Articles scientifiques

Asymmetric Performance: The Market Share Impact of Scale and Link Alliances in the Global Auto Industry

P. DUSSAUGE, B. GARRETTE, W. Mitchell

Strategic Management Journal

juillet 2004, vol. 25, n°7, pp.701-711

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


This study investigates how participating in strategic alliances with rivals affects the relative competitive positions of the partner firms. The paper builds on studies that show significant differences in the outcomes of scale and link alliances. The study argues that the more asymmetric outcomes of link alliances translate into greater changes in the relative market shares of the partner firms, due to unbalanced opportunities for inter-partner learning and learning by doing. We find support for this argument by examining 135 alliances among competing firms in the global automobile industry, from 1966 to 1995

Better late than never: A study of late entrants in household electrical equipment

J. Shamsie, C. C. PHELPS, J. Kuperman

Strategic Management Journal

janvier 2004, vol. 25, n°1, pp.69-84

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise


Abstract: Studies on entry timing have largely attempted to determine the benefits that early entrants can obtain over subsequent entrants. Given that a large number of firms enter late in the development of markets, it is surprising that little research has examined the performance differences among late entrants. In this paper, we focus exclusively on late movers and examine the extent to which their post-entry performance is related to their resources, strategic positioning and market conditions around the time of entry. We analyze 165 late entrants in household electrical equipment markets and find that while market entry conditions don't significantly impact late movers' performance, their resources and strategic positioning at the time of entry do effect their subsequent performance. Keywords: Entry timing, late movers, resource based view, strategic positioning

Fading Legitimacies in Organized Contexts

R. DURAND, J. McGuire

International Studies of Management and Organization

hiver 2004, vol. 34, n°4, pp.3-6

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Key Success Factors for Technological Entrepreneurs R&D Projects

T. B. ASTEBRO

IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management

2004, vol. 51, n°3, pp.314-321

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1506331


The impact of 36 innovation, technology, and market characteristics on the probability that early stage R&D projects will reach the market is examined. Analysis is based on data from 561 R&D projects developed by technological entrepreneurs. Four characteristics stand out as most predictive: expected profitability, technological opportunity, development risk, and appropriability conditions. These predict future commercial success well with an out-of-sample accuracy of 80.9 %. This model performs better than R&D managers' and venture capital's (VC's) forecasts of success and has the potential to be used as a screening tool for early stage R&D investment reviews by, for example, VCs. Implications for both research and practice are discussed.

La régulation nationale des télécommunications : une lecture économique néo-institutionnelle

D. RICCARDI-BENIN, B. QUÉLIN

Revue Française d'Administration Publique

janvier 2004, n°1/2004 (n°109), pp.65-81

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Le recours à l'analyse économique institutionnelle permet d'examiner la nature et les limites des régulations des industries de réseau mises en place en Europe à un niveau national. Il conduit à souligner le mauvais ajustement entre ce niveau de régulation et l'environnement institutionnel et les problèmes qui en découlent. Afin d'y remédier, il paraît nécessaire de construire, au niveau supra-national, des autorités de régulation communautaires mieux à même d'harmoniser les cadres réglementaires et la fluidité des marchés. L'émergence de telles autorités réduirait fortement aussi les coûts de transaction et limiterait les asymétries d'information dont savent profiter les principaux opérateurs historiques.


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