by examining the impact of corporate disclosure policy on a firm’s equity financing choice between Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) and Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs). PIPEs offer firms a way to share proprietary information privately with a small group of investors. We employ several concentration and competition constructs to proxy for proprietary costs, but fail to find support to this hypothesis. Consistent with the literature, our results indicate that an “urgent need for cash” explains firms’ choice of PIPEs over SEOs. We also find that firms that choose SEOs over PIPEs are characterized by higher holdings by dedicated institutions, transient institutions and quasi-indexers. However, the PCH does not receive support even after controlling for these other determinants of the financing choice. Finally, we estimate a two-stage endogenous treatment-effect model to explain discounts associated with PIPEs and SEOs. Preliminary results indicate that discounts are lower when unobservables (e.g., private information) seem to influence the choice of PIPE over SEO.

Operating Leverage, Risk Taking and Coordination Failures

Finance

Intervenant : Matthieu Bouvard
Desautels Faculty of Management

14 juin 2018 - S125 - De 14h00 à 15h15

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We study an economy with demand spillovers where firms' decisions to produce are strategic complements. Firms have access to an increasing returns to scale technology and choose their operating leverage trading off higher fixed costs for lower variable costs. Operating leverage raises the sensitivity of firms' profits to an aggregate labor productivity shock, thereby magnifying systematic risk. We show that firms take excessive risk as they do not internalize that higher operating leverage increases the likelihood of a coordination failure where output is infficiently depressed across the economy. More generally, our analysis suggests that individual risk-taking decisions aggregate into excessive output volatility in the presence of strategic complementarities among agents.


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